Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building\u27 by Carman, Steven W.
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the 
‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
Steven W. Carman 
California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo 
June 2013 
Statement of Disclaimer 
 
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as 
fulfillment of the course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course 
requirements does not imply technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this 
report is done at the risk of the user. These risks may include, but may not be limited to, 
catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of patent or copyright laws. California 
Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot be held liable for any use or 
misuse of the project. 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
iii 
Abstract 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Science in 
Fire Protection Engineering, a prescriptive and performance-based analysis was 
performed on a building housing the Center for the Arts.  The building was constructed in 
1947 in California as an automobile dealership and repair shop under the provisions of 
the then-controlling Uniform Building Code.  It subsequently underwent several 
occupancy changes and has since served as a beauty school, gymnastics center, and 
currently as a performing and visual arts center. 
Prescriptive analyses were conducted based primarily upon the provisions of the 
2010 California Building and Fire Codes, and the 2009 edition of NFPA 101, Life Safety 
Code.  Where required, other NFPA codes such as the 2010 editions of NFPA 13, 
Automatic Sprinkler Systems Handbook and NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and 
Signaling Code were also referenced. 
The overall fire protection system was divided into subsystems and then 
examined.  Subsystems included those involving safe egress, fire detection and 
notification, water-based suppression and structural fire protection.  Results are provided 
with respect to each. 
The performance based analyses focused primarily upon the ability of occupants 
to safely escape the building after the onset of various fire events.   The computer fire 
model, “Fire Dynamics Simulator”, was used to estimate the available safe egress times 
of occupants under various fire scenarios.   The required times needed for safe egress 
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were determined based upon calculation methods set forth in the Society of Fire 
Protection Engineering Handbook.  Available and required safe egress times were 
compared for each of the different fire scenarios. 
Where deficiencies in fire protection systems were noted in the existing building 
layout and arrangements, recommendations for improvements are provided herein.  It 
should be noted that these recommendations are considered a best effort and are 
presumed technically valid.  Even so, any changes or upgrades made based upon these 
recommendations must still be reviewed and approved by a licensed professional fire 
protection engineer and the local authority having jurisdiction. 
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Project Scope 
Background 
Fire protection analyses of buildings are  
performed to evaluate the level of protection from fire afforded to both life and property.  
Such protection may come from both passive and active systems associated with a 
particular facility as well as through proper procedures.  Complete fire safety is extremely 
difficult if not impossible to design into a building and its operations since fire risk 
cannot be completely eliminated.   It is the responsibility of building stakeholders such as 
owners and occupants as well as designers, builders and officials having jurisdiction to 
ensure fire safety objectives for a particular facility are established and pursued to 
provide a minimum acceptable level of safety of life and property from fire as well as to 
prepare for continuity of operations in the event of a fire. 
 
Prescriptive Based Analysis 
Prescriptive or specification-oriented codes and regulations such as building and 
fire codes exist to provide guidance for design and operational factors that have been 
shown to offer an acceptable level of safety.  Such codes have been developed over time 
and changes to their contents regularly occur in response to changes in building materials, 
procedures and designs as well as to fire incidents shown to require modifications.   
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Further, changes in building designs, occupancies and uses over time often lead to 
modifications to building and fire protection systems required by applicable codes. 
This prescriptive-based analysis is intended to examine the current state of fire 
protection to persons and property associated with the Center for the Arts.   Changes in 
the building, its occupancy and its operation since being built almost 60 years ago have 
been outpaced by changes to the codes that existed at the time of construction.  
Evaluation of the current state of fire protection will afford the owners and operators a 
look at the current risks to life and property as well as the protections afforded to 
occupants, clients and visitors.  It will also compare facets of the existing levels of 
protection with those required of new buildings. 
The state of fire protection at the Center for the Arts was evaluated against several 
prescriptive codes.  Those include:  the 2010 editions of the California Building Code 
(CBC) and the California Fire Code (CFC); the 2009 edition of NFPA 101, the Life 
Safety Code (LSC); the 2010 edition of NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of 
Sprinkler Systems; and the 2010 edition of NFPA 72, the National Fire Alarm and 
Signaling Code.  In the analyses discussed below, other codes or standards will also be 
referenced and identified as to their specific applications. 
Readers are cautioned not to consider the extent of this evaluation as all-inclusive 
in its findings and recommendations but more of an overall summary of present 
conditions. Limitations in resources and time available preclude a complete evaluation of 
all aspects of the total fire safety picture. 
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Performance Based Analysis 
In examining the Center for the Arts in terms of a performance-based analysis, 
several design fires were devised and considered that represent realistic and possible fire 
scenarios that might be anticipated to occur in the building.  The extent of these fires and 
their threat to life and property have been evaluated in terms of the existing building and 
fire protection systems design.  While a performance based analysis for a new building 
design is more comprehensive, the design fires used to examine the Center for the Arts 
address existing conditions and their effect on occupants’ tenability under various fire 
scenarios.    Computer fire modeling was used to estimate conditions that would affect 
that tenability. 
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Prescriptive Analysis 
Building Description 
 
The Center for the Arts is a privately owned and operated performing arts center.  
It occupies a building completed in 1947 and built of Type III construction, commonly 
referred to as “Ordinary Construction”. The structure’s original function was quite 
different that its current use.  From 1947 until 1984 it served as an automobile dealership 
and repair facility.   It consisted of an indoor showroom at the south, offices above, and a 
mechanical repair facility to the north. Auto painting and body-shop repair spaces were 
added years later to the north. 
The Center for the Arts is presently classified under the Life Safety Code (LSC) 
as a mixed occupancy building with specific occupancies for assembly, business and 
storage.  It contains two theaters, one with 170 fixed and several portable seats and the 
other, a smaller day-theater known as the “Off Center Stage” with about 60 portable 
seats. 
The building is oriented in a north-south direction and measures approximately 
262 feet long and 72 feet wide at its limits.  It is built on a sloping hillside that rises to the 
west.  A perimeter foundation with fill supports the concrete slab floor.  The front of the 
building opens onto a public street at the south.  The northern, narrower portion of the 
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building opens to a private parking lot at the north and west of the property that in turn 
borders and empties onto a public street to the north. 
 
Figure 1:  Front (south) side of the Center for the Arts 
 
The building consists of two floors in the front (south), a tall, single-story space in 
the middle section, and a shorter, single story wing further to the rear (north).  The total 
estimated floor space is approximately 19,000 square feet with approximately 13,900 of 
that being on the ground floor.  There are no known existing plans for the building.   
Measurements referred to herein are based on estimations made from direct observation. 
The first floor at the front of the building houses an art gallery, theater lobby and 
gathering place, storage spaces, dressing rooms, restrooms and offices. The second floor 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
6 
at the front of the building houses an independently operated dance studio, associated 
offices, dressing room and a sound studio. 
 
Figure 2:  Aerial view of the Center for the Arts (Google, 2013).  North is to the left. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Sketch of building layout from southwest with roof shown in place 
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Figure 4:  Sketch of building layout viewed from northwest with roof shown in place 
 
The original two-story portion of the building at the front (southern) measures 
approximately 72 feet wide by 65 feet deep. Each of the two floors there is about 12 feet 
high and fitted with 8-foot high drop ceilings mounted in a metal “t-bar” grid framework.  
Exterior walls are concrete-filled, masonry block with some large display windows in the 
front.  Interior walls are primarily gypsum board over a wooden framework. 
North of the front, two-story portion of the building and separated by a 27-foot 
high wood-framed wall is single-story section housing the main theater that measures 
approximately 72 feet by 75 feet.  It is open to the 27-foot high peak of the arched truss 
roof. Sidewalls at the base of the roof are about 16 foot high.  An open, elevated platform 
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of slightly more than 1,000 square feet in the west portion of the theater serves as a stage.   
Though used as a stage, the platform it is not so classified by Section 410 of the 
California Building Code since it has “…no overhead hanging curtains, drops, scenery or 
stage effects other than lighting and sound.”  A stage on the other hand is defined as 
having “…overhead hanging curtains, drops, scenery or stage effects other than lighting 
and sound.”  The main floor of the theater is of a slightly elevated wood design likely 
installed for cushioning when the building housed a gymnasium in that space. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Main theater platform viewed from the fixed seating area.  Note the lack of 
overhead curtains leading to the designation as a platform. 
 
Much of the eastern half of the main theater is filled by 170 fixed, loge-type seats 
mounted to an enclosed, stepped, wooden framework.   The highest level of seating is 
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about 6 feet above the main floor. Just north of the seating area is a part-time lounge 
complete with a small bar to serve light food and drink. 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Fixed seating in the main theater and portable seats in front.  Arched roof 
trusses are visible as well as elevated theatrical lighting fixtures. 
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Figure 7:  Lounge area north of fixed seating in main theater 
 
Two, 12-foot high storage areas/rooms arranged one on top of the other are 
located immediately north of the platform/stage and occupy the northwest corner of the 
main theater space.   Access to the upper storage is from the north end of the platform 
while the lower storage is entered through a garage-door sized opening immediately west 
of the lounge area.  At the northeast corner of the main theater space are two more 
storage rooms that extend approximately fifteen feet north of the north wall of the theater 
and mark the original northern extent of the building. 
The newer, single-story wing north of the main theater is attached to the eastern 
half of the original structure. This wing measures about 30 feet east-west as compared to 
the original building’s 72-foot width. It contains four primary spaces that serve as a 
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smaller theater, lobby, dressing and accessory rooms and storage. A bow-truss roof tops 
this part of the building.  The peak of the roof rises to about 16 feet.  Sidewalls are about 
11 feet high.  There are no direct connections for interior passage between the original 
building and the newer wing to the north. Access to the northern wing is only through 
doors in the west exterior wall. 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  North wing of the Center for the Arts viewed to the southeast 
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Figure 9:  Exploded sketch of building viewed from southwest 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Exploded sketch of building viewed from northwest 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Rear theater audience seating viewed from the platform/stage 
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Egress 
Despite all the attempts made to prevent fires in buildings, it is unrealistic to 
believe complete fire safety can be fully achieved in public buildings since the risk of fire 
can never be eliminated.  As a result, a major part of fire prevention efforts is the 
application of minimum criteria for egress provisions to allow and foster the timely 
escape of occupants from buildings in the event of a fire.  Because of the obvious 
importance of this aspect of fire prevention, egress analysis of the Center for the Arts is 
the first topic to be discussed. 
Egress analysis includes examination of a wide array of factors including the type 
and numbers of people occupying a building, the uses in which a building might be 
expected to be employed, the number, layout and access to exits from a building and 
factors that might inhibit the prompt and safe evacuation of occupants through those 
exits.  Each of these topics is addressed below as they apply to the Center for the Arts.  
Lastly, a specific analysis of the Center for the Arts layout is offered in terms of 
determining the required safe egress time (RSET).   That required time needed to safely 
exit will subsequently be compared with the available safe egress time (ASET) 
determined in the performance based analysis by evaluating potential fire scenarios.   
  
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
15 
Occupancy 
Section 302 of the 2010 edition of the California Building Code (CBC) classifies 
building occupancy based upon the use of a structure.  In instances where there are 
multiple uses, building are classified by Section 508 of the CBC as having multiple 
occupancies. 
The occupancy classifications of the Center for the Arts have changed over time.  
Presently, the building meets the definition of a multi-occupancy structure.  The various 
classifications assigned as part of this analysis include: Assembly (Group A-1) for the 
theaters, lobbies/waiting areas, art gallery and dance studios; Business (Group B) for 
rooms and areas used for business administration of the facilities; and Storage (Group S-
1) for those spaces used to store the various equipment, props and theatrical equipment 
needed to support various productions and dance studio operations. 
The 2009 edition of the Life Safety Code also specifies occupancy classifications 
in addition to those set forth in the CBC.   Section 6.1.2.1 defines Assembly occupancy as 
covering a building or space in which 50 or more persons gather for amusement including 
in theaters.   Section 6.1.11.1 defines Business occupancies as used for the transaction of 
business other than mercantile.  Section 6.1.13.1 defines Storage occupancy as an 
occupancy used primarily for the storage or sheltering of goods, merchandise, products, 
or vehicles.  Each of these generally agrees with the CBC in the broad classifications that 
have been assigned to spaces in the Center for the Arts although sub-classifications such 
as A-1 or S-1 are not included. 
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The Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) over the Center for the Arts are the 
local city fire and building departments.  Should questions arise as to classifications of 
various spaces in the building, Section 6.1.1 of the Life Safety Code assigns the AHJ as 
responsible for determining whether the occupancy has been correctly classified. 
The distributions of the various occupancy classifications throughout the building 
are shown in Figures 12 through 14.  In each of the figures, North is to the left.  Figure 12 
depicts a plan view of the first floor at the front of the building.  Figure 13 shows the 
northern wing.  Figure 14 is for the second floor of the building.  The color legend shown 
in Table 1 shows the occupancy classifications in terms of colors displayed in the 
occupancy diagrams. 
 
Compartment Occupancy Key 
 
Assembly 
 
Business 
 
Storage 
 
Exit Stairs 
 
Table 1:  Compartment Occupancy Key 
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Figure 12:  Occupancy Classification of the Front First Floor Spaces.  North is depicted 
towards the left. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Approximate Building Areas by Occupancy Classification 
 
 
 
 
Occupancy Areas (ft2) by Classification 
 Occupancy Classification 
Area of Building Business Assembly Storage 
Front Office / Lobby / 
Art Gallery 
 
1,950 
 
2,410 
 
0 
Main Theater / 
Platform/Stage 
 
0 
 
4,450 
 
1,550 
North (Rear) Wing 560 1,950 1,140 
Second Floor 990 2,975 270 
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Figure 13:  Occupancy Classification of the Rear First Floor Spaces.  North is depicted 
towards the left. 
 
Figure 14:  Occupancy Classification of the Second Floor Spaces.  North is depicted 
towards the left. 
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The layout of exits in the Center for the Arts building was established long before 
the current occupancy usage began.  When the occupancy of the building shifted in about 
2002 to that currently in use, the AHJ did not require significant changes as to the 
number or arrangement of exits.  As a result, in some instances, the remoteness and 
location of exits today do not meet the prescriptive code requirements of either the CBC, 
CFC or the LSC.  Whether a formal waiver was granted by the AHJ is uncertain.   Present 
day AHJ staff members are aware of the layout of the exits. 
 
Occupancy Load 
The building’s overall occupancy load was calculated using Table 7.3.1.2 of the 
Life Safety Code based upon occupancy classifications assigned individual spaces.  
Though the building is listed as “multiple-occupancy”, its primarily use throughout is 
Assembly (A-1).  The sizes and occupancy classifications of the various spaces are 
detailed in Table 2 and specified in greater detail in Appendix A. 
The building’s maximum occupancy was determined to be 1,061 persons.  That 
consists of 849 persons on the ground floor and 211 on the second floor.  For calculation 
purposes, the ground floor occupancy was subdivided into three areas including, 1) the 
art gallery, 2) the main theater, front lobby and business areas, and 3) the rear theater, 
rear lobby and rear storage rooms.  Primary occupancy loading was determined in 
accordance with the factors set forth in Table 7.3.1.2 of the LSC.  Minor exceptions were 
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made specifically as related to restroom capacity (which is not detailed in the LSC) and 
areas to the front and sides of the main theater fixed seating. 
Some modifications to the maximum occupancy load might be called for based 
upon the normal Center for the Arts’ practices.  Those modifications relate to the fact that 
when the main theater is in use for productions, the areas to the front and side of the fixed 
theater seating are, as a matter of practice either void of people or not filled to capacity.  
Even so, for purposes of this analysis, each of those areas were considered at maximum 
capacity as per the LSC to provide a more conservative estimate of required safe egress 
time (RSET). 
 
 
Adequacy of Exits 
The overall adequacy of the number of exits and means of egress was evaluated 
using the general provisions of Sections 7.3 through 7.10 of the LSC as well as Chapter 
10 of both the CBC and the CFC.  Since the requirements of each of these codes are 
similar with regards to egress, only the requirements of the LSC will be discussed herein. 
 
Required Number of Exits 
The building, due to its varying occupancy types was evaluated in terms of egress 
capacity both for specific sections as well as overall.  The maximum occupancy load was 
calculated as 1,061.  Section 7.4.1.2 of the Life Safety Code (2009 edition) requires a 
building with an occupancy load of more than 1,000 to have 4 exits.  This building, 
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because of its somewhat complex layout has 7 exit discharge doors.  With regards to 
number of exits alone, the building design adequately complies with this mandate of the 
LSC.  The layout of exits and travel paths to those exits are presented in Figures 86 
through 92 in Appendix B. 
 
Exit Access Apart from Passing Through Intervening Rooms 
Section 7.5.1.2 of the LSC states, “Corridors shall provide exit access without 
passing through intervening rooms other than corridors, lobbies, and other spaces 
permitted to be open to the corridor unless otherwise provided in 7.5.1.2.1 and 7.5.1.2.2.”  
The first of these two exceptions allow for existing buildings to continue using passage 
through a room to access an exit if approved by the AHJ, if the travel path is marked, 
doors along the path are in compliance with other exit requirements and there is no other 
prohibition. 
In the Center for the Arts, some of the exit paths pass through other rooms.  Even 
so, it appears that such a layout is generally in compliance with the provisions set forth in 
Section 7.5.1.2.1 of the LSC.  The building layout also complies with Section 7.5.1.6, 
which allows for continued use of existing passages to pass through other rooms if 
approved by the AHJ. 
Access to the first floor exit from the front lobby and half of the main theater is 
adequate if people use both the main entry door and the art gallery exit door.  The 
occupant load of 378 (for half of the main theater and all of the front lobby) is excessive 
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for the 360-person capacity served by just the 72-inch wide main lobby door.  This extra 
load is adequately handled however if some of the people divert into and through the art 
gallery and used the exit discharge door there. The location of the art gallery door does 
not strictly meet the LSC provisions with regard to remoteness of exits since the art 
gallery exit and main exit are not adequately separated as required by Section 7.5.1.3.2 of 
the LSC.  That provision requires they be located at a distance from one another of not 
less than one-half the diagonal dimension of the area to be served.  To meet this 
requirement, the two doors would have to be about 60 feet apart.  They are in fact about 
12 feet from each other. 
The second floor has two exits doors.  The first is the normal entrance and exit 
located at street level at the southeast corner of the building that is used by most people.  
A second exit, an emergency exit located at the north wall of the second floor does not 
lead directly out of the building but instead passes into and through the main theater.  
Stairs for this exit lead down to the south edge of the platform/stage.  There, evacuees can 
choose to go directly to the theater’s north exit door that discharges into the rear parking 
area or use one of two paths to go the main exit door to the south.  The second floor rear 
exit stairs terminate adjacent to a door to the front dressing room.  That dressing room in 
turn opens into the front lobby. Evacuees could also leave the platform/stage and use the 
south exit from the theater into the front lobby and out the front of the building that way. 
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Remoteness of Exits 
The remoteness requirements for exits set forth in Sections 7.5.1.3.1 and 7.5.1.3.2 
of the LSC are satisfied in only part of the Center for the Arts building.  The main theater 
has exits in the north and south walls.  Those doors are sufficiently distant from each 
other.  The north exit discharges to a parking lot at the north exterior of the building.  The 
south exit leads into the front lobby.  That lobby has a single main exit discharge in the 
south wall  that empties onto a public street.   Section 7.5.1.6 of the LSC states, “Exit 
access from rooms or spaces shall be permitted to be through adjoining or intervening 
rooms or areas, provided that such rooms or areas are accessory to the area served. 
Foyers, lobbies, and reception rooms constructed as required for corridors shall not be 
construed as intervening rooms.”  Accordingly, the south door of the theater is permitted 
to empty into the front lobby. 
As mentioned earlier, the exit doors in the front lobby do not meet the remoteness 
requirement.  There are two ways out of this room besides the main entry.  One requires 
going into and through the adjoining art gallery to an exit that discharges onto a public 
street.  The interior door to the art gallery is only about five feet away from the main exit.  
The second path out of the main lobby other than through the main exit would be going 
north through the door into the main theater.  If the people evacuating the building 
originated in the theater, then clearly the theater door would be an entrance into the front 
lobby and not an exit out of it. 
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Figure 15:  The main exit from the front lobby (shown centered) is only steps away from 
the entry to the art gallery (show behind the easel) that leads to another exit. 
 
The door between the front lobby and the theater would qualify as a final exit 
from either room if the separating wall between them met the requirements for a 
horizontal exit.  Currently it does not. 
Section 3.3.75.1 of the LSC defines a horizontal exit as, “A way of passage from 
one building to an area of refuge in another building on approximately the same level, or 
a way of passage through or around a fire barrier to an area of refuge on approximately 
the same level in the same building that affords safety from fire and smoke originating 
from the area of incidence and areas communicating therewith.”  The wall separating the 
main theater from the front lobby (and from the second floor) does not meet the fire 
resistance requirements of a fire barrier.  First, the 72-inch wide door between the theater 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
25 
and the front lobby is not a fire-rated door.  Also, there are several non-sealed 
penetrations at various levels including several HVAC ducting runs. 
 
 
Figure 16:  The door between the front lobby and the main theater.  The non fire-rated 
door plus wall penetrations prevent use of this passage as a horizontal exit. 
 
Exit remoteness requirements are likely not met in the rear theater either.   While 
the distance between two openings that could be used as exits is sufficient, most theater 
occupants will likely only be aware of one of them.   The main 72-inch wide exit in the 
west wall opens from the theater into a parking lot and is clearly visible.  A 36-inch 
doorway located 30 feet north behind the stage is not readily apparent from audience 
seating.  That doorway leads from behind the platform/stage and into and through the 
sprinkler control room, which in turn opens to the exterior.  Because stage sets are 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
26 
usually positioned between that doorway and the audience blocking its view, most people 
would be unaware it exists.   Section 7.5.1.1 of the LSC requires that, “Exits shall be 
located and exit access shall be arranged so that exits are readily accessible at all times.”  
While these two exits are separated by more than half of the 55 foot diagonal 
measurement of the rear theater, until both doors are clearly visible at all times, the exit 
arrangement in the room is deficient. 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  A 36-inch doorway leading to an exit in the sprinkler control room is located 
behind the platform/stage and is neither clearly marked nor readily accessible. 
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Figure 18:  16 feet beyond the main exit (at the right) is an exit hallway to the rear lobby.   
Each requires travel past the edge of the seating through a 52-inch wide walkway. 
 
A third exit also leads out of the rear theater.  A 36-inch hallway behind the 
seating and south of the theater’s main exit connects to the rear lobby.  The entrance to 
the hallway is about 16 feet away from the theater’s primary exit.   If the main exit is 
blocked by fire or an obstruction, reaching the hallway would be very difficult.  The 
second exit behind the stage that leads into and through the sprinkler control room would 
be the only alternative egress path. 
On the second floor, remoteness requirements are met both in individual rooms as 
well as for the two exits from the floor.   The main exit leads down stairs and discharges 
on a public street.  A second, emergency exit passes through a fire door in the north wall 
and to an open staircase that leads down to the south edge of the main platform/stage.  
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Further exit from there is either through a door into the front dressing room and then onto 
the front lobby or into the main theater and through one of its two theater exits.  Although 
these interior stairs to the main theater allow an alternate path out of the second floor, 
because of their location high in the main theater, they would be almost immediately 
subject to smoke conditions and unusable if a fire was burning in the theater. 
If the wall between the main theater and the second floor was a qualifying firewall 
as defined in Section 3.3.75.1 of the LSC for a horizontal exit, the rear stairs might be an 
adequate exit.  Currently however, that is not the situation.  In order for the stairs to 
comply with the prescriptive requirements of the LSC, they would have to either enter a 
smoke proof enclosure inside the theater or a separating wall would have to be 
constructed to qualify that door as a horizontal exit.  The rear exit door from the second 
floor currently is a fire rated door. 
 
Dead Ends 
Provisions related to dead-end travel are set forth in Table A.7.6 of the LSC.   For 
both new and existing assembly occupancies, regardless of whether or not they are 
sprinklered, the limit for dead end travel is 20 feet.  The only dead ends in the front lobby 
could be entered either by moving into the hall leading towards the bathrooms or entering 
the business office from the main entrance lobby foyer.   The bathroom path extends less 
than 20 feet from the main lobby and does not violate the dead end provision.  Someone 
walking into and through the office however could travel more than 20 feet before 
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reaching a dead end, forcing them to turn around.  This path is technically in violation of 
the 20-foot long dead end limit.  Since the main exit is a glass double door in a glass wall 
however, it seems unlikely anyone leaving the building would instead bypass the exit 
door by making a sharp left turn and entering the office rather than just continuing 
straight ahead through the main exit door only 4 feet away. 
 
 
Figure 19:  Dead end hallway from front lobby leading to restrooms. 
 
In the main theater, a dead end path lies alongside the south side of the fixed 
seating, but as with the office scenario, the possibility of people traveling that path seems 
remote.  To enter that dead end, one would have to walk past the adjacent exit door.  It 
seems unlikely anyone would pass immediately next to the exit door without noticing it.  
Since the theater ceiling height is 27 feet high at the peak and since it is sprinklered, 
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smoke levels would likely remain above the door for a long enough period after the onset 
of a fire so the first people moving to the exit would not bypass the door without seeing 
it.  If they did however, the distance they might travel before having to turn around would 
be approximately 20 feet.  During each of the assessment visits to the Center for the Arts, 
the rear portion of that pathway was blocked by chair storage usually making the dead 
end distance less than 20 feet. 
Another possible dead end path in the theater would involve travel towards the 
bar at the north of the fixed seating area.  Like the previous mentioned path at the south 
end of the fixed seating, turning towards the bar seems an unlikely choice.  Normal exit 
flow to the north would have to be interrupted by a sharp turn to the east.  Should that 
happen, the distance to the east wall dead end would be approximately 36 feet. 
On the second floor, the only potential dead end would be leaving Dance Studio 3 
towards the exit stairs to the exterior and entering a short walkway leading to the storage 
room.  The walkway is adjacent to the exit stairs.  Both paths initially lead to the east.   
The dead end distance involved is less than 10 feet. 
 
Travel Distance Limit 
Travel distance limits are prescribed in Table A.7.6 of the LSC.  The travel 
distance limit of 250 feet for sprinklered buildings is easily met throughout the Center for 
the Arts.  The entire structure is approximately 262 feet long and there is no means by 
which one could travel completely inside the building over that entire distance. 
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On the second floor, exceeding the travel distance limits is not an issue.  Egress 
through the main exit to the exterior of the building involves a maximum distance of 
about 100 feet.  If one exited through the rear of the second floor into the main theater 
below, then once on the ground floor, the travel distance to either the rear or front exits 
would be approximately 100 feet.  Even considering the longest possible second floor 
path in addition to the remaining distance on the ground floor, the overall travel path 
remains well below the allowable 250 feet. 
 
Discharge from Exits 
All paths to exits on the first floor lead directly to exit discharges from the 
building.  From the second floor, the emergency exit first leads into the main theater 
where paths to first floor exit discharges are located.  Neither of the second floor exits 
require a change in direction to head in an upward direction once downward travel 
commences. 
The three exits at the front of the building, in the art gallery, the main lobby and 
the second floor stairs each discharge directly to a public sidewalk.  That sidewalk allows 
movement away from the building in either direction.  At the rear, exits open at a large 
parking lot owned by the Center for the Arts, which in turn connects to a public street and 
sidewalk and allows for movement away from the building. 
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Illumination of Means of Egress 
During musical and stage productions, both theaters are typically darkened with 
only dim theater lighting showing.  All of the exits out of the main theater are lit with 
standard, interior backlit green illumination signs marked "EXIT".  The main exit from 
the rear theater is also clearly marked in the same manner.  Other exits including those in 
the main and rear lobbies, the art gallery, and those from the second floor are similarly 
marked.  Each “EXIT” sign has battery backup systems that are tested regularly.  
Packaged with the signs are dual floodlights that also have emergency battery power.  
These signs are mounted directly above each exit, no more than a foot above the top of 
the 80-inch high doors in accordance with Section 7.10.1.9 of the LSC.  The doorway 
behind the rear stage leading into the sprinkler control room is the only exit not marked 
with an “EXIT” sign. 
The main theater fixed seating has rows of flexible tube lights with LED lighting 
that mark the exit pathways out of the seating area and onto the main floor which then 
leads to exits marked with lighted signs.   Similarly, the railing along the stairs from the 
second floor into the theater is also marked with LED lighting. 
 
Interior Finishes 
The requirements for interior finish of buildings are found in section 10.2 of the 
LSC.  In addition to describing the various testing methods allowed for testing finishes, 
multiple finish classifications are also listed. 
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Interior finish requirements set forth in A.10.2.2 of the LSC call for all exits in an 
assembly occupancy to meet interior finish Class A materials.   Exit access corridors and 
most other spaces must meet Class A or B.  The Center for the Arts is sprinklered 
throughout.  Accordingly in any area where Class B finish materials are called for, Class 
C materials suffice.  Likewise, because of the sprinklers, where Class A materials are 
called out, Class B materials will suffice in their place.  Section 13.3.3.3 of the LSC 
requires that in existing buildings with general assembly areas having occupant loads of 
more than 300, interior wall and ceiling finish materials shall also be rated Class A or 
Class B.  These classifications are obtained through testing using either the ASTM E84 
“Steiner Tunnel” test or ANSI/UL 723 test. 
The interior ceiling finish throughout the main and rear theaters in the Center for 
the Arts and much of the second floor dance studios poses a serious concern in this 
regard.  Ceilings in these areas are lined with exposed insulation affixed to the underside 
of the roof.  The facing of the insulation on the exposed side is a paper-like material.  In 
each of the theaters, this facing has been painted black to reduce light reflection. 
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Figure 20:  Exposed, painted, paper-like insulation facing on the underside of the entire 
main theater ceiling 
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Figure 21:  Close up view of exposed, paper-like insulation facing under the main theater 
ceiling.  Here it is shown cut where penetrated by sprinkler piping. 
 
 
Figure 22:  Similar exposed, insulation facing on the underside of rear theater ceiling 
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Figure 23:  Exposed, insulation facing on the underside of the ceiling on the second floor.  
It is unknown if white is the material’s original color or if it also has been painted. 
 
Center for the Arts personnel were unaware whether the exposed ceiling finish 
throughout the building had been tested for flame spread and smoke generation in 
accordance with the ASTM E-84 or ANSI/UL 723 tests or if it was ever assigned an 
interior finish classification.  A simple, open flame test of the insulation facing was 
conducted by Center for the Arts personnel.  A small section of the painted, paper-like 
facing was exposed to an open flame of a cigarette lighter.  The material readily ignited.  
While such a test is insufficient to assign a flame spread rating, it clearly shows the need 
to have the material properly tested at the soonest opportunity.  If it does not achieve at 
least a Class B rating as required by 13.3.3.3, prompt, remedial measures should be taken 
to either treat, remove or cover the exposed insulation facing. 
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Another potential fire safety issue with interior finish is the flammability of the 
vertical hanging curtains/sound dampening cloth panels located at each side and the rear 
of the main platform/stage.  Section 10.3.1 of the LSC states, “Where required by the 
applicable provisions of this Code, draperies, curtains, and other similar loosely hanging 
furnishings and decorations shall meet the flame propagation performance criteria 
contained in NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of 
Textiles and Films.”    Section 13.7.4.1 of the LSC governing existing assembly 
occupancies states, “Fabrics and films used for decorative purposes, all draperies and 
curtains, and similar furnishings shall be in accordance with the provisions of 10.3.1.”  
Section 806.1 of the CBC states that in assembly occupancies, “…curtains, draperies, 
hangings and other decorative materials suspended from walls or ceilings shall meet the 
flame propagation performance criteria of NFPA 701 … or be noncombustible.”  These 
sections clearly require that the curtains in the Center for the Arts’ theater must be or 
have been tested and meet related flame propagation standards. 
The NFPA 701 tests involve applying a burner flame to a vertically positioned 
sample of a material (such as the curtains) for a specified time. Upon removal of the 
flame, the sample must self-extinguish and must not have charred beyond a specified 
distance in order to pass the test. 
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Figure 24:  Main theater curtains immediately adjacent to the second floor exit stairs 
 
Though there are anecdotal reports that the Center for the Arts’ curtains may have 
been treated with fire retardant materials, no known documentation was found showing 
evidence they had undergone NFPA 701 flame propagation testing.  Curtains that do not 
pass such a test could, if ignited, pose a danger not only to the actors/stagehands on or 
near the platform/stage but also to the audience throughout the main theater.   Non-fire-
resistant curtains would also present an extreme threat to occupants of the second floor 
who might be forced to use the rear, emergency exit stairs.  Those stairs discharge to the 
south edge of the stage immediately adjacent to the curtain panels. 
The Center for the Arts’ exterior walls are painted, concrete block.  Flooring 
generally consists of hardwood panels mounted over a concrete underlayment.  Interior 
walls are typically gypsum board attached to wooden studs.  The front lobby and business 
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spaces have a “T-bar”, metal, ceiling grid support system into which standard mineral 
tiles are laid.  Above the 9-foot high drop ceilings are approximately 3 foot ceiling void 
spaces through which standard HVAC systems and other support systems such as 
electrical power is routed. 
 
Types of Occupants 
Since the Center for the Arts now serves primarily as a public venue for various 
types of live entertainment, it is likely that many occupants will be visitors not intimately 
familiar with the layout of the building or its egress systems.  Alcohol is not regularly 
served in the building but occasionally some alcohol is available at one of two portable 
bars.  Such alcohol service is not the primary focus of the businesses but is merely an 
ancillary activity.  Rarely is inebriation by guests a concern. 
The occupants of the upper floor are also generally transient in nature with the 
typical visitors there attending the dance studio and instruction facility.  It is possible that 
many of those people are repeat visitors who are more likely to be familiar with the 
regular exit that is also the principal entrance, than would be visitors to the ground floor 
theaters. 
The second floor facilities are typically operated during standard business hours 
and the majority of the visitors are juveniles or young adults.  Some mature adults also 
visit the facility either as tenants, instructors or for other business interests.   The ground 
floor theaters are used both for with matinee presentations as well as more typical 
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evening performances. The main theater also serves as a training facility for actors and 
entertainers during non-event hours. 
If a fire were to occur on the second floor, that area in the building will likely be 
staffed with regular employees who are familiar with the egress systems and exit 
passages.  It is not known whether these employees participate in regular fire or other 
emergency drills or if they regularly instruct their students or customers about the same 
information. 
Pre-movement activities for the second floor are expected to be similar to those 
experienced with most business occupancies.  If regular fire drills are not conducted it is 
likely that the persons inside could spend the first few minutes attempting to verify the 
validity of an fire if they do not receive outside confirming signals such as the odor of 
smoke to indicate a fire. 
Dance students on the second floor might be dressed in atypical pubic attire such 
as leotards or other dance garb.  With many of these participants being young females, it 
could be expected that prior to exiting the building, they might try to gather clothing and 
personal belongings from the second floor dressing room.  Also, there may be music 
playing to accompany their dance or exercise routines.  Such music might interfere with 
prompt recognition of alarm notification signals. 
Accordingly, for the second floor, the pre-movement time before occupants 
actually departing through the two exit doors is estimated at up to three to fire minutes.  
The second floor is only about 75 foot square so once occupants decide to move, travel 
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times to an exit will be relatively short.  Once egress begins, there is only one floor to 
descend through with a vertical height of approximately 12 feet. 
In the main theater, lighting is typically dimmed during performances.  One 
danger in any performing arts venue is that the event of a fire, the audience might not 
immediately recognize an alarm or fire as a real event and not merely part of the show.  
Dimmed lighting and potentially loud music from performances are expected to add to 
the recognition time of a fire event.  This was one of the problems encountered at the 
Station Nightclub fire in 2003 in Rhode Island where people did not recognize that the 
initial fire posed a real threat and was not just part of the show.   As a result, extended 
pre-movement times and flammable interior finish contributed to the deaths of 100 
people and injuries to about 230 more. 
It is anticipated that people inside the main theater will start moving towards an 
exit within two minutes of hearing or seeing the results of an alarm activation or fire.  
Pre-movement times for main theater guests may be shorter than for second floor dance 
studio visitors since theater guests will not typically have many belongings to be 
concerned about.  Further, the onset of several people starting to leave the theater should 
serve as a signal to others that they should also evacuate. 
The front lobby south of the main theater can serve as gathering/meeting place for 
local events.  Visitors there may not readily appreciate a fire event in the main theater.  
Double doors separate the front lobby and theater.  Door windows are covered with 
privacy fabric to keep light out of the theater. 
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It is anticipated that should a fire occur in the main theater or in an adjoining 
space, the occupants in the front lobby may have extended pre-movement times since it 
may take considerably longer for them to recognize that a fire is burning.  That along 
with a set of glass doors in clear view less than 50 feet away may make these persons feel 
more secure in their ability to exit.  Two to three minutes of pre-movement time is 
anticipated for these people.  The front occupants’ first indication of a fire elsewhere in 
the building might be seeing people from inside the main theater evacuating through the 
doors that open to the front lobby on their way to the main exit. 
The total floor space in the smaller, rear theater is slightly less than 1,000 square 
feet.  Between the actors, the stagehands and the approximately 60 guests expected 
during a performance, it is not anticipated that a fire in that space would go unnoticed for 
long.  Distances to adjacent exits are no greater than 40 feet so once people start moving 
towards an exit the movement should be quickly noticed.  Pre-movement time in the rear 
theater would likely be on the order of one minute or less. 
 
RSET Estimations 
Required Safe Egress Time or RSET, the estimated time needed to evacuate a 
building is dependent upon several variables.  These variables include the time to detect 
and notify occupants of a fire, the time taken by occupants to recognize the need to 
evacuate and then start moving, and then the travel time of the actual evacuation.  
According to Nelson and Mowrer’s chapter on “Emergency Movement” in the 3rd edition 
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of the Society of Fire Protection Engineering Handbook, “RSET can be subdivided into a 
number of discrete time intervals, the sum of which constitute the total RSET…”  An 
equation proposed to demonstrate this principle is: 
 
RSET = td + ta + to + ti + te 
 
 
where:  td  = time from ignition to detection 
 
ta  = time from detection to notification of occupants 
 
to  =  time from notification until occupants decide to take action 
 
ti = time from decision to take action until evacuation commences 
 
te = time from the start to the completion of evacuation 
 
 
These time relationships and their relationship to one another are depicted in the 
following diagram. 
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Figure 25:  Graphical relationship between ASET and RSET 
 
Often in such analyses, detection and notification time (shown above as td) is 
based upon detection by smoke and/or heat detectors which in turn activate notification 
devices such as horns or strobes.  Because of the lack of these devices in the Center for 
the Arts, such a time equivalency does not exist throughout most of the building.  As a 
result, determination of detection and notification time in determining RSET is based 
upon an evaluator’s best judgment. 
At present, there are no smoke detectors installed in the main theater area nor are 
there any notification devices. Previously, the AHJ decided that the presence of sprinklers 
were adequate for notification.  If a fire started and hot gases rose to the arched roof and 
activated sprinklers, then visitors may be “notified” in the manner of a notification 
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device.  The problem with such a scenario is that with a flammable ceiling finish 
throughout the theater, by the time a sprinkler activated, fire growth could be extremely 
fast and untenable conditions could be quickly reached. 
If a fire was to occur on the platform/stage out of sight of main theater visitors but 
not trigger sprinklers to activate, the first indication of a fire by guests might be an 
interruption of a production and unexpected, yet hurried evacuation of the stage area.  
The confusion by visitors that would be expected to accompany such an interruption 
could cause a significant delay in deciphering whether the actions are part of the show.  
That confusion may extend the detection time far beyond what would be expected if 
detection and notification devices were in place and functioning. 
It is anticipated that pre-movement times for occupants in most spaces of the 
Center for the Arts, particularly during productions, will be noticeably longer than 
perhaps they would be for the same people in most business or mercantile facilities.  
These delays will in large part depend upon how long it takes for the first occupants to 
detect something that is extremely unusual by their seeing flames, smelling smoke, being 
directed by others who have already detected the fire or by seeing an unexpected and 
hurried movement of people towards exits. 
Uncertainty in the analysis of movement time is based in part on occupant 
characteristics and their conditions at the time of evacuation.  The ages of visitors to the 
Center for the Arts ranges from the very young to the elderly, some perhaps in 
wheelchairs or with limited mobility.  A majority of the people in the facility during 
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productions could be first time visitors.  Even those who might be more familiar with the 
facility due to having attended numerous productions may still be completely unfamiliar 
with any egress path besides their typical route in and out of the building. 
According to Center for the Arts staff, while alcohol is occasionally served, it 
rarely results in inebriation.    Even so, considering the likely lack of familiarization by 
visitors with the building, the variations in their physical condition, and the prospect of 
their being in darkened and loud conditions during productions and thus not having their 
normal levels of sight and hearing, the movement times estimated herein should be 
considered as minimums for fires occurring during productions.  At other times such as 
during visits to the facility outside productions, occupancy levels would be expected to be 
far lower than at the maximum and fewer people would be available to signal the need to 
evacuate. 
In light of these factors, it is imperative that the Center for the Arts staff and 
performers are trained in and willing participants for notifying visitors of possible fires 
and assisting them in evacuations.  The leadership role of staff members can, if 
enthusiastically embraced, reduce pre-movement time and as a result, overall evacuation 
time. 
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Estimated Movement Times 
Calculations of estimated movement times are detailed in Appendix A.  The 
general factors regarding each space that are used in those calculations are discussed 
below. 
 
Art Gallery 
 
The art gallery is located at the front of the building and fronts a public street.  It 
measures slightly less than 1,000 square feet in area and is used for various meetings and 
art displays independent of productions in either of the theaters.  The maximum 
occupancy of the gallery was determined to be 132 persons based on a concentrated 
usage calculation in which space allotted per person is less than half of “less 
concentrated” use (see Appendix A).  Under “less concentrated” use conditions such as 
when tables are used in the room and seating is provided, the occupancy load would be 
62 persons.  The gallery has one, 72-inch exit door that discharges onto the street.  It also 
has another 72-inch door that leads to the front lobby about 5 feet from the building’s 
main exit.  Assuming everyone is equally spaced through the art gallery and heads to the 
exit at about the same time, it is estimated that evacuating the maximum 132 people from 
the art gallery will take about 66 seconds. 
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Front Lobby and Adjacent Rooms (less main theater population) 
 
The front lobby and adjacent rooms encompass the first floor of the structure 
south of the main theater apart from the art gallery.  The area includes offices, the main 
lobby, restrooms, and a dressing room for performers.  It will be referred to collectively 
as the front lobby.  Its maximum occupancy load is 199 people (see Appendix A).  The 
front lobby discharges to the exterior of the building through a 72-inch wide glass door.  
Another 72-inch wide door within feet of the main exit door leads into the art gallery and 
accesses its 72-inch wide glass door that also discharges to the exterior of the building. 
Assuming the people are equally spaced throughout the front lobby and adjacent 
rooms, the longest travel distance to the discharge door exit is about 80 feet.  It is 
assumed that there will be minimal queuing at the front exit door when only occupants in 
these spaces are considered.  Movement times for the evacuation of the front lobby are 
estimated to be on the order of 119 seconds. 
 
Main Theater, Platform/Stage, and Adjoining Supply Rooms 
 
The main theater and its ancillary spaces are located just north of the front lobby 
and measure approximately 5,400 square feet.  The maximum occupant load for this area 
was calculated at 358 people (see Appendix A).  This value is higher than the occupancy 
loads experienced during non-production times.  The main theater area has fixed seating 
that includes 170 loge-type seats on a progressively elevated, enclosed wooden 
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framework and up to 50 moveable seats that can be placed on the main floor in front of 
the elevated seating.  A lounge area adjacent and north of the fixed seating section is 
available for visitors to get drinks and light food items prior to the start of a production.  
The occupant load of the lounge area and bar was calculated to be 48 people.  During 
actual production events, people do not congregate in the lounge area but must be seated.  
Even so, the occupancy load of 48 was included in the maximum capacity analyzed in 
this evaluation.  Lastly, the platform stage area and ancillary storage rooms have a 
maximum occupancy of 90 people.  In total, the maximum occupancy load in the main 
theater is estimated at 358 people. 
It is assumed that in the case of a fire, the people in the theater will divide in near-
equal groups and head to one of the two, 72-inch wide exit doors for the theater.  The rear 
exit discharge door in the north wall of the theater leads to a parking lot at the rear of the 
building.  The front door leads into the front lobby and then to the front exit discharge 
door. 
The raised, seating platform consists of seven rows of fixed seats with spring-
loaded seat bottoms that lift when an occupant stands.  After the seats rise, there is an 
approximately 18-inch wide path between rows of seats for people to walk through.  
There are two aisles of stairs for people to enter and leave the seating platform, one on 
each side.  The average distance for a person to walk from their seat to the closest aisle is 
about 12 feet.   The steps on these exit aisles each have treads of about 40 inches and 
risers of about 7 inches.   They lead to sets of three steps at the bottom of each exit aisle 
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that in turn descend 21 inches to the main floor.  For the last person to reach the ground 
floor by first traversing their seating row and then down the exit aisle and steps involves 
about 40 feet of horizontal travel plus the equivalent of about 6 feet of vertical descent 
from the top row. 
Estimations were made of the movement times for evacuations using one or both 
exits.  The movement times ranged between 2.6 minutes when both doors were available 
to 3.3 minutes when only one door could be used.  Specific calculations are presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
Rear Theater, Platform/Stage and Actor Areas 
 
The rear theater, platform/stage area and actor spaces have a maximum occupant 
load of 110 people.  The rear theater floor measures about 1,500 square feet.  Of that, 
approximately 400 square feet is seating and the remainder includes the stage, the area 
between the audience and the stage, and the control room and actor areas.  It is estimated 
that because of the room’s size, the time to alert the people in this area of a fire will be 
minimal and that pre-movement times will be negligible. 
A 72-inch wide door serves the rear theater.  Most of the occupants (less actors in 
their spaces or people in the control room will have to pass this door when entering the 
theater through the 36-inch wide hallway from the rear lobby.  It is assumed that most 
people will exit through the main door inside the rear theater rather than bypassing it in 
favor or the hallway (13 feet away) to return to the lobby to exit. 
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Of the maximum 110 people in the rear theater, about 60 people are expected to 
be seated on a tiered, seating platform, the highest point of which is 2 feet above the 
floor.  Chairs there are portable and arranged together but unconnected nor affixed to the 
platform.   According to the Section 1028.12 of the California Fire Code, “In places of 
assembly, the seats shall be securely fastened to the floor.”  Exception 4 to that 
provision states, “In places of assembly where flexibility of the seating arrangement 
is an integral part of the design and function of the space and seating is on tiered 
levels, a maximum of 200 seats shall not be required to be fastened to the floor.  
Plans showing seating, tiers and aisles shall be submitted for approval.”  Despite the 
possibility of the seats being tipped over leading to potential obstructions during an 
evacuation, this exception to the CFC allows for the seating in the rear theater to 
remain loosely positioned as long as the arrangement of those seats conforms to the 
plans submitted to the AHJ. 
The furthest distance from the main door in the rear theater is about 40 feet of 
horizontal travel.  That plus the travel distance on the seating platform makes the 
maximum distance anyone would have to travel on the order of 50 feet or less. 
To reach the main exit door, occupants will have to pass through a narrowed 
walkway between the seating platform and the west wall.  That walkway is about 52 
inches wide.   The south entrance to that walkway from the seating area and stage could 
become a chokepoint where queuing might be expected.   Considering delays that might 
be experienced at that chokepoint if queuing occurred, it would take approximately 1.5 
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minutes for all 110 people to pass the chokepoint and leave through the main exit door 
once movement begins. 
A second option for people to evacuate from the rear theater would be for some to 
pass through the unmarked doorway behind the platform/stage and on through the 
sprinkler control room exit to the exterior.  The interior doorway is unmarked however 
and generally blocked from view and egress by the stage sets.  Accordingly, the only 
people likely familiar with that route would be actors and those who regularly work in the 
theater.  If 10 people were familiar with and used that route, it would only reduce the 
overall time to evacuate the theater by about 7 seconds to a total time of about 1 minute 
and 23 seconds. 
 
Rear Lobby, Dressing Rooms and Restrooms 
 
The rear lobby, dressing rooms and restrooms have a maximum occupant load of 
48 people.  The occupant load for the adjacent rear supply rooms is 3 people.   The 
supply rooms are fitted with a 72-inch wide exit door and a 96-inch wide garage type 
roll-up door.  Egress should not pose a problem from them and they will not be 
considered further. 
The rear lobby has a 72-inch wide door that opens onto the parking lot.  The door 
could accommodate a pass-through rate of 120 people per minute.  Considering the 
maximum expected number of occupants, no queuing is expected.   If egress through the 
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door was somehow blocked, occupants could also travel through a hallway or the 
dressing rooms into the rear theater and exit through the 72 inch door there. 
If the lobby door is not blocked and all occupants exit through it, the time to 
evacuate will be approximately 24 seconds which includes the time to walk the maximum 
distance of about 50 feet to the exit. 
 
Second Floor 
 
The second floor occupancies are situated over the combination of the first floor 
lobby, adjacent rooms and the art gallery.   They include a dance studio (with three dance 
rooms), a dressing room, offices and reception area, a sound studio, associated hallways, 
restrooms and a storage room. The total second floor space measures approximately 5000 
square feet. 
According to calculations shown in Appendix A, the maximum occupancy load of 
the second floor is 211 people.  The second floor is fitted with two stair exits.  One of the 
stairs serves as the main and typical entrance / exit to the second floor.  It is entered from 
and discharges directly to a sidewalk at the front exterior of the building.  A second stair 
designed to serve only as an emergency exit is located at the rear (north side) of the 
second floor at the reception area.  It provides egress from the second floor down to the 
first floor inside the main theater adjacent to the main platform/stage.   Once there, two 
exit paths can be chosen.  One leads through a 36-inch door to the front dressing room 
and onto the front lobby and the other to a 36-inch doorway to the floor of the main 
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theater. The rear emergency exit door does not serve as a normal entrance to the second 
floor. 
Travel over the front stairs includes a 12-foot vertical distance between the floors 
and approximately 20 feet of landings or level path between the door at the top of the 
stairs and the front, exit discharge door.  The travel over the rear stairs also includes a 12-
foot vertical distance between the floors and approximately 22 feet of landing or level 
path. 
Since all of the people normally entering the second floor do so through the front 
stairs it is assumed most occupants will try to exit along the same path using the front 
stairs.  Since the door to the rear stairs is located in the second floor reception area, some 
people who are there when a fire is detected might choose to evacuate via the rear stairs. 
Movement times to exit the second floor were estimated for four different 
scenarios:  100% of occupants using the front stairs, 100% using the rear stairs, 50% 
using each of the stairs and 75% using the front and 25% using the rear.  It is assumed 
that as long as neither exit is blocked by obstructions or fire, 75% of the second floor 
occupants (158 people) will use the front stairs and 25% (53 people) will attempt to use 
the rear stairs.   Each of the scenarios results in slight queuing at the entrance doors to the 
stairs.  If an evacuation of the first floor is already underway, any additional queuing of 
the second floor occupants once they reach the first floor would be dependent on things 
such as pre-movement times of the first floor occupants. 
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In general, movement times for the maximum number of people on the second 
floor (211) varies from 2.9 minutes if half the occupants use each set of stairs to 5.3 
minutes if everyone is forced to use the rear stairs.  If a fire in the main theater makes the 
rear stairs inaccessible, it would take 5.1 minutes of movement time to evacuate everyone 
through the front stairs. Table	  3	  summarizes	  the	  calculated	  travel	  times	  from	  each	  space.	  	  The	  actual	  RSET	   times	   will	   be	   the	   sum	   of	   these	   times	   plus	   time	   to	   notification	   and	   pre-­‐movement	  time.	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Estimated  Movement  Times 
Area of 
Building 
Maximum 
Occupancy 
Special 
Conditions 
Minutes Seconds 
     
Art Gallery 132  1.1 66 
Front Lobby & 
Adjoining Rooms  
 
199 
   
Main Theater  
358 
Both exits 
available 
2.6-2.75 156-165 
  
358 
One exit 
available 
3.3 200 
Rear Theater  
110 
Main exit 
available 
 
1.5 
 
90 
Rear Lobby & 
Dressing Rooms 
 
 
48 
  
 
0.4 
 
 
24 
Second Floor  
211 
50% through 
each exit 
 
2.9 
 
174 
  
211 
 
75% through 
front exit, 
25% through 
rear 
 
4.0 
 
239 
  
211 
100% through 
front exit 
 
5.1 
 
304 
  
211 
100% through 
rear exit 
 
5.3 
 
318 
Table 3:  Estimated Movement Times  
 
The calculations upon which these values are based are presented in Appendix A. 
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Water-based Suppression 
Installed Automatic Sprinkler System 
An automatic sprinkler system was installed in the building in 1993 when the 
building occupancy changed to include a gymnasium in what is now the main theater.  
The occupancy changed again around 2002 when it was converted to its current use as a 
performing arts center.  At that time, the sprinkler system was not modified. 
The sprinkler system installed into the building is a wet-pipe system designed to 
control a fire rather than extinguish it.   Considering the assembly occupancy spaces in 
the building, system activation is designed to allow extra egress time for their safe 
evacuation. 
When the sprinkler system was first installed, the building served primarily as a 
gymnasium and health-club type facility and the sprinkler system was classified 
according to an “Ordinary Hazard, Group 1”.   If a new system were designed today, the 
dance school would likely maintain the OH-1 classification originally assigned when the 
system was installed or perhaps fall under a Light Hazard classification.  The 
auditorium/theater areas apart from the platform stage would also be classified at Light 
Hazard but the platform/stage in the theater would be classified as Ordinary Hazard, 
Group 2. 
The density/area criterion for which the sprinkler system was designed was 0.15 
gpm/ft2 over a 1,500-ft2 area of sprinkler operation.   For the areas such as the theater and 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
58 
offices that could currently be classified Light Hazard by NFPA 13, the installed 
density/area criteria exceed what is needed since they require only was 0.10 gpm/ft2 over 
a 1,500 ft2 area.  For an actual stage, the hazard classification would be Ordinary Hazard, 
Group 2.  The required density/area coverage for OH-2 of 0.20 gpm/ft2 over an area of 
1,500 ft2 would be slightly more than the existing coverage.  The Center for the Arts 
production area is not officially a stage but rather a platform because the lack of hanging 
curtains over the front as well as hanging sets and props.   It is uncertain whether the 
technical differences between a stage and a platform might allow for a less dense 
coverage than OH-2.  In any case, the AHJ did not require an increase in the density after 
the conversion to a performing arts center. 
 
Water Supply 
The water supply for the building is supplied via city water mains of the local 
city.  It is located at the rear of the building in underground mains that run along the 
street, immediately north of and perpendicular to the long axis of the building.  The water 
is fed by a gravity feed from a water treatment facility located about one mile away at a 
higher elevation of several hundred feet. 
According to records of recent tests conducted by the city’s Public Works 
Department, the water supply for the Center for the Performing Arts’ sprinkler system 
has a static pressure of 64 psi and a residual pressure of 54 psi at a flow rate of 2,400 
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gpm.  The connection to the building’s sprinkler system is underground at the far north 
end of the facility. 
 
System Location and Layout 
The sprinkler system riser enters the northernmost utility room of the building 
adjacent to a public street.  The riser is made of 4 inch, Schedule 10 steel pipe.   At the 
sprinkler room, the riser is fitted with two inline gate valves, a check valve, test line 
apparatus and a pressure gauge. The fire department’s 4-inch connection is located above 
the check valve and tees into the riser.  That FD connection is fitted with a check valve 
(prior to the “T”) and extends to the exterior of the building to a single male fitting. 
The riser climbs for an elevation of 18 feet where it ties via an elbow into a 3-
inch, Schedule 10 steel feed main that leads south into the building.   At the north end of 
the building in the single-story section which houses a “day theater”, dressing rooms, 
waiting room and storage areas, branch lines are fed off the primary north-south supply.  
The feed main line tees off to a 3 inch cross main running east and west along the short 
axis of the building and which in turn supplies three branch lines that T and run to the 
north and to the south covering the length of the northern, one-story annex.  Branch lines 
are a combination of 1-1/4” and 2 inch Schedule 40 piping. 
Each of the cross main sections and branch line pipes is supported by a 
combination of adjustable swivel ring hangers and rigid pipe supports attached to the 
building’s structural roof members. 
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The principle feed main travels for 152 feet to the south and enters the main 
portion of the building where it T’s into another 3-inch cross-main.  The secondary cross 
main spreads out across the full width of the building.  Rising off that cross main are 
various 2 inch riser nipples, each rising to feed one of seven north-south running branch 
lines spaced 10 to 12 feet apart that are fitted with sprinkler heads for the main theater.   
These lines continue 76 feet to the south where they T into a downward leading pipe as 
well as extend further south at the same elevation into the second floor ceiling area (at the 
front of the building).  The downward-flowing vertical pipes extend to just above the 
height of the first floor ceiling and then T again into horizontal pipes that supply the first 
floor at the front of the building. 
 
 
 
Figure 26:  Plan view of the sprinkler layout.  The remote area shown here is located on 
the second floor in Dance Studio 1.  North is to the left. 
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The sprinklers that are used for the system are a combination of ½ inch upright, 
brass pendants (k-factor = 5.6) or recessed, ½ inch pendants.  Most of the sprinklers are 
165 °F activated, standard response sprinklers that are the “A” model, manufactured by 
Central sprinklers.   The sprinklers are not glass bulb activated sprinklers but instead have 
a fusible alloy sealed into the sprinkler’s brass activating rod that is held in place by a 
stainless steel ball. 
The most remote area of the sprinkler system was determined to be sprinklers on 
branch lines on the second floor at the south end of the building.   Second floor sprinklers 
were spaced 12 feet, 10.5 feet, or 10 feet apart (the system was initially approved with a 
non-symmetrical spacing to best fit room layouts) on the branch lines.   It was determined 
that 12 heads would have to operate to cover the required 1,500 ft2 area of operation.  In 
order to determine the size requirement for the length of one size of the remote area, the 
formula, L ≥ 1.2 √1500, was used.  That gave a minimum length of 46.5 feet along a 
branch line.  Further, the sprinkler system designer calculated the area of coverage by a 
particular sprinkler as 126 ft2.  Using that, it was determined to cover the minimum area 
of operation would require 12 sprinklers.  
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Figure 27:  NFPA 13 Table of Sprinkler Specifications for Ordinary Hazard Protection 
 
 
Section 11.2.3.2.4 of the NFPA 13, the Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler 
Systems, 2010 edition, states that for sloped ceilings, like that in the Center for the Arts’ 
main theater, “The system area of operation shall be increased by 30 percent without 
revising the density…” when spray sprinklers are used on sloped ceilings with a pitch 
exceeding 1 in 6, the equivalent of 15 degrees slope.  The design area increase is based 
on the sprinkler tests and modeling conducted at FM Global. In those tests, slopes greater 
than 15 degrees resulted in erratic sprinkler operating patterns that could adversely affect 
sprinklers operating outside the design area. Heat accumulated near the peak and tended 
to activate sprinklers distant to the fire.  The result was the potential for the sprinkler 
system to be overwhelmed by the activation of too many heads threatening the system 
with becoming ineffective at providing design area coverage.   A 30 percent increase in 
the coverage of the 15-foot maximum spacing set forth in Table 8.6.2.2.1(b) would 
reduce the maximum spacing to 10.5 feet. 
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The slope of the ceiling near the sides of the main theater is approximately 25 
degrees.  In accordance with the provisions of Section 11.2.3.2.4 of NFPA 13, that slope 
would trigger the 30 percent increase in coverage.  As can be seen by the hydraulic 
calculations prepared for the Center for the Arts building, the outer branch line spacing 
on each side of the building was in fact reduced by 30 percent.   The maximum distance 
from the walls for the outer branch lines is established by Section 8.6.3.2.1 and Table 
8.6.2.2.1(b), both of NFPA 13 as no more than half the distance between sprinklers, in 
this case 10.5 feet.  Actual distance of the outer branch lines was measured at 5 feet out 
from the walls in adherence to this requirement. 
 
 
 
Figure 28:  Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking south. 
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Figure 29:  Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking west. 
 
Unfortunately, no known plans exist for the installed sprinkler system.  A search 
of the records of the AHJ as well as by the Center for the Arts personnel failed to locate 
any copies.  The designer is reportedly no longer in business.  A copy of a computerized 
hydraulic calculation was available in the AHJ file.  That record is presented in Appendix 
D.   It shows the sizes of various pipes used in the calculations as well as fittings, 
elevations, and other related values.  The computer calculations estimated a water supply 
demand at the base of the riser (BOR) of 245.8 gpm with a required pressure of 53.7 psi.  
That coupled with a 250-gpm hose demand led to an overall demand of 495.8 gpm at 
53.7 psi. 
Activation of 12 sprinklers could involve 6 sprinklers on each of the furthest 2 
branch lines or 4 heads on each of the furthest 3 lines or a combination thereof.  Not 
knowing which heads had activated in the computer calculations, hand estimates were 
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performed to identify possibilities.  It was estimated that the most geographically remote 
heads would be on the furthest two or three branch lines to the west on the second floor.  
Hand calculations determined that the highest demand was created when 4 sprinklers 
opened on each of the 3 westernmost branch lines on the second floor. That demand was 
calculated to be 245.3 gpm at 49.0 psi at the base of the riser (BOR) (see Appendix D for 
calculations).  The hose stream allowance for an Ordinary Hazard Group I occupancy is 
250 gpm for 90 minutes.   The total water demand for the building is therefore 495.3 gpm 
at 49 psi.  These values were in reasonable agreement with those indicated in the 
computerized calculations. 
 
Inspection, Testing and Maintenance 
Several inspection, testing and maintenance (ITM) requirements for the sprinkler 
system in the Center for the Arts are set forth in NFPA 25, Inspection, Testing and 
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems and modified by Title 19 of the 
California Code of Regulations.  NFPA 25 contains three tables that generally summarize 
ITM requirements.  They are Tables 5.1.1.2, 6.1.1.2, and 13.1.1.2.   Monthly observations 
of the sprinkler system are the responsibility of the staff of the Center for the Arts.  A 
sprinkler contractor approved by the AHJ carries out annual inspections, testing and 
maintenance.  A table synopsizing the inspection, testing and maintenance requirements 
for alarm systems set forth in NFPA 25 is included herein as Appendix E. 
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Alarm Detection and Notification System 
History 
Like with the automatic sprinkler system, the   Center for the Arts building   was   
not   originally   fitted   with   alarm detection or notification systems.     The first alarm 
system components were installed sometime before the sprinkler system was required.  
The only known alarm system requirement for the Center for the Arts is for a waterflow 
alarm for the sprinkler system.   That alarm and its ancillary components are currently in 
place. Other than that however, there are no requirements for any alarm detection or 
notification systems to be installed. 	  
Requirements for Fire Detection and Alarm Systems 
Neither the California Building Code (CBC), the California Fire Code (CFC) nor 
the Life Safety Code (LSC), NFPA 101, have established requirements for alarm systems 
to be installed into existing buildings like the Center for the Arts.    Section 907 of the 
CFC specifies the rules and regulations regarding Fire Alarm and Detection Systems.   
The LSC requirements for Detection, Alarm and Communication Systems are set forth in 
Section 13.3.4. 
LSC Section 13.3.4.1.1 states that “Assembly occupancies with occupant loads 
of more than 300 and all theaters with more than one audience-­‐viewing room hall be 
provided with an approved fire alarm system… unless otherwise permitted…” (emphasis 
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added).  Even though the Center for the Arts is an assembly occupancy with an 
occupant load of more than 300 in the main theater, it is covered by an exception to that 
requirement.  Section 13.3.4.1.4 of the LSC states, “The requirement of 13.3.4.1.1 
shall not apply to assembly occupancies where, in the judgment of the authority having 
jurisdiction, adequate alternative provisions exist or are provided for the discovery of a 
fire and for alerting the occupants promptly.”   In this instance, the local fire department 
as the AHJ has deemed installation of most alarm systems unnecessary. 
According to local fire inspectors with the AHJ, the Center for the Arts 
technically falls under the latter exclusion because of other provisions in Section 907.3 
of the CFC entitled, “Where required in existing buildings and structures”.  In that, it 
states that, “An approved fire alarm system shall be installed in existing buildings and 
structures where required in Chapter 46”. Section 4603 of that code addresses “Fire 
Safety Requirements for Existing Buildings.”   In 4603, the only requirements for fire 
alarm systems in existing structure are for occupancy types other than those existing 
in the Center for the Arts.    Further, it has been decided by local fire officials that the 
building’ full coverage sprinkler protection in effect adds heat sensors in the form 
of sprinkler heads.   While the AHJ might recommend a fire notification system be 
installed throughout the building, under these provisions they cannot require such a 
system be installed.   
If Center for the Arts personnel choose to upgrade the existing or install a 
different system to improve life safety conditions, they should first identify their goals 
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and objectives for the system.  NFPA 72 offers various features and functions in Section 
23.3.3.1that owners may want to evaluate and consider as potentially applicable to the 
building.  
Since the building is protected by a water sprinkler system, both the CFC and 
the LSC require that that system be monitored with a waterflow alarm.  Section 903.4 
of the CFC states,  “All valves controlling the water supply for automatic sprinkler 
systems, pumps, tanks, water levels and temperatures, critical air pressures and water-­‐
flow switches on all sprinkler systems shall be electrically supervised by a listed fire 
alarm control unit.”      Similarly, Section 9.6.2.1 of the LSC states,  “Where required by 
other sections of this Code, actuation of the complete fire alarm system shall be initiated 
by, but shall not be limited to, any or all of the following means: 
 
(1) Manual fire alarm initiation 
(2) Automatic detection 
(3) Extinguishing system operation (emphasis added). 
 
In meeting this requirement, the Center for the Arts installed a waterflow alarm system 
at the sprinkler riser. 
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Installed Alarm System 
Currently, two independent alarm detection and notification systems are installed 
on the ground floor of the Center for the Arts. Each has its own fire alarm control panel.  
No alarm system is present on the second floor besides local smoke detectors or as 
related to activation of the waterflow alarm in the sprinkler system.  Each of the two 
alarm systems for the Center of the Arts are of the Supervising Station type connected by 
telephone lines to a Central Station.    
Though no documentation of installation could be found, the oldest of the two 
alarm systems appears to be around 20 to 25 years old.   It originally consisted of a 
mixture of smoke detection and a burglar alarm system.  Though the smoke detectors are 
still monitored by a central station, the burglar alarm portion of the system has been 
deactivated.   The other system installed at the far north end of the building is located 
primarily in and around the sprinkler room.  It is designed to serve as both a detection and 
notification system of sprinkler activation as well as detection and notification of fire 
related problems in the sprinkler room that could affect the sprinkler system.  
Unfortunately, no drawings or installation documentation for either of the two systems 
was available either at the Center for the Arts or at the local fire department or are even 
known to exist. 
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Front System Detectors and Notification Appliances 
The smoke detection and alarm notification system in and around the front lobby 
currently covers only the first floor of the front portion of the building south of the main 
theater.  The fire alarm control panel connected to the original system is an Optex Morse 
model SMDC- 16   unit.     It is also wired to an Optex Morse keypad and  annunciator  
panel. 	  
	  
Figure 30:  Optex Morse SMDC-16 Fire Alarm Control Panel keypad for the front alarm 
system 	  
Those portions of the system designed to serve as a burglar alarm have been 
disconnected.  The fire alarm control panel is monitored via telephone line by a 
central station monitoring service. 
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Five ionization smoke detectors are installed in the front portion of the 
building, two in the front lobby, one in the office, one in the actors’ dressing “green” 
room, and one in the art gallery.  Four are similar in appearance to older style General 
Electric 120V models although the exact model type could not be verified.  The other 
appears to be a BRK model 120V detector.  Each of the detectors appears to be about 
twenty years old.  All of the front system smoke detectors are ceiling mounted except 
for that in the art gallery. 	  
	  
Figure 31:  Smoke detector on the front lobby ceiling	  
 
The art gallery detector is wall mounted, 30 inches below a 12 foot 6 inch high 
ceiling.  That location is not in compliance with NFPA 72.  Sections 17.7.3.2.1 dictate 
that a smoke detector should be mounted within the top 12 inches of the room height.  
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Even if the detector was mounted at the correct height on the wall or on the ceiling, 
there would still be problems associated with having only one detector in the gallery.  
Because the upper part of the gallery is divided into three bays separated by deep solid 
beams, having only one detector in the room would not necessarily assure prompt 
activation unless the fire started directly below the bay in which the detector was 
mounted.  If the fire started below another bay, then smoke would first have to fill that 
bay and then spill out and flow into the bay with the detector before activation would 
be assured.   Under the current arrangement, all three bays will have to fill with 
smoke and then the level descend about six inches further to even reach the existing 
detector. 	  
	  
Figure 32:  Smoke detector mounted low on the north wall of the art gallery 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
73 
With regards to detector spacing in the front half of the building, since there was 
no mandate for these detectors to be in the building, according to Section 17.5.3.3.1 of 
NFPA 72, there is no prescribed spacing required for them.   The existing arrangement 
seems somewhat arbitrary other than that it covers the largest spaces in the front area. 
The only notification appliance in the front half of the building is an Amseco 
model BZ-­‐54VT electric horn.   It is mounted on the north wall of the lobby, 92 inches 
above the floor, immediately below the drop ceiling.  That wall separates the lobby and 
the main theater.  The mounting location does not fully meets the requirement of Section 
18.4.8.1 even though it is located at least 90 inches above the finished floor.  That section 
also requires that it must be 6 inches below the ceiling. 	  
	  
Figure 33:  Amseco model BZ-­‐54VT  electric horn in the front lobby  
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The Fire alarm control panel for the front half of the building is also mounted on 
the north wall of the lobby just below the ceiling, about 10 feet west of the horn. The 
Optex Morse annunciator panel and keyboard is located further south on the west wall, 
approximately 25 feet inside and north of the main entrance doors. 
 
Rear System Detectors and Notification Appliances 
The rear portion of the alarm system serves only to detect and notify occupants of 
either sprinkler waterflow activation, or fire related problems in the sprinkler room that 
could affect the system’s performance.  The fire alarm control panel mounted there 
is a model MS-­‐5012 fire control communicator manufactured by Fire Lite Alarms, Inc., 
a division of Honeywell. Telephone lines connect the system to the central station 
monitoring the system. 	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Figure 34:  FireLite MS-5012 fire alarm control panel 	  
The principal detection device of that system is a Potter model VSR-­‐4 waterflow 
switch mounted in the sprinkler riser.  Also installed in the sprinkler room is a 120V 
smoke detector mounted on the wall nine feet above the floor, directly over the fire 
alarm control panel.  The smoke detector is a Federal Signal model FSF109, 
hardwired, photoelectric detector.	   	   	   	   Located immediately below the fire alarm control 
panel in the sprinkler room is a Fire Lite Model BG-­‐12 pull station. 
One of the notification appliances attached to the rear fire alarm control panel is a 
Gentex model GEC, 24-volt horn strobe with 75 cd and 70-­‐82 dBA.  That horn strobe is 
mounted inside and along the north wall of the rear day theater of the Center for the Arts. 
The unit is 86 inches above the floor but because of a temporarily stage set being used in 
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the theater, it may not be visible at the front (south) side of the stage, either by 
the audience or cast.  The mounting height as well as the existing location behind a 
possible blockage such as a stage set do not meet the location requirements of Section 
18.4.8 of NFPA 72. 	  
	  
Figure 35:  Gentex Model GEC Horn Strobe 
 
Attached outside on the north wall of the building, 12 feet above the ground, is 
a 10-­‐inch vibrating bell manufactured by Potter Electric Signal Company, model 
MBA2410. 
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Figure 36:  Potter Electric Signal Vibrating Bell 
	  
	  
Fire Detection Scenarios  
In order to estimate the time for detection in areas where smoke detectors are 
installed, three fire detection scenarios were examined.  The time to detection was 
analyzed either with the computer zone fire model CFAST for wall mounted detectors or 
with the spreadsheet model, DETACT. The specific calculations and results are included 
in Appendix E. 
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Central Station Disposition of Alarm, Supervisory and Trouble 
Signals 
The fire alarm system installed in the Center for the Arts is a Supervising Station 
alarm type monitored by a central station. Signals are passed to the central station via 
telephone lines installed at each of the two fire alarm control panels. 
NFPA 72 dictates the requirements for central stations to respond to alarm 
signals. A synopsis of those signals and the corresponding actions to be taken are 
discussed in Appendix E. 
 
Mass Notification System 
The Center for the Arts does not have a Mass Notification System installed.	  
 
Secondary Power Requirements 
Each of the two alarm systems installed in the Center for the Arts is required by 
NFPA 72 to have backup power sources to maintain the alarm systems in the event of a 
power outage.  Both fire alarm control panels are outfitted with 8 amp-hour portable 
batteries f o r  this purpose.   Section 10.5.6.3.1 of NFPA 72 states that, “The 
secondary power supply shall have sufficient capacity to operate the system under 
quiescent load (system operating in a non-alarm condition) for a minimum of 24 
hours and, at the end of that period, shall be capable of operating all alarm notification 
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appliances used for evacuation or to direct aid to the location of an emergency for 5 
minutes…” 
Accurate standby power requirements for the smoke detectors at the Center for 
the Arts could not be determined because there currently is no known documentation 
identifying the installed detectors.  Accordingly, estimates of the power requirements for 
the smoke detectors were obtained for those of similar devices described in online 
references.  The notification appliances needing to be powered include the horn in the 
front lobby and horn strobe and vibrating bell for the rear system.   Power requirements 
for those notification appliances were either obtained off the individual appliances or off 
data sheets available from the suppliers. 
Wiring for the rear circuits was readily accessible and determined to be 14 AWG 
copper size. The front system wiring was hidden in the walls and therefore not visible 
without removing the ceiling and/or disassembling the system.  At the time of 
examinations, the Center for the Arts was open and conducting business.  Accordingly no 
disassembly occurred.  Instead, estimations of the power requirements for the front 
system have been made based upon similar wiring (14 AWG solid copper conductors) 
used elsewhere. 
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Front Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement 
 
Item Description Qty Standby 
Current 
per Unit 
(amps) 
Total 
Standby 
Current 
(amps) 
Alarm 
Current 
per Unit 
(amps) 
Total 
System 
Alarm 
Current 
(amps) 
A Ionization 
Smoke Detector 
5 0.0002 0.001 0.077 0.385 
B SMDC-16 
FACP 
1 0.113 0.113 0.20 0.20 
C SMDC-32 
Annunciator 
1 0.070 0.070 0.07 0.07 
D BZ-54VT Horn 1 None None 0.12 0.12 
       
TOTALS  0.184A  0.775A 
 
Table 4:  Front Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement  
 
 
24 hours standby x 0.184A = 4.416 Ah 
0.0833 hours (5 mins) alarm x 0.775 A = 0.065 Ah 
Standby + Alarm power requirement = 4.48 Ah 
Power requirement   x   1.2 (20% Safety factor) = 5.4 Ah 
 
Total Secondary Power Requirement for the front system is 5.4 Ah 
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Rear Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement 
 
Item Description Qty Standby 
Current 
per Unit 
(amps) 
Total 
Standby 
Current 
(amps) 
Alarm 
Current 
per Unit 
(amps) 
Total 
System 
Alarm 
Current 
(amps) 
E MS-5012 FACP 1 0.01 0.01 0.005 0.005 
F FSF109 Smoke Det 1 0.0001 0.0001 0.13 0.13 
G BG-12 Pull Station 1 None None None None 
H GEC Horn Strobe 1 None None 0.137 0.137 
I MBA2410 Vib-Bell 1 None None 0.060 0.060 
J VSR-4 WF Switch 1 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
       
TOTAL  0.0201A  0.322A 
 
 
Table 5:  Rear Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement  
 
 
 
24 hrs standby x 0.0201A = 0.48 Ah 
0.0833 hrs (5 mins) alarm x 0.322 A = 0.03 Ah 
Standby + Alarm power requirement = 0.51 Ah 
Power Requirement  x  1.2 (20% Safety factor) = 0.61 Ah 
 
 
Total Secondary Power Requirement for the rear system is 0.61 Ah 
 
Both the front and rear alarm systems are supplied with 8.0 Ah batteries.  In each case, 
the secondary power supply is sufficient to power the systems in accordance with Section 
10.5.6.3.1 of NFPA 72. 
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Inspection, Testing and Maintenance 
 
A local electric company maintains the Center for the Arts’ alarm system and 
conducts all necessary inspections and testing.  This is allowed under Section 14.2.2.3 of 
NFPA 72 if conducted pursuant to a written contract.   None of the facilities or 
maintenance personnel at the Center for the Arts was familiar with specifics of the alarm 
system in terms of installation or the maintenance.     Further, they stated that they have 
never seen any copies of installation diagrams or paperwork associated with either of the 
two alarm systems and do not know if any exists.  They suggested copies might be 
available at either the alarm system contractor or the fire department.  Checks with both 
organizations revealed neither have copies either installation diagrams or commissioning 
documentation. 
Section 14.2.4 of the 2010 edition of NFPA 72 requires that “At the time of an 
acceptance test, the authority having jurisdiction and the system contractor must ensure 
that all documentation for the system installation has been completed and is presented to 
the owner or the owner’s designated representative in a usable format.”  Whether this was 
ever done is uncertain.  Documents suggested to be maintained by NFPA 72 include:  
Fire Alarm System Record of Completion, Point to Point Wiring Diagrams, Individual 
Device Interconnection Drawings,  As-Built  Drawings,  Copy  of  Original Equipment 
Submittals, Operational Manuals, Manufacturer’s Proper Testing and Maintenance 
Requirements, and a Device Address List/Conventional Device Location List. 
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Besides the documentation requirements, Sections 14.1 and 14.2 of NFPA 72 also 
sets forth the requirements for an inspection, testing and maintenance programs for new 
and existing alarm systems.  Table 14.3.1, Visual Inspection Frequencies, prescribes the 
requirements for visual inspection.  With regards to the installed equipment, the visual 
inspection requirements that apply to the Center for the Art’s system are shown in 
Appendix E. 
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Structural Fire Protection 
 
General Building Construction 
The Center for the Arts was built of Type III construction, commonly referred to 
as “Ordinary Construction”.  It occupies slightly less than 19,000 square feet.  First floor 
space measures about 13,900 square feet while the second floor is approximately 4,750 
square feet.  The building’s maximum height is approximately 28 feet.   
Table 503 of the California Building Code specifies maximum building heights 
and areas for various construction types.   It specifies that a building of Type III-A 
construction can have a maximum height of 65 feet, contain three stories and for an 
Assembly, type A-1, occupancy (which includes theaters), have a maximum floor area of 
14,000 square feet.  Type III-B construction can be used to create a similar occupancy 
building with a maximum height of 55 feet, two stories and 8,500 square feet. (The other 
occupancy types found in the Center for the Arts are less restrictive for both Type III-A 
and III-B buildings and can include more area).  Based upon area increase provisions set 
forth in Section 506 of the CBC, the presence of sprinkler protection and open frontage 
areas onto public ways increases the allowable per floor area of the building.  For the 
Center for the Arts, the area allowed for Type III-A construction is more than 42,600 
square feet per story and to 25,840 square feet per story for Type III-B.  This is because 
the building is sprinklered and has almost 200 feet of its 670-foot perimeter opening onto 
an open area of more than 30 feet in width. 
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Calculations to determine the increase in the floor area for each type of 
construction are as follows: 
 
Frontage Increase 
If = [F/P – 0.25] W / 30 
Where: 
 
If = Area increase due to frontage (percent) 
F = Building perimeter which fronts public way or open space having 20 foot 
minimum width. 
P = Perimeter of the building. 
W = Minimum width of public way or open space. 
For the Center for the Arts: 
F ~ 195 feet 
P ~ 670 feet 
W = 30 feet (since all open areas > 30 feet wide) 
 
Therefore, the increase in floor space because of available public frontage is: 
If = [195/670 – 0.25] 30/ 30 
If = 0.04 or 4% 
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Sprinkler Increase 
 
Section 506.3 of the CBC also provides for an area increase in buildings protected 
with an approved automatic sprinkler system.  The increase, Is is 200 percent for multi-
storied buildings. 
Section 506 of the CBC sets the calculation for the total area modification as: 
Aa = {At + [At x If] + [At x Is]} 
Where: 
Aa = Allowable building area per story (square feet). 
At = Tabular building area per story in accordance with Table 503 (square feet).    
 
For the most restrictive occupancy found in the Center for the Arts, Assembly (A-1), the 
tabular area is 14,000 sq. ft. for Type III-A and 8,500 sq. ft for Type III-B construction. 
 
If = Area increase factor due to frontage as calculated in accordance with Section 
506.2, in this case 4%. 
Is = Area increase factor due to sprinkler protection as calculated in accordance 
with Section 506.3. 
 
For the Center for the Arts, the area modification for Type III-A construction is: 
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Aa = {At + [At x If] + [At x Is]} 
Aa = {14000’ + [14000’ x 0.04] + [14000’ x 2]} 
Aa = 42,560 sq. ft. 
For Type III-B, the area is: 
Aa = {At + [At x If] + [At x Is]} 
Aa = {8500’ + [8500’ x 0.04] + [8500’ x 2]} 
Aa = 25,840 sq. ft. 
 
According to these area allowances and the permitted height and number of stories for 
both Type III-A and III-B construction, the Center for the Arts may be of either type. 
 
Fire Resistance Ratings 
Table 601 of the CBC (shown below) sets forth the minimum fire resistance 
building element requirements for various construction types.  Type III-A construction 
requires a 2-hour fire resistance rating for exterior structural bearing walls, and a 1-hour 
fire resistance rating for interior bearing walls, floors and roof construction. Non-bearing 
interior walls and partitions require no fire resistance rating.   Type III-B construction has 
no fire resistance requirement for any elements other than for exterior bearing walls 
which like in Type III-A is also 2 hours.  Because there are no interior bearing walls, 
these requirements are met throughout the building.  
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BUILDING 
ELEMENT 
TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV TYPE V 
A B Ad B Ad B HT Ad B 
Primary 
structural frameg 
(see Section 202) 
3a 2a 1 0 1 0 HT 1 0 
Bearing Walls          
Exteriorf,g 3 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 
Interior 3a 2a 1 0 1 0 1/HT 1 0 
Nonbearing walls 
and partitions 
Exterior See Table 602 
Nonbearing walls 
and partitions 
Interiore 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
See 
Section 
602.4.6 
0 0 
Floor 
construction and 
secondary 
members (see 
Section 202) 
2 2 1 0 1 0 HT 1 0 
Roof 
construction and 
secondary 
members (see 
Section 202) 
11/2b 1b,c 1b,c 0c 1b,c 0 HT 1b,c 0 
 
Figure 37:  Table 601, California Building Code, 2010 edition 
 
For SI: 1 foot = 304.8 mm. 
a. Roof supports: Fire-resistance ratings of primary structural frame and bearing walls are permitted to be 
reduced by 1 hour where supporting a roof only. 
 
b1. Except in Group A, E, F-1, H, I, L, M, R-1, R-2, R-2.1 and S-1 occupancies, high-rise buildings, and 
other applications listed in Section 1.11 regulated by the Office of the State Fire Marshal, fire protection of 
structural members shall not be required, including protection of roof framing and decking where every 
part of the roof construction is 20 feet or more above any floor immediately below. Fire-retardant-treated 
wood members shall be allowed to be used for such unprotected members. 
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b2. For Group A, E, I, L, R-1, R-2, and R-2.1 occupancies, high-rise buildings, and other applications 
listed in Section 1.11 regulated by the Office of the State Fire Marshal, fire protection of members other 
than the structural frame shall not be required, including protection of roof framing and decking where 
every part of the roof construction is 20 feet or more above any floor immediately below. Fire-retardant-
treated wood members shall be allowed to be used for such unprotected members. 
 
b3. One-story portions of Group A and E assembly occupancies the roof-framing system of Type II A or 
Type III A construction may be of unprotected construction when such roof-framing system is open to the 
assembly area and does not contain concealed spaces. 
 
c. In all occupancies, heavy timber shall be allowed where a 1-hour or less fire-resistance rating is required. 
 
d. An approved automatic sprinkler system in accordance with Section 903.3.1.1 shall be allowed to be 
substituted for 1-hour fire-resistance-rated construction, provided such system is not otherwise required by 
other provisions of the code or used for an allowable area increase in accordance with Section 506.3 or an 
allowable height increase in accordance with Section 504.2. The 1-hour substitution for the fire resistance 
of exterior walls shall not be permitted. 
 
e. Not less than the fire-resistance rating required by other sections of this code. 
 
f. Not less than the fire-resistance rating based on fire separation distance (see Table 602). 
 
g. Not less than the fire-resistance rating as referenced in Section 704.10 
 
 
 
Exterior Walls 
The exterior walls of the Center for the Arts consist of 8-inch thick, filled, 
masonry block units except where there are windows or doors facing onto public areas 
more than 30 feet deep. 
Fire Separation Requirements 
The west wall of the Center for the Arts is approximately 8 feet from the closest 
building.  The north end of the east wall is separated from an adjacent garage by less than 
2 feet.  At the building’s south end, the nearest building lies 30 feet away from the east 
wall (see Figure 38).   
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Figure 38:  Building Separation Layout 
 
The Sections of Table 602 of the CBC dealing with the occupancy classifications 
for the Center of the Arts as shown below list the fire resistance ratings required of 
exterior walls based upon fire separation distance.  For the Center for the Arts, this fire 
resistance rating is 1 hour. 
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FIRE 
SEPARATION 
DISTANCE = X 
(feet) 
TYPE OF 
CONSTRUCTION 
OCCUPANCY 
GROUP A, B, E, F-2, I, 
R,S-2g, Ub 
X < 5c All 1 
5 ≤ X< 10 IA 1 Others 1 
10 ≤ X< 30 
IA, IB 1d 
IIB, VB 0 
Others 1d 
X ≥ 30 All 0 
 
Figure 39:  Calif. Building Code Table 602 - Fire-resistance rating requirements for 
exterior walls based on fire separation distance 
 
 The exterior walls of the Center for the Arts are grouted and filled concrete 
blocks.  Determining the effective fire resistive thickness of a normally hollow unit such 
as a concrete block, one multiplies the thickness of the block by its solid percentage using 
the formula: 
Te = Tn * P   
 
Te = Equivalent Thickness   
Tn = Nominal thickness of block   
P = Percent solid 
 The 8-inch thick, exterior walls were examined by sounding and estimated to be 
completely solid.  Section 721.3.1.4 of the CBC states that for airspaces and cells of 
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concrete block filled with loose-fill material, “The equivalent thickness of completely 
filled hollow concrete masonry is the actual thickness of the unit when loose-fill 
materials are:  sand, pea gravel crushed stone or slag; pumices, scoria, expanded shale, 
expanded clay, expanded slate, expanded slag, expanded fly ash or cinders… or perlite or 
vermiculite…” Accordingly, the Center for the Art’s 8-inch exterior block walls are 
estimated to have an equivalent concrete thickness of 8 inches.  According to Table 
720.1(2) of the CBC, the minimum fire resistance rating for the 8-inch block wall is well 
over 4 hours. 
 The structural framing supporting the concrete block walls consisted of concrete 
block lintels attached to the inside of the exterior walls and positioned under the end of 
each roof truss (8 inch x 20 inch wooden, glulam arched trusses).  It is presumed but 
could not be verified that the lintels contained structural steel within the concrete blocks.   
Because of their apparent construction, the fire resistance of the lintels is the same as the 
exterior walls. 
 Tables 601 and 602 shows that the exterior walls and the primary structural frame 
support of the Center for the Arts meet all fire resistance and fire separation distance 
rating requirements for both Type III-A and III-B construction. 
 
Interior Walls 
 Interior walls throughout the second floor at the front of the building are wood 
framed walls covered with gypsum board.  No plans for the as-built construction were 
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available for examination.   The majority of interior walls appeared to be non-weight 
bearing and serving only as partitions.  Based upon the wall thickness, the studs are 
estimated to be either 3-1/3 or 5-1/2 inches thick, the same thickness as nominal 2x4 or 
2x6 wooden boards (presumably spaced 16 inches on center allowing for 20 minutes of 
protection).  Sheetrock panels appear either ½ inch or 5/8 inch thick.  The wall fire rating 
can be determined using Table 721.6.2(1) of the IBC.  The ratings for ½ inch thick are 15 
minutes for non Type X wallboard or 25 minutes ½ inch Type X.  For 5/8 -inch wallboard, 
the fire resistance is 30 minutes for non Type X wall board or 40 minutes for Type X.  
Calculations using the component additive method show the following fire resistance: 
Wallboard Type                Combined Fire Resistance (mins) 
½ inch regular + wood studs   35 mins 
 ½ inch Type X + wood studs   45 mins 
5/8 inch regular + wood studs   50 mins 
5/8 inch Type X + wood studs   60 mins 
 To meet Type III-A fire resistance requirements, all interior, bearing walls would 
be required to have at least 5/8 inch Type X sheetrock on wooded studs 16 inches on 
center if no sprinkler system was installed.  With the sprinkler system however, a 1-hr 
rating can be achieved because of the sprinkler thus alleviating the need for a more robust 
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fire resistance rating based on structural member types alone.   The presence of the 
sprinklers raises the Center for the Arts construction type from what would normally be a 
Type III-B building to Type III-A. 
The first floor interior walls in the front half of the building are of various 
construction types.  Original wall sections appear to be lath and plaster while later 
additions look like sheetrock on wooden or steel studs.  Again, no plans for the as-built 
construction were available for examination.   Those that might potentially be weight 
bearing walls appeared to be sheathed in plaster instead of sheetrock.  Those walls must 
have a 1-hour rating for Type III-A construction but with Type III-B construction have no 
fire resistance requirements.   The presence of the sprinkler system automatically meets 
the 1-hour requirement for interior walls. 
 The two-story wall separating the main theater from the front of the building is 
approximately 7 inches thick.  It has several unsealed penetrations for HVAC ducting, 
piping, a double door and single door.   With Type III-B construction no fire resistance 
rating is required for the wall and these open penetrations are permissible.  For Type III-
A however, the wall, doors and penetrations would each have to have a 1-hour fire 
resistance rating.   If the wall and door in the wall did in fact meet a 1-hour fire rating, the 
double door could be used as a horizontal exit from the main theater.  While the presence 
of a sprinkler offers a 1-hour resistance rating in general, it does not elevate the condition 
of the wall to meet the requirements of a horizontal exit. 
 The rear (north) wing of the complex has three spaces separated by 8-inch thick, 
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concrete block bearing walls.  Two of the spaces are used for storage of theater props and 
equipment and one contains a day theater, waiting room, dressing rooms and restrooms.  
The smaller rooms have partition walls of sheetrock over 2x4 studs.  The north wing 
meets the previously discussed fire resistance requirements for both Type III-A and III-B 
construction. 
 
Roof 
 The roof framework in the southern half of the building consists of wooden 
planking on an arched, wooden truss framework.  On the second story at the front of the 
building, trusses are bolted with metal bolts.  Over the main theater space, the framework 
is of laminated wooden arched trusses measuring 8 inches wide by 20 inches deep.   The 
trusses over the theater do not have a bottom chord.  The roof decking for a Type III-A 
building requires a 1-hour fire resistance rating.  There is no roofing fire resistance 
requirement for a Type III-B building.   Like with other sections of the building, there 
were no drawings to examine roof specifications.  Roof construction appeared to be 
tongue and groove planks supported on the trusses and covered on the exterior with a 
rolled, aluminized tar and gravel covering.  Paper-sided fiberglass insulation batts are 
suspended under the roof planks and exposed from below. 
 The construction of the Center for the Arts’ roof appears to meet both Type III-A 
and III-B fire resistance requirements based upon section 721.6.2(4) of the CBC. 
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Floors 
 The first floor throughout the structure is concrete either on grade or supported in 
a perimeter concrete foundation.  Various floor coverings are installed over the concrete.  
The second story floor at the front of the building appears to be poured concrete slabs 
supported by plaster encased beams of an unknown type.   Table 601 of the CBC calls for 
a 1-hour fire resistance floor rating for Type III-A construction.  No such rating is needed 
for Type III-B.  Though no plans were available to view, the flooring for the second story 
appears to offer at least a 1-hour rating.  Again, the presence of the sprinkler system 
automatically can be substituted for a 1-hour fire resistance rating except for exterior 
walls. 
 
Structural Fire Protection Summary 
 The Center for the Arts meets the size, height, and area requirements of Type III-
B construction throughout.   With the existing sprinkler protection, it also meets the Type 
III-A requirements.  The only fire resistance rating requirements needed to achieve this 
construction type classification is a 2-hour rating for the exterior bearing walls.  The 8-
inch, filled, concrete block walls easily meet this requirement. 
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Performance Based Analysis 
Tenability Analysis 
 
 
Fire protection in the Center for the Arts relies predominantly on fire prevention 
as well as prompt and safe egress of occupants.  Though installed, the automatic sprinkler 
system is not designed to extinguish a fire, but simply to control one should it occur until 
local firefighters can respond.  Sprinklers do not guarantee complete safety to occupants.  
Instead they are intended to add extra time to that available for safe egress.  One question 
that must be addressed is how much additional time is provided. 
In conducting a performance-based analysis on the Center for the Arts to evaluate 
RSET vs. ASET, four fire scenarios were considered.  Three were in the main theater and 
one was in the rear theater.  These locations were selected because of the likelihood they 
would have the biggest impact on the greatest number of people in terms of evacuation. 
Section 5.2 of the Life Safety Code specifies the types of performance criteria that 
can be used to evaluate fire protection designs.  One of the aspects to be examined in 
such analyses is whether the particular facility can meet tenability performance criteria.  
To do so, one must demonstrate that any occupant not intimate with a fire’s ignition will 
not be exposed to instantaneous or cumulative untenable conditions as specified in 
Section 5.2.2. 
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One of the methods suggested by the Life Safety code for estimating whether a 
building or design meets tenability-related performance criteria is to determine for 
specific design fire scenarios, whether each room will be fully evacuated before the 
smoke or toxic gas layer descends to within 6 feet above the floor.  This method involves 
evaluation of the location, behavior and movements of occupants as well. 
This method was used in conducting the performance-based tenability analysis of 
the Center for the Arts.  Initial reviews showed that for each of several design fire 
scenarios, smoke levels would likely descend within minutes to below 6 feet above the 
floor or other walking surfaces on which people would be located.  Accordingly, the 
required evacuation times (RSET) for maximum occupant loading in the theaters were 
examined based on specific tenability criteria at or below 6 feet above the floor. 
Tenability limits are often specified in terms of four criteria:  visibility, 
temperature, radiant exposure and combustion gas toxicity.  Determining the level of 
exposure to each can be based on somewhat subjective evaluations.  For this analysis, 
untenable conditions were determined to exist when the following values of each criteria 
were reached: 
 
Visibility   < 10 meters 
Temperature   >120°C in dry conditions 
>60°C in moist conditions 
Radiant Flux   >2.5 kW/m2 
Carbon Monoxide  >1,200 ppm 
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The visibility tenability value selected for passage through smoke such as in 
corridors or other escape routes was based on work done by Sherfig13 and 
Hadjisophocleous14.  In their research, they suggest a visibility limit of at least 10 
meters.  This value agrees with suggested values obtained from various documents 
such as the SFPE Handbook and the International Fire Engineering Guidelines for 
large enclosures.  As Hadjisophocleous points out, in a primary room such as an 
office or familiar living space, this value may be dropped down to 3 meters.  Purser 
in the SFPE Handbook suggests a limit of 5 meters in smaller spaces.  Certainly the 
larger value provides a safety margin for less confusion during egress. 
With regards to temperature, a maximum air temperature of 120°C was 
considered since that is the point at which skin exposed to dry, convected air will 
start to feel pain or burn in more than 60 seconds14-15.   The corresponding value for 
moist air is actually lower, closer to 60°C.  After conducting computer-modeling runs 
of fire scenarios in the Center for the Arts, it became clear that for people not in 
intimate contact with fires in the scenarios, exposure to temperatures in excess of 120 
°C value was unlikely.  60°C was reached in some of the scenarios and since it 
usually occurred after sprinkler heads activated, the air was moist with suppression 
water.   Accordingly, that value was chosen to represent untenability. 
Similarly, the tenability limit for radiant heat flux was set at 2.5 kW/m2.  
Babrauskas is listed in the SFPE Handbook16 as choosing a maximum heat flux of 
2.5 kW/m2 as a tenability limit for radiant exposure.   That is a commonly accepted 
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level at which bare skin will generally feel pain.  Conditions of lower intensity should 
limit the onset of burns over a short period of time as well as limit damage to the 
respiratory tracts of people trying to escape.  
The CO level of 1,200 ppm was chosen because at that level, a 30-minute 
exposure will cause incapacitation16.   Shorter time exposures such as the RSETs that 
might be expected for areas through the Center for the Arts might be allowed to go 
higher.  A 5-minute exposure at 6,000 ppm would be expected to cause 
incapacitation so a lower value of 4,000-ppm exposure as a tenability limit for small 
spaces would be appropriate.  In evaluating the various design fire scenarios for the 
Center of the Arts, CO levels remained well within acceptable levels by the time 
other factors became untenable.   
The performance based analysis conducted for this evaluation of the Center for 
the Arts was not done in order to evaluate a particular or specific fire protection system.  
It was instead done to ascertain available safe egress times and compare it with the 
required safe egress times identified for various locations in the building.  The analyses 
were conducted using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), Version 5, a computer fire model 
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.  FDS is capable of 
estimating tenability limit values.  Because of the complex building geometry associated 
with the arched roofs and vertical fuels such as stage curtains, Pyrosim, a graphical user 
interface for FDS was also used to import computer aided drawing (CAD) files created 
during this effort.  Pyrosim then converted the drawing files into the necessary computer 
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input coding needed required to run the FDS model. 
Four design fire scenarios were developed for the performance-based analysis. 
Each was chosen based upon realistic fire possibilities that were identified after visiting 
the Center for the Arts.  Criteria discussed in Section 5.5 of the Life Safety Code were 
used to select appropriate scenarios specific to this facility.  The selections were made to 
simulate both high and low consequence fires as well as a special problem identified in 
the theater.  Available fuels as well as potential ignition sources were evaluated and 
selected based upon their likelihood of occurring as well as the threat to life safety.  Each 
fire scenario involved a T-squared fire growing at rates associated with other fire tests. 
The first three scenarios are set in the main theater.   The fourth scenario occurs in 
the rear theater.  It should be stressed that the fire growth rates are based upon the time a 
fire would grow after established burning occurred.  A slow incipient phase during which 
a fire initially burned with very small flames until starting to grow more rapidly would 
result in a longer fire growth.  In an actual fire, it is often difficult to estimate the time 
leading to established burning.  Such a delay actually benefits the occupants of a 
particular scenario because it tends to increase the ASET for evacuation to safety. 
 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 involves a fire that starts at the south end of the main theater 
underneath stacks of chairs used by the Center for the Arts staff for portable seating.  The 
chairs are a mix of thermoplastic molded chairs as well as metal and wood framed chairs 
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with polyurethane foam padding in the seat and covered with a synthetic fabric.  Chairs 
often stacked 10 high have been seen stored alongside the south edge of the fixed seating 
platform in the eight foot wide space between the seating and the south wall of the 
theater. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40:  Space south of the main theater fixed seating platform and the south wall of 
the theater.  This area is commonly used to stack portable chairs for storage. 
 
 
A fire was selected that starts under the stacks of chairs near the east wall, perhaps 
through human means.  A peak heat release rate of 1,500 kW was chosen based upon 
familiarity with fires involving similar fuels in various test fires or examined in previous 
investigations.  A 60 second growth rate was selected based upon the configuration of the 
fuels.  Stacked plastic commodities have been shown to achieve such high growth rates.  
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This fire is consistent with Design Fire Scenario 1 specified in the Section 5.5.3.1 of the  
Life Safety Code. 
 
Scenario 2 
The second scenario fire also occurs in the main theater.  Upholstered sofas are 
situated in the lounge area at the north of the fixed seating and south of the northern 
storage rooms.  They are available for visitors’ use before or after productions.  A fire 
was selected that occurred adjacent to one of the sofas and peaked at 100 kW in about 30 
seconds similar to a trash can fire.  Again, these values were selected as reasonable based 
upon personal experience with fire testing related to various investigations.  Material 
properties were chosen for upholstered furniture with polyurethane foam cushions that 
have been shown in previous fire modeling efforts to be reasonable in terms of supporting 
ignition from open flaming as well as flame spread across the item. 
This fire is consistent with Design Fire Scenario 5 specified in the Section 5.5.3.5 
of the Life Safety Code although it involves a smaller fire threat.  While it is not 
completely shielded from suppression systems, the location of the fire between two 
sprinklers on a sloped roof reveals the concern with sprinkler activation elsewhere than 
over the fire. 
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Figure 41:  View of the main theater lounge area and upholstered sofas 
 
 
Scenario 3 
The third scenario fire is also in the main theater but on the platform/stage.  Two 
relatively large gymnasium-type mats are stored at the northwest corner of the 
platform/stage between the separating wall to the northwest storage rooms and the 
northernmost three stage curtains.  The mats measure approximately six foot long by five 
feet wide and about four feet high.   Clamp on portable, electric lights have been seen 
positioned directly above the mats.  Additionally, several strands of power to both 
lighting fixtures and audio accessories are often run above the stage.  A catastrophic 
failure in one of the lighting fixtures or other electrical equipment above and dropping 
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onto the mats is the presumed fire cause. 
A peak heat release rate of 2,000 kW was selected along with an ultra-fast growth 
rate.  Full-scale fire tests by Professor Mowrer conducted several years earlier to examine 
the fire growth of gymnasium mats were relied upon to estimate this fire curve20.  It was 
decided that sprinkler activation would likely occur not long after ignition because of the 
relatively small 8-foot distance between the top of the mat and the closest sprinkler head. 
Again, the uncertainty in the fire growth rate with regards to prediction of available safe 
egress time makes the establishment of an actual ASET value difficult.  Even so, it still 
provides an indication of anticipated fire and smoke spread as well as the sprinkler 
system response. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42:  Polyurethane foam gym mats stored at the north side of the platform/stage 
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As with the sofa in Scenario 2, material properties for the mats were chosen based 
upon common values for polyurethane foam that has been shown in previous fire 
modeling efforts to be reasonably accurate.  Identifying specific material properties 
would involve actual testing of the material, perhaps in a cone or full-scale oxygen 
consumption calorimeter to determine the peak heat release rate, burning rate and flame 
spread characteristics.  This fire is consistent with Design Fire Scenario 6 specified in the 
Section 5.5.3.6 of the Life Safety Code.  It is perhaps the most severe, rapidly developing 
fire possible at the Center of the Arts affecting a large number of occupants. 
 
 
Scenario 4 
In scenario 4, a fire starts at the rear of the seating platform in the rear theater 
adjacent to the production control booth.  The seats used in the rear theater are loosely 
situated on the platform but are generally touching to maximize seating capacity.  As in 
the portable chairs used in the main theater, the chairs consist of a metal frame and a 
wooden seat cushioned with polyurethane foam padding and covered with a synthetic 
fabric.   Numerous electrical lines run in and around the control booth to control the 
lighting and sound inside the theater.  While a specific failure mode was not identified, an 
accidental ignition by one of these power sources was presumed. 
Fire modeling was conducted based on a fire growth curve with a 400 kW peak in 
60 seconds.  Material properties for the chairs were the same as those selected for similar 
chairs stacked in the main theater in scenario 1.  This fire is also consistent with Design 
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Fire Scenario 5 specified in the Section 5.5.3.5 of the Life Safety Code.  While the fire is 
not completely shielded from suppression systems, the location of the fire at the rear of 
the seating platform below the seats represents limitations of sprinkler effectiveness when 
water is shielded from the base of a fire.  Water from the closest sprinkler head is blocked 
in part both by the theater control booth as well as the chairs. 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Rear theater seating platform and the adjacent theater control booth behind it 
 
The following assumptions were made in evaluating each of the four scenarios: 
- That the automatic sprinkler system is fully functional. 
- That theatrical productions are underway at the times of the fires.  The 
theaters are darkened with sound at production levels higher than normal, 
ambient conditions. 
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- That only a single fire start occurs in each instance rather than multiple, 
concurrent fire sets that might result from an intensive and aggressive act of 
arson. 
- That the rooms in which the fires start are at maximum occupancy levels. 
- That once fire-room occupants start evacuating, word of the fire spreads 
between people throughout the building and that evacuations of other rooms 
also commence. 
- That in the first three scenarios in the main theater, occupants of the second 
floor discharge through the front exit onto the street and not through the 
theater. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
109 
Computer Fire Modeling – Design Fire Simulations 
Scenario 1 
A 1,500 kW peak HRR fire with a 60 second growth rate burns below the rear 
stacks of chairs south of the main theater fixed seating near the east wall.  The fire is 
centered under four adjacent stacks of chairs.   The first sprinkler activates at around 69 
seconds at the closest head to the south wall of the theater on the easternmost and lowest 
branch line.   A grid size of between 0.2 m and 0.22 m on a side was used throughout the 
main theater domain. 
 
Figure 44:  HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for stackable, polypropylene chairs 
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Figure 45:  HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for stackable, metal-framed, upholstered 
chairs 
 
 Figures 44 and 45 were examined to determine an appropriate growth rate for the 
scenario.   The growth of the scenario was based upon the assumption that established 
burning would occur at time = 0.  Though that might be an overly aggressive assumption 
considering the variety of ignition sources that might start more slowly, the result is 
representative of a worst-case condition.   The peak heat release rate for the fire scenario 
was based upon the heat release rate of a such a fire at the time of sprinkler activation 
determined by the model. 
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Figure 46:  Heat release rate for scenario 1.  Sprinkler activation occurs at about 69 
seconds 
 
A graph of the heat release rate calculated by the model and affected by the 
sprinkler activation shows that even though the fire was spreading through and involving 
the chairs, the effects of the sprinkler controlled the fire to a HRR just above 1,500 kW.  
This is consistent with expected fire growth in stacked commodities where water may not 
reach lower, protected fuels to extinguish fires, but still controls the fire, limiting further 
growth. 
Since there are no fire alarms or notification devices in the main theater, the 
detection and notification times can only be estimated.  Certainly the activation of a 
sprinkler head at the southeast corner of the theater would serve to notify people there. 
Smoke from the fire would also likely alert people seated near the south end of the fixed 
seating even before sprinkler activation.  Detection time was estimated as 30 seconds 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
112 
after ignition.  Since the fire is not located near the stage, it is unlikely that visitors would 
confuse it as being part of a production and will begin moving soon after recognizing the 
threat.  Presumably they would begin warning others and the production staff would raise 
the lighting and cut sound to hasten notification.  Under these circumstances, the 
combination of detection/Notification and pre-movement times estimated at 1 minute. 
According to the movement calculations shown under the egress section, the 
minimum time needed to evacuate the main theater if both exit doors are available is 2.6 - 
2.75 minutes.  If only one door is available, then the time is closer to 3.3 minutes.  It was 
assumed that both exit doors would be opened for Scenario 1 at about 30 seconds after 
ignition and would remain open for the entire simulation.    
With all times combined, the RSET for this scenario is approximately 3.6 minutes 
to 4.3 minutes.   A review of the ASET for Scenario 1 shows that the limiting factor for 
tenability is visibility.  Thermal conditions and CO concentrations remained satisfactory 
beyond the time that visibility dropped.   The maximum temperatures at 6 feet above the 
floor other than at the actual fire were below 40°C.  The maximum CO concentration in 
the simulation was about 100 parts per million, about 1/10th of untenable levels.   Similar 
trends occurred in scenarios 2 and 3.  
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Figure 47:  Scenario 1 - View from south wall of main theater.  Stacked chairs are shown 
to the right in green and tan. 
 
Figure 47 is a representation of the FDS output as generated by the Smokeview 
graphics program.  Perimeter wall sections have been rendered invisible for easier 
viewing.  The blue sections at the left of the graphic represents the theater curtains on the 
platform/stage.  The arched roof and other structural elements are depicted in white and 
grey.  Because FDS is based upon a rectilinear format (squares, rectangles and boxes), 
the shape of curved surfaces such as the arched roof of the Center for the Arts are 
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estimated by creating numerous rectangular sections and stepping them in an offset 
fashion from adjacent blocks. 
 
 
Figure 48: Time = 69.9 seconds just after initial sprinkler activation 
 
Figure 48 shows that shortly after 1 minute of burn, the buoyant smoke has 
reached the opposite side of the theater, its momentum driving it below the arched roof 
level.   Note that the rear exit from the second floor, the top landing of which can be seen 
in white in front of the dark blue theatrical curtains, is already engulfed in smoke over its 
upper section.  A person attempting to egress down those stairs, even though it’s unlikely 
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they would have been alerted to a fire within a minute, would be immersed in smoke 
upon opening the door. 
 
Figure 49: Time = 2 minutes after fire start.  Two sprinkler heads activated. 
 
Within two minutes after ignition, smoke levels descend to near floor level along 
the south side of the fixed seating platform.  Suppression water not only limits the fire 
growth but also cools the smoke, thus reducing its buoyancy.  The second floor rear exit 
stairs are visible towards the left side of the graphic, with the top half of them enveloped 
in smoke. 
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Figure 50: Slice file depicting the visibility 6 feet above the theater floor 
 
The slice file in Figure 50 displays visibility conditions 6 feet above the floor two 
minutes after ignition, the same time as the previous figure.  The dark smoke has been 
removed from the graphic to enhance the view.  Areas shown in light and dark blue 
represent locations where the visibility has fallen below the selected tenability limit of 10 
meters.    
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Figure 51: Northern view slice file showing visibility at a 6 foot height above the floor 
 
This slice shows conditions about 229 seconds after ignition.  Visibility over 
much of the elevated seating platform is well below 10 meters.  Some of the area above 
the fixed seating is actually less than 6 feet above the platform aisles since the 6 foot 
measurement is referenced to the theater floor. 
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Fire Timeline – Scenario 1 
Approx. Time Conditions Visible in Smokeview 
30 seconds Estimated Detection / Notification time 
36 seconds 
 
Smoke descends to the top of the 2nd floor rear exit door. 
Visibility near the top of the exit door at about 12 meters 
50 seconds 
 
Smoke reaches west  (opposite) wall and starts to flow downward 
from momentum 
60 seconds Estimated completion of pre-movement time. 
Upper half of 2nd floor rear exit stairs have visibility <10 meters 
at 6 feet above steps 
64 seconds Smoke reaches north wall and starts to bank down.  
68 seconds 
 
1st sprinkler activates directly overhead burning chairs. 
Momentum of smoke flow across theater slows. 
Heat flux adjacent to the fire at the upper portion of the south 
aisle to fixed seating exceeds 2.5  kw/m2 
71 seconds 
 
Smoke descends to 6 foot height at the north exit door of main 
theater.  Visibility about 20 meters  
82 seconds 
 
Smoke at north theater door risen to about 8 feet above floor but 
smoke is thick at 6 feet above floor in NE corner of theater 
85 seconds 
 
Visibility on the upper level, north end of the fixed seating 
platform is  < 10 meters 
90 seconds 
 
Visibility for the entire north aisle of fixed seating at 6 foot height 
is 10 meters or less. 
Visibility around the bar area of the lounge is below 10 meters. 
98 seconds 
 
2nd sprinkler head activates on next branch line up towards roof 
peak 
100 seconds 
 
East half of double exit doors at south end of theater are 
immersed smoke with visibility < 10 meters.  Smoke down to 
about 6 feet above floor. 
Entire aisle at south end fixed seating has <10 meters visibility at 
6 feet above floor. 
Much of area at south of theater has visibility <10 meters. 
Temperature at the 2nd floor rear exit about 60 °C.  Onset of pain 
or burns from moist air possible. 
110 seconds 
 
Visibility in smoke at upper reaches of fixed seating near south 
end around 10 meters or less at 6 feet above floor 
125seconds 
 
The south doorway to the theater has visibility of only about 2 
meters. 
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Table 6:  Fire Timeline for Scenario 1, fire in stacked chairs in main theater south of 
fixed seating  
 
	  
 Visibility at the southern exit door fell to below the 10-meter tenability limit at 
about 2 minutes after the start of the fire.  Visibility for the entire southern half of the 
theater fell below this limit in about 220 seconds.  Visibility at the northern exit door was 
still above 10 meters until 280 seconds into the simulation.  At that point, egress was 
limited to a single exit, which would necessitate a longer required egress time.    
Occupants throughout the theater other than in the immediate vicinity of the fire would 
not have reached untenable limits for temperature, heat flux or carbon monoxide 
exposure during the 5-minute simulation. 
140 seconds 
 
3rd sprinkler head activates.  Head next one north on easternmost 
branch line  
155 seconds 
 
Visibility at the base of the upper fixed seating near the south end 
is < 2 meters 
158 seconds 
 
4th sprinkler head opens in the center of the ceiling bay between 
first two trusses 
165 seconds 
 
Southeastern portion of fixed seating has visibility well below  
10 meters. 
Visibility south of platform/stage < 10 meters, 6 feet above the 
base floor level. 
195 seconds 
 
5th head opens on second branch line adjacent to south side of the 
2nd truss. 
220 seconds 
 
The entire southern half of the main theater has visibility < 10 
meters 6 feet above floor 
300 seconds 
 
Visibility still > 10 meters at north exit, 6 feet above floor. 
Temperatures in south aisle of fixed seating and throughout main 
body of room 6 feet above the floor remain < 40° C throughout 
the theater except in the fire. CO levels < 100 ppm. 
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 The evaluation of Scenario 1 in terms of ASET vs. RSET shows that while many 
occupants would be able to evacuate from the theater, there was no safety factor for the 
time needed for a complete evacuation. RSET exceeded ASET because of deteriorating 
visibility.  
There is uncertainty in a few variables in Scenario 1 including the fire’s growth 
rate as well as the estimated detection and pre-movement times.  There is also a question 
as to whether the FDS simulation accurately modeled whether the flammable ceiling 
finish throughout the main theater space would have ignited.  Depending on the actual 
flammability of that finish, it is possible that the ceiling may ignite causing fire to sweep 
across the underside of the ceiling trapping some occupants inside in a cloud of burning, 
falling debris.   Temperature at the ceiling directly above the fire is estimated to have 
peaked at 200 °C at 100 seconds after ignition.  Burning brands carried aloft to the ceiling 
are possible but could not be modeled. 
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Figure 52: Visibility vs. Time, Scenario 1 
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Figure 53: ASET vs RSET graph for main theater occupants in Scenario 1 
 
Second floor occupants were presumed to have required longer 
detection/notification and pre-movement times.  Because of the lack of a coordinated 
detection network throughout the building, a fire in the main theater may not have been 
noticed on the second floor until smoke was circulated through the HVAC system (for 
which the air return is located above the second floor spaces) to the second floor.   The 
extent of that circulation is unknown. 
The rear exit to the second floor would have been rendered impassable by smoke 
within one minute of ignition.  It seems doubtful that anyone on the second floor would 
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even have noticed the fire by that time.  Detection notification times there may have 
taken several minutes, however an exact time is likely dependent upon the state of the 
HVAC system at the time as well as natural leakage between the spaces.   Pre-movement 
times would likely take another one to two minutes in the ensuing confusion.  If second 
floor occupants opened the rear exit door to investigate, an initial flow of hot smoke 
through the door would have occurred.   
Fortunately, most productions in the main theater take place after hours and on 
weekends when the second floor occupancies levels are minimal.  Travel times of 100% 
of the second floor occupants through the front exit stairs is estimated at 5.1 minutes.  
That coupled with detection/notification times along with pre-movement times suggests 
evacuation of the second floor may take on the order of 10 minutes or more.  Quick 
thinking occupants of the second floor who open windows at the front of the building to 
allow descending smoke to flow out may extend their available egress time. 
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Scenario 2 
A 100 kW peak HRR fire with a 30 second growth rate, similar in size and growth 
to a trash can fire, starts on one of two upholstered sofas in the lounge area at the north of 
the main theater.  The fire impinges upon the upper back seating portion of the sofa.  FDS 
calculates the initial sprinkler head activation at around 80 seconds.   The grid size used 
was again between 0.2 m and 0.22 m on a side.  It was assumed that both exit doors 
would be opened about 30 seconds after ignition and remain open for the entire fire 
simulation. 
 
Figure 54: HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for various upholstered furniture items 
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Figure 54 was considered in determining an appropriate growth rate for the 
scenario.   The growth of the scenario was based upon the assumption that established 
burning would occur at time = 0.  Though such an assumption might be overly aggressive 
in light of the variety of ignition sources that might start more slowly, the fire represents 
a worst-case condition.    
A graph of the heat release rate calculated by the model shows that unlike in 
scenario 1, this fire continued to grow in size even after activation of the first sprinkler.  
This is in part due to the fact that the first sprinkler to activate is located “upslope” from 
the fire plume.  The second sprinkler head that activates is actually “downslope” and 
closer to the outer wall, some 20 feet away.  Neither of these sprinklers appears to have 
provided the typical control that might be expected of a fire under or near a sprinkler 
head.  This type of situation with sloped ceilings is discussed in NFPA 13 in Section 
11.2.3.2.4 and calls for a 30% increase in sprinkler coverage if the ceiling slope exceeds 
1 in 6.  Sprinkler designers for the Center for the Arts added that extra coverage near the 
east and west walls of the building between the outermost branch lines.  Even so, the 
water from the sprinkler did not appear to limit this fire’s growth to the heat release rate 
level at the time of sprinkler activation. 
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Figure 55:  Scenario 1 HRR.  Sprinkler activation occurs at about 69 seconds 
 
 It is assumed like with scenarios 1 and 3, the fire occurs during a theatrical 
production and that lights are dimmed and sound is possibly elevated.  During such times, 
the lounge area north of the fixed seating typically is empty of patrons.  Because of this, 
the time to fire detection and notification will likely be somewhat extended unless light 
from flames catches someone’s attention.  Otherwise, the detection and notification time 
is estimated at about one minute.  Pre-movement time is again estimated at an additional 
30 seconds.  It is unlikely that visitors would confuse a fire in the lounge area as being 
part of a theatrical production. 
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Figure 56:  View from north shortly after 1st sprinkler activation at 80 seconds 
 
This view from the north of the theater to the area of fire origin clearly shows 
activation of the first sprinkler head several feet laterally removed from the smoke plume.  
It also shows the plume leaning over somewhat to the east away from the open sprinkler 
head. 
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Figure 57:  View from south even before 1st sprinkler activation showing second floor 
exit immersed in smoke and untenable visibility conditions 
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Figure 58:  View from north shortly after 3rd sprinkler activation at 107 seconds 
  
As shown in Figure 58, three sprinkler heads activate in just under two minutes 
yet none of them is directly above the seat of the fire in this instance.  This certainly 
limits outward flame spread but has little extinguishing effect on the original fire. 
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Figure 59:  View from north shows visibility < 10m at north door 6 feet above the floor  
  
 By 157 seconds, the visibility 6 feet above the floor at the north exit door has 
fallen well below 10 meters making visibility conditions untenable at that door.  
Elsewhere in the southern portion of the theater, visibility is still adequate for egress.  
This causes the overall movement time for complete evacuation to increase to somewhere 
between 2.6 and 3.3 minutes calculated in Appendix A. 
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Figure 60:  View from south.  Visibility at 6 feet height by the exit door < 10 m 
 
By 275 seconds, occupants are subject to untenable visibility conditions 6 feet 
above the floor at the south exit door.  Smoke has caused visibility to fall well below 10 
meters.   
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Figure 61:  View from north.  Temperatures are below 60 °C at 6 foot height throughout 
 
 By the end of the simulation, temperatures 6 feet above the floor remain below 
even the 60 °C level of untenability throughout the theater.  Temperatures at the rear exit 
to the second floor passed this point at about 90 seconds into the fire shortly after that 
area was already rendered untenable by low visibility. 
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Fire Timeline – Scenario 2 
Approx. Time Conditions Visible in Smokeview 
50 seconds Visibility untenable at 2nd floor rear exit door 
60 seconds Estimated Detection & Notification time 
65 seconds Smoke at 6 feet above the south aisle of fixed seating temporarily 
drops to < 10 meters 
69 seconds Smoke in upper rows at southern part of fixed seating temporarily 
drops the visibility to < 10 meters 
80 seconds 1st sprinkler head activates. 
81 seconds Visibility 6 feet above top level of fixed seating < 10 meters 
90 seconds Estimated pre-movement time complete. 
Temperature untenable at 2nd floor rear exit door 
99 seconds Smoke at south end of fixed seating rises and visibility > 10 
meters 
105 seconds 2nd sprinkler head activates at lowest branch line to east 
107 seconds 3rd sprinkler head activates closer to roof peak, further from fire 
plume 
158 seconds Visibility untenable at north exit, 6 feet above the floor 
230 seconds Visibility untenable at south exit, 6 feet above the floor 
300 seconds Temperatures at 6 feet above floor throughout the theater remain 
below 60 °C 
Table 7:  Fire Timeline for Scenario 2, fire in sofa in lounge area of main theater  
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Figure 62: Visibility vs. Time, Scenario 2 
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Figure 63: ASET vs RSET graph for main theater occupants in Scenario 2 
 
The ASET vs. RSET graph for Scenario 2 shows that the required safe egress 
time from the main theater would be expected to be on the order of 4 to 4.5 minutes.  The 
difference between the two is dependent upon whether or not some of the people could 
evacuate through the north exit door prior to visibility there becoming untenable at 158 
seconds.  If so, then it’s possible the ASET is sufficient since visibility at the south exit 
door is generally adequate until about 230 seconds after the fire start. Temperature, heat 
flux and carbon monoxide exposures remained tenable throughout the entire period.   If 
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the detection/notification and pre-movement times can be shortened by about a minute 
than those estimated here, the likelihood of a successful evacuation improves.  If the 
flammable ceiling finish becomes involved in fire and upper level flames spread 
throughout the theater, the chances of injuries or fatalities increase. Regardless, even 
though this fire is relatively small in size, this scenario again shows there is little chance 
of a complete evacuation of the main theater even with sprinkler activation unless early 
notification occurs. 
As with Scenario 1, egress of occupants of the front lobby areas and art gallery 
along with those in the second floor spaces was not studied.  Even though the fire in this 
scenario starts at the north end of the theater opposite these spaces, rapid smoke filling 
throughout the theater makes the second floor rear exit unusable in less than a minute, 
very similarly to a fire burning at the south end of the theater adjacent to these spaces.  
Successful evacuation of the second floor will again rely on 100% evacuation through the 
front exit door.  Second floor evacuation times are again estimated at up to ten minutes 
depending on the number of people there at the time. 
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Scenario 3  
The third fire scenario occurs on the platform/stage.  Two large gymnasium-type 
mats kept there are presumed to ignite and burn, possibly started by a malfunction in 
nearby electrical equipment.  A peak heat release rate of 2,000 kW was chosen with an 
ultra-fast growth rate.  Testing conducted several years ago in full-scale fire tests by 
Professor Mowrer to examine the fire growth of gymnasium mats were considered in 
estimating this fire curve.  It was concluded that sprinkler activation would likely follow 
not long after ignition because of the relatively close distance between the top of the mat 
and the sprinkler.   Reducing the growth rate in the model to provide for a slower fire 
development would significantly increase calculation time and likely not add 
substantially to the understanding of smoke layer development and spread or the response 
by the automatic sprinkler system.   It might provide a more conservative estimate of the 
ASET.   A similar mesh size of between 0.2 m and 0.22 m like those for scenarios 1 and 
2 was again used. 
Figure 54 (shown above on page 124) was again used to determine an appropriate 
growth rate for this scenario since the major mass of the gym mat is polyurethane foam.   
The growth of the scenario was once again based upon the assumption that established 
burning would start at the very onset of the scenario.  Though such an assumption might 
be overly aggressive in light of the variety of ignition sources that might start more 
slowly, the fire represents a worst-case condition and minimizes unnecessary model 
calculation time. 
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Figure 64:  Heat release rate for scenario 3.  Sprinkler activation occurs at about 73 
seconds. 
 
The estimated growth rate of the fire seemed reasonable in comparison to actual 
testing. Though there was the potential for a much higher peak heat release rate without 
sprinklers, the peak rate in the model was consistent with a sprinkler activation that 
controlled the fire growth but did not extinguish the blaze. 
Detection and notification times were estimated to be on the order of 60 seconds.  
It would be expected to be less if the platform/stage was occupied at the time.  The gym 
mat is generally not observable by the audience.  If the platform/stage was occupied as in 
a performance, back-stage actors and stagehands would be expected to notice the fire and 
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give directions to visitors.  This would reduce pre-movement time to approximately 45 
seconds.  As with Scenarios 1 and 2, movement time for evacuation of the main theater is 
estimated at between 2.6 or 2.75 minutes when both exit doors are accessible to 3.3 
minutes for only one door.  In this scenario, both doors should have remained accessible 
for equal periods of time.  Both exit doors are assumed to be opened about 30 seconds 
after ignition and to remain open for the entire fire simulation. 
 
 
 
Figure 65:  View of west side of main theater.  Gym mats shown to left with green top.  
The white space to the right of the mat depicts the rear side of the theater screen. 
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Figure 65 is the Smokeview output of the layout of Scenario 3 in the main theater.  
The graphic depicts the theater prior to ignition.  As before, wall sections have been 
rendered invisible for ease of viewing.  The blue sections represent the curtains on the 
platform/stage.  Structural elements are generally depicted in white.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 66:  View from west of main theater shortly after 1st sprinkler activation at 75 
seconds 
 
 The first sprinkler activates at about 73 seconds after the fire start.  The estimated 
HRR at the time is about 2,000 kW.  Smoke levels have already enveloped the rear exit 
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door from the second floor and have descended approximately one-third the depth from 
floor to ceiling. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67:  View from southwest shortly after 1st sprinkler activation at 75 seconds 
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Figure 68:  View from southeast after 4th sprinkler activation at 95 seconds 
 
Because of the intensity of the fire and the elevated position of the gym mats in 
relation to the sprinklers, four sprinkler heads activate within 22 seconds of each other.  
By the time the 4th head activates, smoke levels descend below a level 6 feet above the 
upper fixed seating platform.  
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Figure 69:  Visibility slice at the southern aisle of the seating platform at 110 seconds.   
  
By 110 seconds, the visibility at 6 feet above the upper platform in the fixed 
seating is well below 10 meters.  Overall smoke layer stability is nearly uniform 
throughout the main theater and still descending. 
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Figure 70:  View from north at 180 seconds.  Visibility 6 feet above the floor < 10 meters 
 
 By 180 seconds into the fire, at least five sprinklers have activated including one 
at the peak of the roof, approximately 35 feet laterally distant from the main fire.  The 
number of activations not only tax the sprinkler system’s ability to control the fire by 
adding increased water demand but they also cool the smoke sufficiently to drop 
visibility levels at 6 feet above the theater floor to less than 10 meters. 
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Figure 71:  Visibility slice shown from the northeast at 240 seconds.  Visibility at 3 feet 
above the floor < 10 meters 
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Figure 72:  Chart of sprinkler element temperature vs. time showing activations for 
Scenario 3 
 
 
The magnitude of the gym mat fire revels that in addition to creating untenable 
conditions for occupants in terms of visibility, it also severely challenges the sprinkler 
system.  By four minutes into the fire, at least eight sprinkler heads activate.  The 
sprinkler system was designed to fully operate with up to five heads activating. 
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Figure 73:  View of gas temperatures at 270 seconds into the fire 
 
 
Throughout the fire, though smoke levels drop close to the floor, temperature 
exposures at a level 6 feet above the highest seating level do not reach above 60 °C.  
Although the fire conditions become untenable in terms of visibility, they do not become 
untenable due to temperature exposure.   
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Table 8:  Fire Timeline for Scenario 3, fire in gym mat on main theater platform/stage 
 
 
Fire Timeline – Scenario 3 
Approx. Time Conditions Visible on Smokeview 
48 seconds Visibility < 10 meters at 2nd floor rear exit 
60 seconds Estimated Detection / Notification time 
64 seconds Smoke reaches east side of theater 
68 seconds Visibility near zero at base of 2nd floor rear exit upper landing 
73 seconds 1st sprinkler head activates above fire 
84 seconds 2nd and 3rd sprinkler heads activate 
84.3 seconds 4th sprinkler head activates  
95 seconds 5th sprinkler head activates 
96 seconds Visibility < 10 meters at north end, top of fixed seating 
105 seconds Estimated completion of pre-movement time 
110 seconds Visibility < 10 meters at south end, top of fixed seating 
155 seconds 6th sprinkler head activates 
200 seconds 7th sprinkler head activates 
Visibility < 10 meters throughout theater at about 6 feet above 
floor 
205 seconds 8th sprinkler head activates 
230 seconds Visibility < 10 meters throughout theater; rolls out north door 
240 seconds Visibility < 10 meters throughout theater; rolls out south door 
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Figure 74: Visibility vs. Time, Scenario 3 
 
 The visibility at 6 feet above the floor at the south doors, north doors and stage 
temporarily drops to below the 10-meter tenability limit at about 50 seconds at the south 
and 170 seconds at the north and stage.  These are short-lived instances however and the 
visibility quickly raises to tenable levels.  Not until around 200 seconds does the visibility 
at all three areas become untenable for an extended period of time.   Accordingly, the 
ASET based upon visibility was estimated at 200 seconds after ignition.  It should be 
noted that in this instance, as in Scenarios 1 and 2, the visibility at the second floor rear 
exit becomes untenable in less than a minute. 
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Figure 75: ASET vs RSET graph for main theater occupants in Scenario 3 
 
 As seen by the ASET vs. RSET graph for Scenario 3, though the required safe 
egress time from the main theater would be expected to be on the order of 4.5 minutes, 
visibility of more than 10 meters at a point 6 feet above the floor lasted slightly more than 
3 minutes.  Temperature, heat flux and carbon monoxide exposures remained well below 
the tenability limits throughout the entire period.   The maximum temperature outside the 
immediate fire area at 6 feet above the floor was about 40 °C.  Maximum CO levels again 
reached only about 100 ppm, 10 times less than untenable conditions.   
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Once again like in the first two scenarios, only the egress of occupants from the 
main theater was examined.  And like with the first two scenarios, the second floor rear 
exit became untenable in less than a minute.  The uncertainty in the detection/notification 
times on the second floor is high.  The available safe egress time from the second floor is 
unknown and a matter of speculation.  What is likely however is that the required safe 
egress time using conservative estimates of detection/notification and pre-movement 
times is on the order of 10 minutes after ignition depending on the occupancy load of the 
second floor at the time of the fire. 
In order to improve the ASET vs. RSET conditions for Scenario 3, the 
detection/notification and pre-movement times must be decreased. Even if they were 
decreased to on the order of 30 seconds, a full safe evacuation of the maximum 
occupancy load of the theater even with sprinkler activations is questionable. If the 
estimated fire growth rate used in the model is faster than an actual fire would grow, 
some time cushion would result.    If actual sprinkler activations followed the pattern 
revealed in the model, then its possible that the entire system might be overwhelmed.   
Residual water supply pressure and supply may be sufficient to handle the additional load 
but a new hydraulic calculation should be performed to verify that. 
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Scenario 4 
Scenario 4 involves a fire in the rear theater.  It starts behind the rear row of 
audience seats at the top of platform, adjacent to the production control booth.  The 
movable seats used in the rear theater consist of a metal frame and a wooden seat 
cushioned with polyurethane foam padding and covered with a synthetic fabric.   
Numerous electrical power lines run in and around the control booth to operate the 
lighting and sound inside the theater.  While a specific failure mode to cause this fire was 
not identified, an accidental ignition by one of these power sources was presumed. 
Fire modeling was conducted based on a fire growth curve of an initial fuel with a 
400 kW peak in 60 seconds.  The fire spreads to other fuels including chairs in the area of 
origin before the sprinkler system activates.  Material properties selected for the chairs 
are the same as those selected for similar chairs stacked in the main theater in scenario 1.   
The initial fire was designed to start decaying after 60 seconds. 
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Figure 76:  HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for stacked wood pallets 
 
Figure 76 was considered in estimating an appropriate growth rate for the 
scenario.   The fire started under the chairs on the rear side of the platform and would 
initially involve openly configured, vertical and horizontal wood members.  The growth 
of the scenario was based upon two assumptions.  The first was that established burning 
would occur at time = 0 and the second was the involvement of the fire on the wooden 
items would be at a rate consistent with Figure 76.  The peak heat release rate was based 
upon estimations of the amount of wood that would be burning as well as upholstered 
cushions on the chairs by the time of sprinkler activation.   
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This scenario again assumes that the fire occurs during a theatrical production and 
that lights are dimmed and sound is possibly elevated.  Because of the relatively small 
size of the theater and the location of the fire near the audience, detection and notification 
times would likely be on the order of 30 seconds or less if the platform/stage is occupied 
at the time.  The first audience members to notice the fire would be expected to notify 
others and begin moving. Pre-movement time is estimated at 30 seconds after 
notification. Since a smoke detector is mounted in the normally open sprinkler control 
room at the rear of the theater, it is expected that detector would sound within one minute 
of the onset of the fire and activate the horn-strobe notification device.  Additionally, 
once a sprinkler head opens, the outside vibrating bell will sound.   
Movement time for evacuation of the rear theater is estimated at 1.5 minutes.  
People in the rear lobby at the time of the fire would be notified by the horn strobe 
sounding or when actors or theater personnel in the dressing rooms move to the lobby 
door to evacuate.  The main exit door to the theater is assumed to be opened 20 seconds 
after the start of the fire and to remain open.  The sprinkler control room door and the 
rear lobby exit door are assumed to be opened at 60 seconds after ignition and to remain 
open. 
 Unlike the fires in the three main theater scenarios, this fire decays almost as 
quickly as it grows.  Any ignition of the chairs is quickly controlled and extinguished in 
part due to the closer proximity of the low sprinkler heads in this theater as compared to 
those in the main theater. 
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Figure 77:  Heat release rate for scenario 3.  Sprinkler activation occurs at about 73 
seconds. 
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Figure 78:  View of rear wing from northwest.  West wall made invisible for viewing.  
Seating on the seating platform is shown in olive green. 
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Figure 79:  Close-up view of the rear theater 30 seconds after ignition. Detection by 
occupants presumed to happen by this time. 
 
 
By 30 seconds after ignition, an established smoke plume likely would alert 
occupants in the seating area as well as theater personnel in the control booth 
immediately behind the seating. 
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Figure 80:  Sprinkler head activates above control room at 73 seconds 
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Figure 81:  By 87 seconds visibility throughout seating area is untenable 
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Figure 82:  Wider view of rear theater at 87 seconds.  Smoke has reached the sprinkler 
room. 
 
 By 87 seconds after ignition, the smoke level had enveloped much of the seating 
area and has flowed into the sprinkler room.  The smoke detector there would have 
activated by this time alerting people outside the building of a fire within. 
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Figure 83:  Visibility slice file 6 feet above floor showing untenable conditions in blue 
 
 Though the platform/stage area still has adequate visibility a minute and a half 
after ignition, the rear seating area is mostly enveloped in smoke causing visibility to 
drop to below untenable conditions.  If the doorway behind the platform/stage is clearly 
marked and visible with open access, some patrons will likely move towards it and into 
the sprinkler room exiting through its door into the parking lot. 
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Figure 84:  Vertical slice at 101 sec.  The stage is to the left and seating to the right.  
Visibility about 6 feet above floor is less than 10 meters. 
 
 By 101 seconds, the visibility throughout the rear theater at 6 feet above the floor 
is reduced to untenable conditions.   The fire size has decays to around 200 kW, that of a 
moderate trash can fire.   
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Figure 85:  Maximum temperatures of about 30 °C reached at 6 feet above floor outside 
of fire plume 
 
 Though visibility conditions from even a small fire such as this worsened rapidly 
and became untenable within a minute and a half, temperatures in the theater remained 
moderate.  This slice shows temperatures at 6 feet above the floor at their near-maximum 
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levels in the fire.  Subsequently, as the fire decays, temperatures quickly drop.   
Maximum CO levels of about 140 ppm occur at 200 seconds and thereafter drop.  At 
about the time the sprinkler activates, heat fluxes reach approximately 3 kW/m2 at the 
backs of the second row of chairs from the top row as the fire grows under the rear seats.  
Thereafter it drops to well below the untenable limit of 2.5 kW/m2.  Heat fluxes outside 
the area of actual fire also remain low. 
 
 
Table 9:  Fire Timeline for Scenario 3, fire in gym mat on main theater platform/stage 
 
 
 
Fire Timeline – Scenario 4 
Approx. 
Time 
Conditions Visible on Smokeview 
30 seconds Estimated Detection and Notification time 
60 seconds Estimated completion of pre-movement time 
73 seconds 1st sprinkler head activates above fire 
75 seconds The bottom of the smoke layer had descended to about 6 feet above 
top level of seating platform 
87 seconds Visibility is untenable at 6 feet above the eastern 2/3 of seating 
platform 
101 seconds Visibility is untenable at 6 feet above the floor throughout the 
theater 
120 seconds Peak temperatures of about 30 °C at 6 feet above the floor 
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Figure 86: ASET vs RSET graph for rear theater occupants in Scenario 4 
 
The ASET vs RSET graph for Scenario 4 clearly demonstrates that with even a 
small fire controlled by sprinkler activation, occupants of the rear theater would be 
exposed to untenable visibility conditions before a full evacuation could be expected.   
By 101 seconds, visibility at six feet above the floor is less than 10 meters throughout the 
theater.  At this time, visibility near the floor would be adequate but would require 
evacuees to bend down below normal standing height or crawl from the theater.   
Fortunately, temperatures in this scenario at 6 feet above the floor and below never peak 
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much above about 30 °C except in the fire plume reducing thermal exposure from such a 
small fire controlled by sprinkler activation.  
Even so, this scenario clearly demonstrates the need for alternate exits out of the 
rear theater in accordance with the remoteness requirements contained in Sections 
7.5.1.3.1 and 7.5.1.3.2 of the Life Safety Code.  They state in part that multiple, 
accessible exits must be located no closer to each other than one half the diagonal 
measurement of a room.  For the rear theater, that minimum separation distance between 
exits is on the order of 28 feet. 
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Comments and Recommendations 
 
 The prescriptive and performance-based analyses of the Center for the Arts 
building identified various factors related to both major and minor fire safety issues that 
might affect the life safety of the building occupants.  Computer fire modeling 
simulations showed that with regards to four design fire scenarios created to examine 
ASET vs. RSET, that even with an automatic sprinkler suppression system activating, 
maximum occupancy loads face significant hurdles in achieving safe egress and that 
incomplete evacuations are likely. 
Possible corrective measures are discussed below that could either decrease the 
required time needed for safe egress allowing for a greater margin of safety or increase 
the available safe egress time.    Some are relatively easy to accomplish while others may 
require more intense and perhaps costly efforts. 
 History has shown that when fires occur in buildings with similar, unaddressed 
issues, large losses of life and numerous injuries to occupants can result.   Two notable 
examples of fires that led to tremendous loss of life in the past 40 years were the Station 
Nightclub fire in 2003 in which 100 people died and more than 200 more were injured 
and the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in 1977 that resulted in 164 deaths and more than 
200 injuries. 
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Alarm System 
The	  Center	   for	   the	  Arts	   is	   not	   required	   by	   code	   to	   have	   an	   alarm	   system	  besides	   that	   installed	   in	   the	   sprinkler	   control	   room.	   	   Even	   so,	   the	   performance-­‐based	   analyses	   presented	   herein	   have	   shown	   the	   benefit	   of	   modification	   and	  extension	   of	   the	   existing	   system.	   	   	   	   	   NFPA	   72	   states	   that,	   “Fire	   alarm	   systems	  intended	   for	   life	   safety	   should	  be	  designed,	   installed,	   and	  maintained	   to	  provide	  indication	   and	   warning	   of	   abnormal	   fire	   conditions.	   The	   system	   should	   alert	  building	   occupants	   and	   summon	   appropriate	   aid	   in	   adequate	   time	   to	   allow	   for	  occupants	   to	   travel	   to	   a	   safe	   place	   and	   for	   rescue	   operations	   to	   occur.	   The	   fire	  alarm	  system	  should	  be	  part	  of	  a	  life	  safety	  plan	  that	  also	  includes	  a	  combination	  of	  prevention,	  protection,	  egress,	  and	  other	  features	  particular	  to	  that	  occupancy.”	  The	  Life	  Safety	  Code	  sets	   forth	  as	  one	  of	   its	  principal	  objectives,	   the	   idea	  of	  occupant	  protection.	  	  In	  it	  is	  states,	  “A	  structure	  shall	  be	  designed,	  constructed,	  and	  maintained	   to	   protect	   occupants	   who	   are	   not	   intimate	   with	   the	   initial	   fire	  development	  for	  the	  time	  needed	  to	  evacuate,	  relocate,	  or	  defend	  in	  place.”	  	  Many	  of	  the	  occupants	  of	  the	  Center	  for	  the	  Arts	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  first	  time	  or	  occasional	  visitors	   not	   totally	   familiar	   with	   the	   building	   and	   its	   system	   and	   layout.	  	  	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  above	  objective	  contained	  in	  the	  LSC	  seems	  particularly	  applicable	  to	  the	  Center	  for	  the	  Arts.	  The	   water	   flow	   alarm	   for	   the	   sprinkler	   system	   is	   connected	   to	   only	   two	  notification	  appliances,	  a	  horn/strobe	   	  mounted	   	   in	   	  the	   	  rear	   	  theater	  adjacent	  to	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the	  sprinkler	  room	  and	  a	  vibrating	  bell	  mounted	  on	  the	  exterior,	  north	  end	  of	  the	  building,	  also	  adjacent	  to	  the	  sprinkler	  room.	  According	  to	  the	  building	  staff,	  even	  if	  either	  of	  those	  notification	  appliances	  should	  activate,	  they	  may	  not	  be	  heard	  under	  normal	   circumstances	   in	   the	   main	   part	   of	   the	   building	   that	   includes	   the	   main	  theater,	  the	  front	  lobby	  and	  offices	  or	  in	  the	  second	  floor	  spaces.	  During	  a	  performance	  in	  the	  main	  theater,	  attendees	  there	  might	  never	  hear	  the	   notification	   appliances	   sounding	   because	   of	   the	   sound	   levels	   from	   ongoing	  presentation.	   	   	   The	   potential	   evacuation	   delays	   could	   have	   deadly	   consequences.	  Attendees	  would	  likely	  be	  delayed	  in	  starting	  their	  departure	  making	  a	  safe,	  timely	  and	  full	  evacuation	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  Modifications	   and	   additions	   to	   the	   existing	   alarm	   system	   could	   greatly	  enhance	  the	  protection	  of	  theater	  occupants	  from	  such	  an	  event.	  	  First	  and	  relatively	  easily,	   the	  existing	  notification	  appliance	  system	   for	   the	  waterflow	  alarm	  could	  be	  extended	   to	   the	  main	   theater,	   front	   lobby	  and	   the	   second	   floor	  occupancies.	   	   This	  simple	   improvement	   would	   reduce	   detection/notification	   and	   probably	   pre-­‐movement	   times	   significantly.	   	   Further,	   commercially	   available	   devices	   could	   link	  the	  alarm	  system	  with	  the	  theater’s	  sound	  and	  lighting	  systems.	   	   	   In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  fire	  during	  a	  performance,	   theatrical	  sound	   levels	  would	  be	  automatically	  reduced	  to	  allow	  fire	  notification	  appliances	  to	  be	  heard	  and	  lighting	  levels	  in	  the	  darkened	  theater	   would	   be	   raised.	   	   Provisions	   for	   such	   systems	   are	   discussed	   in	   Section	  18.4.3.1	  of	  NFPA	  72.	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Where	   acceptable	   to	   the	   authority	   having	   jurisdiction,	   reducing	   the	  background	   noise	   is	   a	   viable	   alternative	   to	   providing	   a	   fire	   alarm	   notification	  system	  with	  high	  level	  audio	  output.	  NFPA	  72	  states	  that	  in	  some	  situations,	  such	  as	   nightclubs,	   concert	   halls,	   and	   theaters,	   an	   advisable	   action	   is	   to	   stop	   the	  background	  noise	  and	  control	  the	  lighting	  to	  create	  a	  sudden	  and	  noticeable	  change	  in	   the	   environment	   to	   get	   people’s	   attention.	   	   This	   would	   serve	   to	   alert	   both	  visitors	  and	  employees.	  It	  is	  also	  recommended	  to	  extend	  the	  smoke	  detection	  system	  to	  under	  the	  ceiling	   in	   the	   main	   theater	   to	   provide	   additional	   notification	   time	   to	   occupants.	  	  While	  detection	  throughout	  the	  theater	  is	  recommended,	  even	  a	  line	  of	  detectors	  at	  the	   top	   of	   the	   arched	   ceiling	   would	   be	   a	   significant	   improvement.	   	   In	   the	  performance-­‐based	  scenarios,	  the	  time	  to	  detection	  was	  wholly	  based	  on	  occupant	  detection.	   	  Although	  a	  wet	  pipe	  sprinkler	  system	   is	   installed,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   large	  amounts	   of	   smoke	   can	   be	   produced	   and	   spread	   throughout	   the	   theater	   before	   a	  sprinkler	  head	   activates.	   	   Any	   reduction	   in	   the	   time	  of	   detection	   and	  notification	  adds	  a	  safety	  margin	  to	  RSET.	  	  	  Another	   alarm	   system	   improvement	   that	   would	   minimize	   smoke	   flow	  throughout	  the	  Center	  for	  the	  Arts	  would	  be	  connecting	  the	  fire	  detection	  system	  to	  the	  HVAC	  air	  movers.	  	  Once	  a	  detection	  signal	  was	  sensed,	  power	  to	  the	  fans	  would	  be	   shut	  off	   thus	  minimizing	   forced	  circulation	  of	   smoke	   into	   the	   first	   and	   second	  floor	  spaces	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  building.	  	  An	  air	  return	  located	  near	  the	  peak	  of	  the	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south	   wall	   of	   the	   main	   theater	   routes	   air	   into	   cooling	   equipment	   located	   in	   a	  portion	  of	  the	  ceiling/attic	  space	  above	  the	  second	  floor.	   	  Disabling	  air	  movement	  through	  this	  system	  during	  a	  fire	  would	  slow	  the	  smoke	  flow	  out	  of	  the	  theater	  to	  a	  rate	  wholly	  dependent	  on	  leakage	  rather	  than	  forced	  air	  flow.	  The	   AHJ	   previously	   opined	   that	   the	   Center	   for	   the	   Arts	   is	   relieved	   of	   the	  onus	   of	   Section	   13.3.4.1.1	   of	   the	   Life	   Safety	   Code	   (requiring	   an	   alarm	   system	   in	  existing	  assembly	  spaces	  with	  occupant	  loads	  of	  more	  than	  300)	  since	  a	  sprinkler	  system	   is	   installed	   therein.	   	  The	  reasoning	  was	   that	  a	  sprinkler	  head	  can	  act	  as	  a	  form	   of	   heat	   detector	   and	   serve	   to	   alert	   occupants	   of	   fire	   danger.	   	   As	   the	  performance	  based	  analyses	  showed,	  by	  the	  time	  sprinklers	  do	  activate,	  smoke	  can	  be	  widespread	  throughout	  the	  main	  theater	  and	  visibility	  levels	  quickly	  dropping.	  A	   series	   of	   smoke	   detectors	   and	   notification	   devices	   installed	   in	   the	  main	  theater	  would	   provide	   earlier	   alerts	   to	   fire	   there	   than	  would	   the	   activation	   of	   a	  sprinkler	   head.	   	   Since	   the	   existing	   sound	   and	   visual	   appliances	   connected	   to	   the	  waterflow	  alarm	  are	   located	  well	  outside	  the	  theater,	   it	  should	  be	  presumed	  they	  might	  be	  completely	  ineffective	  in	  alerting	  occupants	  of	  fire	  danger.	  In	   addition	   to	   adding	   an	   alarm	   system	   to	   the	   main	   theater,	   addition	   of	  detection	   and	   notification	   appliances	   on	   the	   second	   floor	   should	   also	   be	  considered.	   	   Since	   the	   second	   floor	   occupancies	   do	   not	   share	   common	   areas	   or	  activities	  with	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  building	  with	   the	  exception	  of	  HVAC,	  a	   fire	   starting	  elsewhere	  could	  easily	  go	  unnoticed	  on	  the	  second	  floor	  for	  a	  significant	  time.	  	  That	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along	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  half	  of	  the	  second	  floor	  egress	  capacity	  passes	  through	  the	   main	   theater	   makes	   it	   crucial	   to	   provide	   second	   floor	   occupants	   with	   early	  notification.	  	  As	  is	  evident	  with	  each	  of	  the	  three	  fire	  scenarios	  in	  the	  main	  theater,	  the	  second	  floor	  rear	  exit	  can	  become	  impassable	  within	  one	  minute	  of	  fire	  ignition	  at	  ground	  level	  in	  the	  theater.	  Lastly,	   though	  perhaps	  minor	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   other	   alarm	   issues,	   the	  existing	  smoke	  detector	  arrangement	   in	  the	  art	  gallery	   is	   insufficient	  and	  does	  not	  meet	  code	  requirements	  with	  regards	   to	  placement.	   	  Sections	  17.5.2	  and	  17.5	  3	  of	  NFPA	  72,	   the	  National	  Fire	  Alarm	  and	  Signaling	  Code	  dictate	  that	  smoke	  detectors	  should	   be	   mounted	   within	   the	   top	   15%	   of	   the	   room	   height.	   	   	   In	   the	   art	   gallery,	  that	   distance	   is	   within	   22.5	   inches	   of	   the	   ceiling.	   The	   existing	   detector	   is	   30	  inches	   below.	   	   Even	   if	  mounted	  at	   the	  correct	  height	  on	  a	  wall	  or	  on	  the	  ceiling,	  the	  existing	  detector	  might	  still	  not	  provide	  adequate	  smoke	  detection.	  	  The	  upper	  part	   of	   the	   gallery	   is	   divided	   into	   three	   bays	   separated	   by	   deep,	   solid	   beams.	   	   A	  single	  smoke	  detector	  will	  only	  lead	  to	  timely	  activation	  if	  a	  fire	  starts	  directly	  below	  the	   bay	   in	   which	   the	   detector	   is	   mounted.	   	   If	   it	   started	   below	   another	   bay,	   then	  smoke	  would	  first	  have	  to	  fill	  that	  bay	  and	  then	  spill	  out	  and	  flow	  into	  the	  bay	  with	  the	   detector	   before	   activation	   would	   be	   assured.	   	   	   Currently,	   all	   three	   bays	   will	  have	  to	  fill	  with	  smoke	  and	  then	  the	  smoke	  layer	  will	  have	  to	  descend	  about	  six	  more	   inches	  before	  reaching	  the	  existing	  detector.	   	   	  Although	   fire	  detection	   is	  not	  required	   in	   the	   art	   gallery,	   to	   make	   the	   current	   system	   adequate	   will	   require	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repositioning	  the	  existing	  detector	  higher	   in	  the	  room	  and	  addition	  of	  at	   least	   two	  more	  detectors	  in	  the	  adjacent	  ceiling	  bays.	  	  	  
Horizontal Exit 
 The performance based scenarios in the main theater all showed that in the event 
of a fire there, the rear emergency exit for the second floor becomes unusable within 
seconds of the fire’s start.  With that exit unavailable, little option is left to those on the 
second floor with regards to egress other than full evacuation through the front exit.  An 
expensive and challenging option to alleviate this problem would be addition of an 
additional exit that opened directly from the second floor to the exterior of the building.  
Another option would be to separate or isolate the existing second floor rear exit stairs 
from the rest of the main theater by enclosing it behind fire rated walls and doors, thus 
qualifying it a horizontal exit.  Without some modification however, the current rear exit 
should be considered as unreliable in the event of a fire starting in the main theater, front 
lobby or adjacent spaces.  It could still be effective should a fire start in the second floor 
spaces. 
 The wall separating the main theater from the first and second floors to the south 
could serve as a horizontal exit into the front lobby with some modifications.  The doors 
between the lobby and theater would have to be upgraded to fire rated doors limiting 
smoke flow through ample leakage paths around the existing door.  Additionally, 
penetrations through the wall from piping or ducting would also have to be filled or 
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enclosed to prevent smoke and fire migration through the wall.  HVAC ducts extending 
between the first and second floors could be enclosed in chases surrounded by fire 
resistant rated walls. 
 
Administrative Controls - Storage 
Two of the fire scenarios examined for the performance based analyses involved 
stored items as the main fuel source.  Stacked chairs, either upholstered or plastic and the 
gym mats on the platform/stage can result in fires with readily high heat release rates that 
would not only lead to rapid fire spread, but which could overwhelm the existing 
sprinkler system.   Prompt consideration should be given to eliminating the chair storage 
from alongside the south edge of the theater’s fixed seating and relocating it to enclosed 
storage areas such as at the north end of the theater.  Though the fire danger from the sum 
of the chairs when unstacked is relatively insignificant, once stacked, the geometry of the 
stacks makes them a serious fire danger to occupants.  If ignited, even sprinkler activation 
may prove ineffective at fire control since many of the chairs’ burning surfaces may be 
shielded from falling droplets.  Further, a fire in a stacked arrangement tends to generate 
significantly more toxic smoke than if the same number of chairs burned separately. 
The gym mat on the platform stage also poses a serious fire danger if ignited.  As 
shown in Scenario 3, the mass of foam in the mat has enough energy to overwhelm the 
theater’s sprinkler system in minutes.    If alternative storage is unavailable due to the 
size of the mats, then they should at least be enclosed under fire resistant materials or 
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protected from the possibility of ignition from failures in nearby, overhead electrical 
circuits and equipment.  The current location of the mat openly exposed to potential 
ignition sources poses an unnecessary risk. 
 
Interior Finish 
 Ceilings throughout most of the Center for the Arts, on both the first and second 
floors, are lined with insulation with the facing exposed.  That facing has been shown to 
easily ignite with a small flame.    Section 13.3.3.3 of the LSC requires that in existing 
buildings with general assembly areas having occupant loads of more than 300, interior 
wall and ceiling finish materials shall be rated Class A or Class B as determined by 
standardized testing.  No records of applicable testing or flammability ratings of the 
material are known to exist.  Unofficial flammability tests that exposed the material to 
small flames suggests the ceiling finish will likely not meet existing Class A or B 
requirements.   
 A documentation review for similar products for sale by major insulation 
suppliers suggests most analogous materials do not meet the interior finish rating 
requirements set forth in the Life Safety Code for existing occupancies.   One need only 
review the results of major fire catastrophes such as the Station Nightclub Fire, the 
Beverly Hills Supper Club and others in which the contribution of flammable interior 
finish led to multiple fatalities to realize the significance of this issue. If ignited, flame 
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spread over the exposed ceiling facing would be rapid.  Such a fire could quickly 
overwhelm the sprinkler system and rain flaming debris down onto the occupants below.   
 Reducing thus fire danger will likely require that the material either be removed, 
covered or treated.  It could be protected from fire exposure from below by covering it 
with gypsum board or another material with low-combustibility or Class B finish ratings.  
There might also be approved fire resistant coatings that could be used to cover the 
facing.   
 
Rear Theater Exits 
 The existing arrangement of exits in the rear theater does not appear to meet the 
requirements of the Life Safety Code in terms of exit arrangement or visibility of exits.  
At present, most occupants to the rear theater would likely attempt to evacuate through 
the main exit in the event of a fire.  Though a second exit behind the platform/stage that 
leads into and through the sprinkler control room has been thought by Center staff to be  
a satisfactory alternative, it is neither visible from the main part of the theater nor is it 
clearly marked and accessible.   The AHJ should be consulted with regards to available 
alternatives.  At a minimum, the secondary exit must be clearly visible from throughout 
the space and access to it unimpeded.    Whether that would be an acceptable alternate 
exit based upon its required egress travel through the sprinkler control room is a matter to 
be decided by the AHJ. 
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Appendix A  
Egress - Occupancy Load Determinations 
 
The following four pages show maximum occupancy load spreadsheet 
calculations for the Center for the Arts building that are based upon the occupancy 
loading criteria of Table 7.3.1.2 of the Life Safety Code.    
  
    Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
   
178 
 
 
 
    Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
   
179 
 
 
    Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
   
180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
181 
  
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
182 
Hand Calculations Of Estimated Movement and 
Required Safe Egress Times (RSET) 
 
Art Gallery 
Exit Discharge Door     72-inch  
Door to Lobby    72-inch  
Maximum occupancy    132 persons  
Maximum Specific Flow thru Door  24.0 persons/min/foot eff. width  
      (Table 3-14.5, SFPE 3rd).    
 
Effective width of 72 inch doors   72” -12” = 60” or 5 feet.   
 
Maximum calculated flow through each doorway at ideal density would be: 
24 persons/minute/foot effective width x 5 feet = 120 persons/minute 
 
Assuming everyone is equally spaced through the art gallery and heads to the exit 
at about the same time, it is estimated that to discharge 132 people from the art 
gallery will take 132 people/120 people/minute  = 1.1 minutes (66 seconds). 
 
Front Lobby and Adjacent Rooms (less main theater population) 
 
Maximum occupancy    199 persons   
Exit discharge door    72-inch wide  
Door to Art Gallery    72-inch wide  
Maximum flow through 72” door   120 persons/minute 
 The time to discharge 199 people: 
 
199 persons/120 persons per min  =   1.66 minutes (99 seconds) 
 
Longest distance to discharge door   Approx. 80 feet.   
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Maximum travel rate on flat surface  235 feet/minute  
(Table 3-13.4 SFPE 4th) 
 
Time to reach exit door:   80 feet/235 feet per min    
= 0.34 minutes (20 seconds) 
 
Assume minimal queuing at the front exit door when just considering these occupants.   
 
Evacuation of the front lobby and adjacent rooms = 119 seconds. 
 
Main Theater, Platform/Stage, and Adjoining Supply Rooms 
 
Maximum occupant load    358 people* 
 
170 fixed seats 
50 moveable seats  
48 people in lounge 
90 people in platform/storage areas.  
 
 Exit doors     Two, 72-inch wide  
Space between fixed seat rows  18-inch  
Average distance seat to closest aisle  ~12 feet.    
Aisle steps      Treads ~ 40” 
Risers 7” 
Three step bottom of each aisle  
Height of steps    21” to main floor.   
Horizontal travel     40 feet average 
Vertical descent    6 feet from top row 
Stair travel for  7/11 stair    1.85 x vertical distance  
1.85 x 6 = 11 feet 
(Table 3-14.5, SFPE 4th).    
Total distance (horiz. + stairs)  51 feet for furthest seated person  
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Speed on stairs is calculated using the equation: 
 
S = k – akD    
 
Where:        S = speed along line of travel 
D = density (persons/unit area)  (0.175 for ideal flow, 
SFPE Handbook Figure 3-14.5) 
K and a = constants (Table 3-14.2, SFPE 3rd ed.) 
K = 212 for stairs, 
a = 2.86  for speed in feet/min 
 
Therefore, speed of travel on the stairs = 212 – (2.86)(212)(.175) 
Approximately 106 feet / minute 
 
Exit stairs width    36” 
Effective width     24”  (36” – 2x6”) 
 
Eff. width x 18.5 persons/minute/foot e.w. = 37 people/minute  
 
Assume 170 people in fixed seats divide equally between sets of steps 
 
170 people / 37 people per min = 2.3 minutes (140 seconds) 
to get people out of fixed seating and onto the main floor. 
 
Travel distance / speed on stairs =  Travel time 
 
51 feet / 106 feet/min on stairs  = 0.48 minutes (29 seconds)  
 
A queue may form at the bottom three steps making the stair passage the limiting factor. 
 
Time to clear fixed seating = 170 people / 37 people per min  
Time = approximately 2.3 minutes (140 seconds)  
 
Distance to the rear (north) exit    21 feet  
Distance to the rear (north) exit      9 feet  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
185 
Travel speed on flat floor    235 feet/minute  
(Table 3-14.4, SFPE, 3rd) 
Travel time to north exit   6 seconds  
Travel time to south exit   3 seconds 
 
 
Remaining occupant load of    188 people  
(stage hands/performers/lounge/ 
temp seating)  
 
It is assumed these 188 people will divide evenly sending 94 people to each of the 
two exit doors.   
 
Maximum travel distance    50 feet approx. 
 
Travel time to exits  50’ / 235’ per min =  0.33 minutes (20 seconds)  
    
Width of Main Theater Doors  72-inches wide.   
 
At maximum flow thru doors, 
 
Time to pass thru doors   94 people / 120 people per minute  
 
   Time to pass = 0.78 minutes (47 seconds)  
 
Time to travel to/thru exit doors = 47 secs + 20 secs  =  67 seconds  (1.1 mins) 
 
That should be sufficient time for the 94 people to pass through each door before 
the additional two groups of 85 people each to clear their respective sides of fixed seating 
and head to the doors.  Therefore, 179 people will likely not cause a queue to form. 
 
It is assumed the 179 people exiting through the front lobby (85 from the fixed seating 
and 94 from the stage) will possibly form a slight queue at the  front exit discharge door 
when joining the people from the front lobby.   
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The second double door to the art gallery may cause minor queue if any will form at the 
front exit discharge door since it will only take 106 seconds to fully evacuate the front 
lobby.   
 
Time from theater to front exit doors  = 70 feet / 235 feet per min  =  18 seconds  
 
 
Time to evacuate fixed seating   140 seconds (longest period) 
Time to evacuate platform/stage or    67 seconds (to either door) 
temporary floor seating 
Time from north steps to north exit door     6 seconds 
Time from north steps to south exit door     2 seconds 
Time to pass from south theater door    18 seconds 
to front exit discharge 
 
Total time to clear the main theater to rear exit or to front lobby (using both 
theater exit doors) will be approximately 2 minutes and 25 seconds after people start 
moving. 
 
Additional time to reach front exit  = 18 seconds  
 
Time to evacuate main theater after movement starts  = 2 mins 25 secs thru rear exit 
                 2 mins 45 secs thru front exit 
 
*This value is likely higher than occupancy loads experienced under normal use during 
productions. 
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Rear Theater and Platform/Stage 
Storage Rooms 
Max occupant load rear supply room  3 people 
Exit Doors     72-inch man door  
96-inch roll-up door 
 
Rear Theater, Platform/Stage Area, Actor Spaces 
Max occupant load     110 people 
 
Rear Lobby, Dressing Rooms And Restrooms  
 
Max occupant load     48 people.   
 
Total Rear Wing Occupancy Load  161 people  
 
REAR THEATER 
 
Exits      72-inch  
36-inch hallway  
36-inch doorway into/thru  
sprinkler room 
 
 Seating on platform    60 
Max Platform Height    2 feet above floor.   
Max Horizontal travel    40 feet  
Max travel distance     ~ 50 feet 
 
Width of walkway to exit door  52 inches** 
  
Boundary layer widths of walkway  8” (Table 3-13.1, SFPE Hbk 4th) 
Effective width of walkway   36”    (52” – 2x8”) 
 
 
Max Specific Flow    24 persons/min/foot eff. width 
(Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th) 
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 Flow thru walkway  =   36” eff. width x 24 persons/min/ft eff. width 
         = 72 people/minute.    
 
Time to pass thru walkway  =     110 persons / 72 persons per min 
    =   1.5 minutes 
 
Average distance to main exit door   50 feet 
Time to reach rear exit  =  50 ft / 235 ft per min 
=  13 seconds 
 
Limiting flow would be through the narrowed corridor next to the seating area. 
 
 
Alternate option  
 
Some people exit thru unmarked doorway behind the platform/stage into sprinkler 
control room exit to the exterior.   
 
The rear doorway is unmarked and typically blocked from the audience by the stage sets.   
The only people likely familiar with that route are actors and theater workers. 
 
If 10 people used the rear exit route through the sprinkler control room, it would only 
reduce the time for the remainder of the people to evacuate via the main exit door by 
about 7 seconds 
 
Total alternative time of about 1 minute and 23 seconds. 
 
 
Based on this information, is estimated the total time to evacuate the rear theater 
using just the 72 inch main exit door will be approximately 1.5 minutes. 
 
** This opening could serve as a chokepoint where queuing might be expected.   
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Rear Lobby, Dressing and Restrooms 
Max occupant load      48 people 
Exit Door      72-inch  
Exit Door Capacity     120 people/minute  
Time to evacuate  thru door =   48 people / 120 people per minute  
Time to evacuate thru door =  0.4 minutes (24 seconds) 
Maximum travel distance     ~ 50 feet 
Time to cover max distance     ~ 13 seconds 
 
Time to evacuate the rear lobby, dressing rooms and restrooms will be 24 seconds 
after all pre-movement is complete if people are equally spaced in these rooms. 
 
 
 
Second Floor Spaces 
 
Max occupancy load      211 people  
Exit Doors      36-inch at top of front stairs 
       36-inch bottom of front stairs 
       36-inch at top of rear stairs 
 
Stair width      44 inches at front 
       44 inches at rear 
 
Eff. Width of doors     24 inches 
          (Table 3-13.1 SFPE 4th) 
Flow thru doors     48 persons/minute 
        (24 people/min/ft eff width) 
         (Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th) 
 
Flow on 7 / 11 stairs     18.5 persons/min/ft eff width 
         (Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th) 
 
Eff. Width of stairs     32 inches  (44” – 12”) 
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Flow down stairs     49.4 people/minute 
 
Therefore, limit to flow in each staircase based upon size of doorways  
 
Speed of travel on the stairs    106 ft / min 
 For ideal density of people on stairs 
 
  Stair speed = 212 – (2.86)(212)(0.175) 
 
 
Calculated using the equation: 
 
S = k  – akD 
 
where:  S = speed along line of travel 
D = density (persons/unit area)  (= 0.175 for ideal flow, SFPE 
Figure 3-13.8) 
K and a = constants (as per table 3-12.2, SFPE 4th) 
K = 212 for stairs, and 
a = 2.86  for speed in feet / min 
 
 
 Vertical distance over stairs    12-foot  
Landings or level path on stairs   20 feet 
Travel distance over front stair  
   & 12-foot vertical distance  
 
Calculated using the equation:     
 
Distance = 12’  x  1.85  =  22.2’ on treads  + dist. on landings  
(Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th). 
  
22.2 ft + 20 ft = 42.2 ft. 
 
Total front stairway travel distance between floors = 42.2 feet 
 
Travel speed on stairs     106 feet/min  
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Time on stairs      24 secs down front stairs  
25 secs down rear stairs 
 
Since people entering second floor do so through the front stairs, assumed most 
will attempt to also exit along the same path.  Since the door to the rear stairs is entered 
from the second floor reception area, some people in that area might choose the rear stairs 
to evacuate. 
 
Weighted averages of time to the nearest door entrance to the top of the stairs are 
calculated based upon the number of occupants of each room and the longest distance 
from any compartment to that door traveled at a speed of 235 feet/min on the level 
corridors (SFPE 4th, Table 3-13.4).   
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Second Floor Egress Distances 
 Max Walking Time to Top of Front Stairs 
 
Max 
Occupants 
Distance 
ft 
Speed
ft/min 
Time 
(secs) Weighted Ave 
Dance Studio 1 90 108 235.0 28 11.76 
 Dance Studio 2 42 28 235.0 7 1.42 
 Dance Studio 3 48 38 235.0 10 2.21 
 Dressing Room 13 58 235.0 15 0.91 
 Office 2 78 235.0 20 0.19 
 Reception 3 35 235.0 9 0.13 
 Sound Studio 3 38 235.0 10 0.14 
 Storage 1 20 235.0 5 0.02 
 Hallway 6 25 235.0 6 0.18 
 Restrooms 3 8 235.0 2 0.03 
 
     
16.99 secs 
average 
Max Walking Time to Top of Rear Stairs 
Dance Studio 1 90 40 235.0 10 4.36 
 Dance Studio 2 42 35 235.0 9 1.78 
 Dance Studio 3 48 56 235.0 14 3.25 
 Dressing Room 13 28 235.0 7 0.44 
 Office 2 25 235.0 6 0.06 
 Reception 3 10 235.0 3 0.04 
 Sound Studio 3 55 235.0 14 0.20 
 Storage 1 50 235.0 13 0.06 
 Hallway 6 25 235.0 6 0.18 
 Restrooms 3 42 235.0 11 0.15 
 
     
10.52 secs 
average 
Table 10:  Calculations of weighted average to reach second floor stairs 
 
 
Assumed 75% (158 people) use the front stairs and 25% (53 people) use rear stairs  
 
Time to front stairs    18 secs  
Time down front stairs   24 secs  
 
Limiting flow at upper doorway   48 people/minute 
 
24 seconds after the first person enter the stairs, they will pass through the exit 
discharge.  As the first person reaches the exterior, there will be 19 people in the stairway 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
193 
(24 seconds to travel stairs x 48 people per minute through the door) with 138 more 
queued up at the top.  From that point on it will take 2.9 minutes (138 people remaining / 
48 people per minute to pass through door) to get the rest of the people in that queue out 
the front door. 
 
Thus, to evacuate 75% of the people out the front stairs will take: 
17 seconds for first person to reach stairs 
+ 24 seconds for that person to reach exit discharge door 
+ 2.9 minutes to get all people in the queue into the stairs 
+           24 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge. 
 
=       4.0 minutes (239 seconds) to clear 75% of the maximum 
occupant load through the front exit once they start moving. 
 
Rear Stair Analysis  
 
Number of people      53 people (25% of max) 
Time to reach stairs     11 secs  
Time on stairs (see above)    25 secs  
 
At that time, there will be 19 people in the stairs and a queue of 33 at the top of 
the stairs.  It will take an additional 41 seconds (33 people / 48 people per min) for the 
remaining people to enter the stairs at the top and then 25 more seconds for the last 
person to reach the bottom.  Then assuming there are no queues or bottlenecks of flow on 
the ground floor, it will take the last person an additional 18 seconds to walk the 
remaining approximately 70 feet to one of the exit discharge doors.   
 
As with above, this totals: 
 
11 seconds for first person to reach stairs 
+        25 seconds for that person to reach the bottom of the stairs 
+ 41 seconds to get all those queued up into the stairs 
+           24 seconds for the last person to reach the bottom of the stairs 
+       18 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge. 
 
Travel Time =       119 seconds after pre-movement time to clear 25% of the max 
occupant load through the rear, emergency exit and out of the building. 
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100% of 2nd Floor Max. Occupancy Load Uses the Rear Exit Door  
 
11 seconds for first person to reach stairs 
+        25 seconds for that person to reach the bottom of the stairs 
+   4 minutes to get the 192 people queued up at the top door into 
the stairs (19 people already on the stairs) 
+          24 seconds for the last person to reach the bottom of the stairs 
+       18 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge. 
 
Travel Time =      5.3 minutes (318 seconds) after pre-movement time to clear 100% 
of the maximum second floor occupant load through the rear, emergency exit and 
out of the building. 
 
 
 
 
 
50% of 2nd Floor Max. Occupancy Load Uses Each Exit Door  
 
Time to reach ground floor thru rear door   36 secs 
 
50% of the people out the front stairs will take: 
17 seconds for first person to reach stairs 
+ 24 seconds for that person to reach exit discharge door 
+ 1.8 minutes to get the 87 people in the queue into the stairs 
+           24 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge. 
 
Travel Time =       2.9  minutes (174 seconds) after pre-movement time to clear 50% 
of the maximum occupant load through the front exit outside the building. 
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50% of the people out of the rear exit door & stairs: 
 
11 seconds for first person to reach stairs 
+        25 seconds for that person to reach the bottom of the stairs 
+  1.8 minutes to get the 87 people queued up at the top door into 
the stairs (19 people already on the stairs) 
 
+       18 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge. 
 
Travel Time =       3.1  minutes (187 seconds) after pre-movement time to clear 50% 
of the maximum occupant load through the rear exit and out of the building. 
 
 
If an evacuation of the first floor is already underway, any queuing of the second 
floor occupants once they reach the first floor is dependent on things such as pre-
movement times on the first and second floors. 
 
It will take 4.0 minutes (239 seconds) to clear 75% of the max occupant load 
departing through the front exit and about half that time, 2.0 minutes (119 seconds) 
to clear 25% through the rear, emergency exit and out of the building.   In order to 
shorten the overall evacuation time from the second floor, more people should be 
urged to use the rear emergency exit to minimize queuing at the front stairs. 
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100% of 2nd Floor Max. Occupancy Load Out of the Front Exit Door  
 
 
If occupants of the second floor determine early on that there is a fire in the main theater 
space or that the rear exit stairs are unusable, then all 211 people on the upper floor will 
be forced to use the front stairs.  Using a similar analysis as shown above, the time to 
evacuate all 211 people through the front stairs will be: 
 
17 seconds for first person to reach stairs 
+ 24 seconds for that person to reach exit discharge door 
(191 people will remain queued at the top doorway) 
+ 239 seconds to get the remaining people into the stairs 
+           24 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge. 
 
Travel Time  =    304 seconds (5.1 minutes) to clear all of the second floor maximum 
occupant load through the front exit after movement begins 
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Appendix B  
‘Center for the Arts’ Plans 
During the evaluation of the Center for the Arts, no plans were located either with 
the AHJ or with the onsite staff showing a detailed layout of the building.  The following 
drawings were generated from on-site inspections to offer a general idea of the 
arrangement of the building as well as the fire protection systems.  These do not portray 
at a level of accuracy with which to make engineering decisions or judgments but only to 
give the reader a general idea of how the building existed at the time of the review. 
 
Floor Plans 
 
 
Figure 87:  First floor, south half layout of the Center for the Arts 
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Figure 88:  First floor, north half floor layout of the Center for the Arts (expanded) 
 
 
 
Figure 89:  Second floor layout for the Center for the Arts (expanded) 
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Exit Configuration and Travel Paths 
 
Figure 90:  First floor (front half) exit layout  
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Figure 91:  First floor (front half) evacuation travel paths  
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Figure 92:  First floor (rear half) exit layout  
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Figure 93:  First floor, rear theater evacuation travel paths  
 
 
Figure 94:  First floor, rear lobby & dressing room evacuation travel paths  
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Figure 95:  Second floor exit layout  
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Figure 96:  Second floor evacuation travel paths  
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Sprinkler System Layout 
 
 
 
 
Figure 97:  Plan view of the sprinkler system including most remote area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 98:  Elevation view of the sprinkler system looking east 
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Figure 99:  Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking south 
 
 
 
 
Figure 100:  Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking west 
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Alarm Detection and Notification System 
 
Figure 101:  Fire alarm detection and notification system in the first floor front 
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Figure 102:  Fire alarm detection and notification system in the first floor rear wing 
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Structural Wall Design Types/Ratings 
 
Figure 103:  Wall types in the front portion of the first floor 
 
Figure 104:  Wall types in rear portion of the first floor  
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Figure 105:  Wall types on the second floor 
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Appendix C 
‘Center for the Arts’ Photos 
 
Figure 106:  View of between seat rows on fixed seating platform in main theater 
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Figure 107:  Additional view of seat rows on fixed seating platform in main theater 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 108: View of exit aisle on fixed seating platform in main theater 
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Figure 109: View of ventilation ducting and grills penetrating south wall of main theater  
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Figure 110: Example of sealed penetration through south wall of main theater 
 
 
Figure 111: Example of unsealed penetrations 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
215 
 
Figure 112: View of exposed rear exit from second floor entering main theater 
 
 
Figure 113: View of rear exit from second floor taken from main platform/stage 
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Figure 114: View of steps from fixed seating and north exit from main theater 
 
 
Figure 115: View of steps from fixed seating and south exit from main theater 
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Figure 116: Alternate view of stacked chairs stored alongside south wall of main theater 
 
 
 
 
Figure 117: Panorama of front lobby taken from south exit door of main theater 
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Figure 118: Exit door from front lobby entrance of the Center for the Arts 
 
 
Figure 119: View of main exit doorway from art gallery  
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Figure 120: View of rear theater doorway opening from behind the platform/stage into 
the sprinkler control room  
 
 
Figure 121: Fire Department supply connection into sprinkler control room 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
220 
 
Figure 122: Sprinkler riser faceplate with hydraulic system requirements 
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Figure 123: Sprinkler system riser valve arrangement 
 
 
Figure 124:  Sprinkler head arrangement adjacent to arched roof trusses  
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Appendix D  
Automatic Sprinkler System 
Computerized Hydraulic Sprinkler Calculations 
 
The following six pages are copies of computer calculations that were located in 
the files of the local fire department.  No copies of sprinkler design plans were available 
to compare these calculations with a particular layout or the as-built arrangement.  
Nonetheless, copies have been provided as reference.  Backup hand calculations were 
also performed.  The results were quite close. 
 The water supply requirements calculated by the computer program were 495.8 
gpm (including a 250 gpm hose allowance) at 53.7 psi.    Hand calculations estimated the 
requirements to be 495.3 gpm at 49 psi.  The available city water supply was 2400 gpm at 
residual pressure of 60 psi. 
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Hand Calculations 
 
 The following two pages are hand calculations to verify the water supply 
requirements at the Center for the Arts based upon visual observations of the installed 
system.  Since no copies of actual plans were available and the applicability of the 
computerized calculations could not be verified as to the final installation, this backup 
calculation was performed. 
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Automatic Sprinkler System Inspection, Testing & 
Maintenance Requirements of NFPA 25 
 
MAJOR 
COMPONENT 
INSPECTION, TESTING, 
MAINTENANCE  ITEMS 
FREQUENCY NFPA 25 
Reference 
CONTROL 
VALVES 
 
Open/Test 
 
Verify as accessible 
 
Wrenches/hand wheel 
available 
 
Operated/Lubricated 
 
Verify valve is free of leaks  
/  locked 
 
 
Identified with signs 
 
Valve maintenance 
 
Annually 
 
           Monthly  12.3.2.1 
 
Monthly 
 
Annually 
 
Weekly/ 
Monthly 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
12.3.3.1 
 
12.3. 1 
 
 
 
12.3.3.1 
 
13.3.2.1 
 
 
5.2.6.1 
 
12.3.4 
RISER Inspect gauges 
 
Gauges in good working 
order 
 
Name plate attached 
 
Seismic bracing checked 
 
3 foot clear space 
 
Monthly 
 
Quarterly 
5 year test/replace 
 
Quarterly 
 
Annually 
 
Quarterly 
 
5.2.4.1 
 
5.2.6 
 
 
5.2.7 
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Main drain test Annually 12.3.3.4,    
12.2.2.6 
13.2.5, 
13.3.3.4 
FIRE DEPT. 
CONNECTION 
Connection visible and 
accessible 
 
System back-flushed 
 
Couplings checked for 
smooth rotation/undamaged 
 
Couplings gaskets in place / 
undamaged 
 
ID signs in place 
 
Verify valves are free of 
leaks 
Check valve components.  
Inspect internally.  Clean, 
repair/replace 
 
Quarterly 
 
 
Every 5 years 
 
Quarterly 
 
Quarterly 
 
Quarterly 
 
Quarterly 
 
Every 5 years 
13.7.1 
 
WATERFLOW 
ALARM PANEL, 
SUPERVISORY 
AND TAMPER 
SWITCHES AND 
DEVICES 
Inspect to verify system is 
free of damage 
 
Waterflow alarm test 
 
 
Test system - Audible 
alarm / visual signals 
activate within 90 seconds. 
Test system – Alarm 
company receives signals 
Quarterly 
 
 
Quarterly 
 
 
Annually 
 
 
Quarterly 
5.2.5 
 
5.3.3.1, 
13.2.6 
 
 
5.3.3 / 12.2.7 
 
ABOVE 
GROUND PIPES, 
Free of leaks and corrosion 
 
Annually 
 
5.2.2 
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FITTINGS, AND 
SUPPORTS 
Verify proper alignment 
 
Verify free of external 
loads 
 
Verify hangers and seismic 
bracing installed and 
undamaged 
 
Verify water filled pipes 
not exposed to routine 
freezing 
 
Obstructions and internal 
inspection of piping 
Annually 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
 
 
Annually 
 
Every 5 years 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3 
 
 
 
 
14.2 
SPRINKLERS Free of corrosion, foreign 
materials, paint and damage 
 
Verify installed with 
correct orientation 
 
Verify unobstructed flow 
 
Verify proper spacing from 
walls 
 
Verify proper distance 
between sprinklers 
 
Verify proper deflector 
distance from ceilings and 
to storage below 
 
Verify if sprinklers are less 
than 50 years old 
 
Verify if there is a spare 
Annually 
 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
 
 
Every 5 years 
 
Annually 
 
Annually 
5.2.1 
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sprinkler head box with the 
correct number of spare 
sprinklers available 
 
Verify spare sprinklers are 
the same as used in system 
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Appendix E  
Alarm System  
 
Central Station Disposition of Alarm, Supervisory 
and Trouble Signals 
 
Section 3.3.240.1	   defines	   an	   Alarm	   Signal	   as,	   “A	   signal	   indicating	   an	  emergency	  condition	  or	  an	  alert	  that	  requires	  action.”	  Section	  26.3.7.1.2	  states	  that	  the	  central	  station	  shall	  perform	  the	  following	  actions:	  
 “(1)	   Immediately	   retransmit	   the	   alarm	   to	   the	  communications	   center. (2)	  	  Dispatch	  	  a	   runner	  	  or	   technician	  	  to	   the	  	  protected	  	  premises	  	  to	   arrive	  	  within	  	  2	  hours	   after	   receipt	   of	   a	   signal	   if	   equipment	   needs	   to	  be	  manually	  reset	   by	   the	   prime	   contractor.	   Except	   where	   prohibited	   by	   the	   authority	  having	   jurisdiction,	   the	   runner	   or	   technician	   shall	   be	   permitted	   to	   be	  recalled	   prior	   to	  arrival	   at	   the	  premises	   if	  a	  qualified	   representative	   of	   the	  subscriber	   at	   the	   premises	   can	   provide	   the	   necessary	   resetting	   	   of	   	   the	  	  equipment	   	   	   and	   	   is	   	   able	   	   to	   	   place	   	   the	   	   system	   	   back	   	   in	   	   operating	  condition.	  (3)	  Immediately	   notify	  the	  subscriber.	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(4)	  Provide	  notice	  to	  the	  subscriber	  or	  authority	  having	  jurisdiction,	  or	  both,	  if	  required.”	  
 NFPA	  72	  states	  that	  central	  station	  operators	  must	  perform	  these	  actions	  in	  the	   order	   given	   and	   must	   do	   so	   to	   properly	   respond	   to	   the	   intended	   levels	   of	  urgency	  implied	  by	  an	  alarm	  activation.	  	  One	  exception	  in	  this	  case	  is	  that	  a	  runner	  might	   not	   be	   needed	   if	   a	   contractor	   needs	   to	   manually	   reset	   equipment	   at	   the	  	  premises.	   	   	   	   If	   the	   subscriber	   or	   another	   trained	   individual	   from	   the	   Center	   for	  the	  Arts	   or	   elsewhere	   is	   trained	   to	   check	  and	  reset	  the	  system	  and	  is	  directed	  to	  do	  so,	   then	   the	  central	   station	   is	  not	  needed	   to	  respond.	   	   It	   should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  if	  the	  alarm	  results	  from	  a	  prearranged	  test,	  then	  the	  above	  actions	  are	  clearly	  not	  necessary.	  Similar	   to	   the	  mandated	   response	   to	   alarm	   signals,	   NFPA	   72	   dictates	   the	  requirements	   for	   how	   supervisory	   signals	   will	   be	   handled	   by	   the	   central	  station.	   Section	  3.3.240.6	  defines	  a	   	   supervisory	   	   signal	   	   as	   	   “a	   	   signal	   	   indicating	  	  the	   	   need	  	   for	   	   action	  	   in	  connection	  with	  the	  supervision	  of	  guard	  tours,	   the	  fire	  suppression	   systems	   or	   equipment,	   or	   the	   maintenance	   features	   of	   related	  systems.”	  	  Section	  26.3.7.3	  states	  that,	  “Upon	  receipt	  of	  a	  supervisory	  signal	  from	  a	  sprinkler	  system,	  other	  fire	  suppression	  system(s),	  or	  other	  equipment,	  the	  central	  station	  shall	  perform	  the	  following	  actions:	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“(1)	  Communicate	   immediately	  with	  the	  persons	  designated	  by	  the	  subscriber	  and	   notify	   the	   fire	   department	   or	   law	   enforcement	   agency,	   	   or	   both,	   when	  required	  	  by	  the	  authority	  having	  jurisdiction	  (2)	   Dispatch	   a	   runner	   or	   maintenance	   person	   to	   arrive	   within	   2	   hours	   to	  investigate	  Exception:	  	  Where	  the	  supervisory	  	   signal	  	  is	  	  cleared	  	  in	  	  accordance	  	  
with	  	  a	  	  scheduled	  procedure	  determined	  by	  26.3.7.3(1).	  (3)	  Notify	   the	   authority	   having	   jurisdiction	   when	   sprinkler	   systems	   or	   other	  fire	   suppression	   systems	   or	   equipment	   have	   been	  wholly	   or	   partially	   out	   of	  service	   for	  8	  hours	  (4)	   When	   service	   has	   been	   restored,	   provide	   notice,	   if	   required,	   to	   the	  subscriber	   or	  the	  authority	  having	  jurisdiction,	  or	  both,	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  signal,	   the	   time	   of	   occurrence,	   and	   the	   restoration	   of	   service	   when	  equipment	   has	   been	   out	   of	   service	  for	  8	  hours	  or	  more.	  
Exception:	  	   If	   the	  	   supervisory	  	  	  signal	  	   results	  	   from	  	   a	  	   prearranged	  	  	  test,	  	   the	  	  
actions	  specified	  by	  26.3.7.3(1),	   (3),	  and	  (4)	  shall	  not	  be	  required.”	  
 
 In	  addition	  to	  the	  	  above	  provisions,	  	  NFPA	  	  72	  	  also	  	  provides	  	  guidance	  	  for	  	  the	   	   central	   	   station	   	   to	   respond	   to	   a	   trouble	   signal	   which	   it	   defines	   in	   Section	  3.3.240.7	  as	  “A	  signal	  initiated	  by	  a	  system	  	  or	   	  device	  	  indicative	  	  of	   	  a	   	  fault	   	   in	   	  a	  	  monitored	   	   circuit,	   	   system,	   	   or	   	   component.”	   Section	   26.3.7.4	   dictates	   the	  requirements	  for	  trouble	  signals	  by	  stating,	  “Upon	  receipt	  of	  trouble	  signals	  or	  other	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signals	  pertaining	  solely	  to	  matters	  of	  equipment	  maintenance	  of	  the	  alarm	  systems,	  the	  central	  station	  shall	  perform	  the	  following	  actions:	  
 “(1)	  Communicate	   immediately	  with	  persons	  designated	   by	  the	  subscriber,	  (2)	   Dispatch	   personnel	   to	   arrive	   within	   4	   hours	   to	   initiate	   maintenance,	   if	  necessary.	  (3)	   When	   the	   interruption	   is	   more	   than	   8	   hours,	   provide	   	   notice	   	   to	   the	  subscriber	   and	   the	   fire	   department	   if	   so	   required	   by	   the	   authority	   having	  jurisdiction	   as	   to	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   interruption,	   the	   time	   of	   occurrence,	   and	  the	  restoration	   of	  service.”	  	  Since	   trouble	   signals	   alert	   the	   central	   station	   to	   the	   alarm	   system	   being	  in	   some	  state	  of	  being	  partially	  or	  completely	  out	  of	  service,	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  the	  central	   station	   takes	   action	   to	   assist	   in	   getting	   the	   system	  back	   in	  working	   order.	  	  	  	  Paragraph	   (2)	   above	   shows	   the	   importance	   placed	   on	   insuring	   that	   a	   technician	  trained	  in	  the	  particular	  system	  is	  dispatched	  to	  the	  site	  to	  get	  the	  system	  back	  up	  into	  working	  condition	  within	  the	  4	  hour	  limitation.	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Inspection, Testing and Maintenance – Alarm System 
 
COMPONENT	   FREQUENCY	  Control	  equipment	  including	  equipment	  monitored	  for	  alarm,	  supervisory	  and	  trouble	  signals	  including:	   a)	  fuses,	   b)	  interfaced	  equipment,	  	  c)	  Lamps	  and	  LEDs,	  and	  d)	  Primary	  power	  supply	  
 
 Annually	  
Sealed	  Lead	  Acid	  Batteries	   Semi-­‐-­‐-­‐Annually	  Fire	  Alarm	  Unit	  Trouble	  Signals	   Semi-­‐-­‐-­‐Annually	  Remote	  Annunciators	   Semi-­‐-­‐-­‐Annually	  Manual	  Fire	  Alarm	  Boxes	   Semi-­‐-­‐-­‐Annually	  Smoke	  Detectors	   Semi-­‐-­‐-­‐Annually	  Waterflow	  Devices	   Quarterly	  Alarm	  Notification	  Devices	  such	  as	  bells,	  horns	  and	  horn	  strobes	   Semi-­‐-­‐-­‐Annually	  
 
Figure 125:  Table 14.4.5, NFPA 72, Testing Frequencies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
241 
The	  following	  testing	  requirements	  from	  Table	  14.4.5	  apply	  to	  the	  Center	  for	  the	  Art’s	  system.	  
 
 
 
 
 
COMPONENT FREQUENCY Control	  equipment	  including	  equipment	  monitored	  for	  alarm,	  supervisory	  and	  trouble	  signals	  including:	   a)	  fuses,	   b)	  interfaced	  equipment,	  	  c)	  Lamps	  and	  LEDs,	  and	  d)	  Primary	  power	  supply 
 
 
Annually 
 Sealed	  Lead	  Acid	  Batteries	  used	  as	  Secondary	  Power	  Supplies Replace	  within	  5	  years	  after	  manufacture	  or	  more	  frequently	  as	  needed.	  	  Charge	  and	  discharge	  tests	  should	  be	  conducted	  annually.	  	  Load	  voltage	  tests	  should	  be	  conducted	  semi-­‐-­‐-­‐annually	  Fire	  Alarm	  Unit	  Trouble	  Signals Annually.	  	  The	  actual	  testing	  should	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  Reference	  10	  of	  Table	  14.4.2.2	  of	  NFPA	  72 
 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building 
 
 
 
242 
 	  Section	   14.5.2	   of	   NFPA	   72	   states	   very	   generically	   that	   the	   frequency	   of	  maintenance	   and	   cleaning	   of	   system	   equipment	   shall	   depend	   on	   the	   type	   of	  equipment	   and	   the	   local	   ambient	   conditions.	   	   	   The	   emphasis	   of	   the	   section	   is	   on	  cleaning	   of	   the	   equipment	   which	   it	   suggests	   be	   conducted	   in	   accordance	   with	  manufacturer’s	  published	  guidelines.	  
 
Fire Detection Scenarios  
Three fire detection scenarios were examined for fires occurring at places in the 
Center for the Arts currently outfitted with alarms.  The times estimated for alarm 
activation were determined using either the computer zone fire model CFAST or a 
spreadsheet analysis following the DETACT model.  The specific calculations follow. 
  
Remote	  Annunciators Annually.	  	  The	  actual	  testing	  should	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  Reference	  11	  of	  Table	  14.4.2.2	  of	  NFPA	  72 Manual	  Fire	  Alarm	  Boxes Annually Smoke	  Detectors Annually Waterflow	  Devices Semi-Annually Alarm	  Notification	  Devices	  such	  as	  bells,	  horns	  and	  horn	  strobes Annually.	  The	  actual	  testing	  should	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  Reference	  15	  of	  Table	  14.4.2.2	  of	  NFPA	  72 
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First Fire Detection Scenario 
 
The first scenario is  a fire presumed to occur in the fire sprinkler 
control room.  The chance that a fire would occur in that room is small considering the 
limited fuels there.  One potential fire could result from a malfunction in the electrical 
system powering the fire alarm control panel.    A medium growth rate fire was 
assumed.  The following additional assumptions are made for this scenario: 
 
Ambient temperature   20°C 
Fire growth rate   Slow 
Ceiling height varies with slope. Max Height =  16 feet. 
Height at sidewall:     11 feet. 
Room size:     Approx. 70 square feet (5 feet x 14 feet) 
Height of wall mounted smoke detector:  94 inches (2.4 m) 
 
Average temperature rise to     7.2 °C 
correlate with a PVC fire source: 
(According to Table B.4.7.5.3 NFPA 72) 
 
The zone fire model CFAST was run to estimate the time of detector activation 
from a medium growth rate fire.  The DETACT model was not appropriate for use 
since the detector is wall mounted and DETACT applies to ceiling mounts.   Although 
the ceiling was slanted, an average height of 13.5 feet (4 m) was used to estimate upper 
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layer filling time.    The time for the upper layer to descend down to the smoke detector 
(94 inches, 2.4 m) with a slow growth fire was about 18 seconds.  By that time, the 
temperature of the upper layer would only have raised about 1 °C.  Increasing the 
temperature of the upper layer to 27.2 °C would take about 55 seconds.  At 55 
seconds, the heat release rate of the fire would be approximately 10 kW. 
 
Second Fire Detection Scenario 
 
The second theoretical fire is located in the front lobby area of the Center for the 
Arts.  Two smoke detectors in the main lobby were evaluated for the time needed for 
detection.    The following assumptions are made for this scenario: 
 
 
Ambient temperature 20°C RTI – Smoke Detectors 
Fire growth rate Medium 
 
 Ceiling height   8 feet (2.4m) under drop ceiling. Ceiling 
        mounted smoke detectors 
 
Radial distance Detector 1 = 20 feet (6.1 m) 
  Detector 2 = 31 feet 8 inches (9.6 m) 
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According to Table B.4.7.5.3 of NFPA 72, the highest temperature rise 
associated with the activation of an  ionization detector is with a wood fire source.  That 
occurred with a rise of 13.9 °C.  For other fuels such as PVC or Polyurethane, the rise 
would be 7.2 °C.  In an effort to determine a conservative time for alarm activation, the 
higher value of 13.9 °C was evaluated. 
According to calculations completed with the spreadsheet for the model 
DETACT, under these conditions, the detector located 20 feet away would activate at 
about 95 seconds after ignition when the heat release rate was about 100-­‐110 kW.  The 
second smoke detector, 31 feet away from the fire would be expected to activate 40 
seconds later at 135 seconds when the heat release rate was around 220 kW.   If PVC or 
synthetic fuels such a polyurethane were involved, the closest detector would activate at 
27.2°C about 60-­‐65 seconds after ignition.  At that time, the heat release rate would be 
about 55 kW.  The furthest detector would activate at about 75 seconds when the heat 
release rate was around 70 kW. 	  
Third Fire Detection Scenario 
 
The third theoretical fire is located in the art gallery of the Center for the Arts.  
The fire is estimated to start in a large, high-­‐density polyethylene (HDPE) trash 
container stored in the main gallery space for visitors’ use.   The fire is estimated to 
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be a medium growth rate fire.  The wall-­‐mounted smoke detector in the gallery was 
evaluated for detection. The following assumptions are made for this scenario: 
 
Ambient temperature 20°C 
Room size  884 sq. ft. (82.3 sq. meters)  
Fire growth rate Medium 
Ceiling height 12 feet, 6 inches  (3.6  m)  with  three  
bays, each 24 inches deep 
 
Wall mounted smoke detector 30 inches (0.75 m) below ceiling 
Necessary temperature rise 7.2 °C 
 
Because the detector is wall mounted, the typical DETACT analysis is not 
appropriate.   Instead, CFAST was used to determine the amount of time until the 
smoke layer descended to the height of the detector.  The fire source was based on 
NIST tests of a HDPE trash can fire documented in figure 3-­‐1.101 of the SFPE Handbook 
(4th ed.). 
According to Table B.4.7.5.3 of NFPA 72, the temperature rise associated with 
the activation of an ionization detector from a synthetic fuel source would be 7.2 °C.  
CFAST was used to determine the length of time it would take for an upper layer of 
smoke to descend to the height of the smoke detector, 10 feet (3.0 m) above the floor and 
to be at a minimum of 27.2°C.    With a medium growth rate fire, the upper smoke layer 
would descend to 9.3 feet (2.8 m) above the floor at 50 seconds.  Even so, at that time 
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the temperature of the upper layer was estimated to only be 24 °C (assuming an 
ambient of 20°C). The  7.2 °C  increase  in  the  smoke  layer  temperature  was  not  
achieved  until approximately 65 seconds after ignition when the upper layer was 
estimated to have descended to 7.9 feet (2.4 m) above the floor.  At 50 seconds, the 
HRR was estimated to be 30 kW.  At 65 seconds, it would be approximately 50 kW. 	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Appendix F  
Sample FDS Input File 
Scenario 1 
The following is a sample of code used as an FDS5 input file to simulate Scenario 1 for a 
fire burning in stacked chairs in the main theater.  Because of the complexity of the file, 
only a partial sample is included.  The actual file’s more than 3,000 lines of obstruction 
definitions were removed along with other repetitive data. 
 
 
MainTheater3-spr.fds 
Generated by PyroSim - Version 2012.1.0605 
Apr 13, 2013 6:30:18 PM 
 
&HEAD CHID='MainTheater3-spr', TITLE='Main Theater Fire 3 Plastic Chairs-
sprinklered'/ 
 
&TIME T_END=300.0/ 
 
&DUMP RENDER_FILE='MainTheater3-spr.ge1', DT_RESTART=15.0/ 
 
&MESH ID='MESH', FYI='Outer Mesh', IJK=112,135,40, XB=0.0,22.5,0.0,29.0,0.0,9.0/ 
 
&REAC ID='POLYURETHANE', 
      FYI='NFPA Babrauskas', 
      C=6.3, 
      H=7.1, 
      O=2.1, 
      N=1.0, 
      SOOT_YIELD=0.1 
      CO_YIELD=0.05/ 
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&MISC CO_PRODUCTION = .TRUE. / 
---------------SPRINKLER LINES--------------- 
 
&PART ID='Water', 
      WATER=.TRUE., 
      AGE=60.0, 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=4.184, 
      MELTING_TEMPERATURE=0.0, 
      VAPORIZATION_TEMPERATURE=100.0, 
      HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION=2259.0/ 
 
&PROP ID='Default_Water Spray02', 
      QUANTITY='SPRINKLER LINK TEMPERATURE', 
      ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=74.0, 
      PART_ID='Water', 
      K_FACTOR=21.0, 
      OPERATING_PRESSURE=0.9, 
      DROPLET_VELOCITY=5.0/ 
 
PROP ID='Default_Water Spray', 
      QUANTITY='SPRINKLER LINK TEMPERATURE', 
      ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=74.0, 
      PART_ID='Water', 
      FLOW_RATE=1.0, 
      DROPLET_VELOCITY=5.0/ 
 
&DEVC ID='SPRK', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray02', XYZ=20.4,2.2,5.0, 
ORIENTATION=0.0,0.4,1.0/ 
 
&DEVC ID='SPRK02', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray02', XYZ=17.0,2.2,6.6, 
ORIENTATION=0.0,0.3,1.0/ 
 
Additional repeating sprinkler definition lines removed for brevity 
 
&DEVC ID='TIMER', QUANTITY='TIME', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0, SETPOINT=30.0, 
INITIAL_STATE=.TRUE./ 
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---------------MATERIAL PROPERTY LINES--------------- 
 
&MATL ID='CONCRETE', 
      FYI='NBSIR 88-3752 - ATF NIST Multi-Floor Validation', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.04, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=1.8, 
      DENSITY=2280.0/ 
 
&MATL ID='YELLOW PINE', 
      FYI='Quintiere, Fire Behavior - NIST NRC Validation', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=2.85, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.14, 
      DENSITY=640.0/ 
 
&MATL ID='PAPER', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.4, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.05, 
      DENSITY=85.0, 
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=1.6E4/ Material to represent insulation facing 
 
&MATL ID='FABRIC', 
      FYI='Covering for Upholstery', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.0, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.1, 
      DENSITY=100.0, 
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=2.0E4, 
      REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=280, 
      HEAT_OF_REACTION=1000, 
      N_REACTIONS=1, 
      NU_FUEL=1/ 
 
&MATL ID='FOAM', 
      FYI='Caution: Reaction Rate Not Validated, remaining data from Jukka Hietaniemi, 
et al., "FDS simulation of fire spread..."', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.0, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.05, 
      DENSITY=60.0, 
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=2.54E4, 
      N_REACTIONS=1, 
      HEAT_OF_REACTION=1250.0, 
      NU_FUEL=1.0, 
      REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=280.0/ 
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&MATL ID='GLASS', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=0.84, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=50.0, 
      DENSITY=2700.0/ 
 
&MATL ID='CURTAIN', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.0, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.1, 
      DENSITY=50.0, 
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=1.0E4, 
      HEAT_OF_REACTION=2500, 
      REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=400, 
      N_REACTIONS=1, 
      NU_FUEL=1/ Representing theatrical curtains.  Estimated values 
 
&MATL ID='HDPE', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=2.0, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.4, 
      DENSITY=750.0, 
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=3.5E4, 
      REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=350, 
      HEAT_OF_REACTION=1500, 
      NU_FUEL=1, 
      N_REACTIONS=1/ Representing plastic material for thermoplastic chairs.   
      Estimated values 
 
---------------SURF  LINES--------------- 
 
 
&SURF ID='CONCRETE', 
      COLOR='GRAY 80', 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='CONCRETE', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.2/ 
 
&SURF ID='WOOD', 
      RGB=51,51,0, 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='YELLOW PINE', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.01, 
      IGNITION_TEMPERATURE=250/ 
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&SURF ID='PAPER', 
      COLOR='GRAY 80', 
      BACKING='INSULATED', 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='PAPER', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.001/ Exposed facing of insulation on ceiling finish 
 
&SURF ID='UPHOLSTERY', 
      RGB=204,153,0, 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='FABRIC', 
      MATL_ID(2,1)='FOAM', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(2,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1:2)=0.003,0.1/ 
 
&SURF ID='GLASS', 
      COLOR='CYAN', 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='GLASS', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.005, 
      THICKNESS=.005/ 
 
&SURF ID='CURTAIN', 
      RGB=0,0,153, 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='CURTAIN', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.006/  Representing theatrical curtains.  Estimated values 
 
&SURF ID='BURNER', 
      COLOR='RED', 
      HRRPUA=1500.0, 
      TAU_Q=-60.0/ 
 
&SURF ID='PLASTIC', 
      RGB=0,204,51, 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='HDPE', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.01/ 
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---------------OBSTRUCTION LINES--------------- 
 
&OBST XB=18.75,19.0,24.25,24.5,0.0,0.5, SURF_ID='UPHOLSTERY'/ Upholstery 
&OBST XB=18.5,18.75,24.25,24.5,0.0,0.5, SURF_ID='UPHOLSTERY'/ Upholstery 
. 
. 
. 
Approximately 3,000 additional obstruction lines removed for brevity. 
 
---------------DOORWAY LINES--------------- 
 
&HOLE XB=7.0,7.9,20.225,20.625,2.5,4.5/ Doorway to N stage high storage 
&HOLE XB=10.3,10.9,1.5,2.25,10.2,10.6/ Hole 
 
 
---------------BURNER LINE--------------- 
 
&VENT SURF_ID='BURNER', XB=19.7,20.7,2.4,3.4,0.2,0.2, IOR=3, RGB=255,0,51/ 
Burner 
 
 
---------------OUTPUT LINES--------------- 
 
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING RATE'/ 
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE HEAT FLUX'/ 
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL TEMPERATURE'/ 
 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=10.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=13.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=20.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=2.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=4.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=12.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=18.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBZ=1.8/ 
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&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBX=10.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBX=13.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBX=20.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=2.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=4.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=18.5/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBZ=1.8/ 
 
&DEVC XYZ = 13.0, 1.9, 1.8,  ID='South6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 13.0, 1.9, 1.8,  ID='South6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 13.0, 1.9, 1.88, ID='South6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME 
FRACTION', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/ 
 
 
&DEVC XYZ = 10.0, 24.6, 1.8,  ID='North6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 10.0, 24.6, 1.8,  ID='North6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 10.0, 24.6, 1.8,  ID='North6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME 
FRACTION', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/ 
 
 
&DEVC XYZ = 6.5, 1.9, 5.5,  ID='Upper6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 6.5, 1.9, 5.5,  ID='Upper6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 6.5, 1.9, 5.5,  ID='Upper6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME FRACTION', 
SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/ 
 
&DEVC XYZ = 4.4, 12.0, 2.4,  ID='Stage6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 4.4, 12.0, 2.4,  ID='Stage6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 4.4, 12.0, 2.4,  ID='Stage6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME 
FRACTION', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/ 
 
 
&DEVC XYZ = 17.0, 2.9, 6.75,  ID='CeilingWestofPlume', QUANTITY= 
'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ = 20.2, 2.9, 5.3,  ID='CeilingatPlume', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
 
 
&TAIL / 
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